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Abstract. 
 
This thesis argues that there is structural dissonance in university-based initial 
early childhood teacher education programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and 
suggests a pedagogy of enacted hope as a countermeasure. In this thesis, 
structural dissonance is constructed as a form of structural violence, which is 
based on the contradiction between socioculturalism in the content of IECTE 
programmes and individualisation in the context in which they are provided.  
 
This theoretical thesis uses Richard Rorty’s (1979, 1982, 1989, 1999) neo-
pragmatic assumptions on truth, reality and knowledge to provide a coherent 
and consistent approach to the argument of structural dissonance and enacted 
hope. Distinctions between truth and justification, reality and appearance, 
found and made are rejected, and utility for social justice, language use, and an 
ironist approach to scholarship are adopted. 
 
This thesis uses philosophical hermeneutics as a methodology for interpreting 
the textual sources that make up the data drawn upon in this thesis. This 
methodology is linked to interpretive scholarship, research bricolage, and the 
constructivist paradigm in qualitative research. The methods used in this thesis 
  
 
 
are an ecological hermeneutic, ideal type method (converted into an 
interpretive method of textual analysis) and focus groups of student teachers. 
 
This thesis constructed two ideal types. The ideal type for socioculturalism is 
used to argue that the content of IECTE programmes is heavily influenced by 
socioculturalism. The ideal type for individualisation is used to argue that the 
context in which IECTE programmes are provided reproduces 
individualisation. Socioculturalism and individualisation are shown to be 
dissonant in the structure of a case IECTE programme in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand resulting in a situation of structural dissonance.  
 
A pedagogy of enacted hope is then proposed to counteract structural 
dissonance in the case study IECTE programme in Aotearoa/New Zealand. This 
pedagogy is constructed using a theory of hope developed through the 
integration of Ernst Bloch’s (1986) philosophy of hope, Rortyan philosophical 
assumptions and enactivist learning theory. Implications of using the pedagogy 
of enacted hope are then discussed in relation to the problem of structural 
dissonance.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
Early childhood education has a history emblazoned with hope and the 
struggle against injustice (Cannella, 1997). Given this rich history there is little 
reason to believe that the future of early childhood education would not consist 
of further attempts to construct socially justice in the practices and study of 
early childhood education. Contemporary writers in early childhood studies 
have fought against injustice for children in the hope of extending citizenry 
rights to the very young (e.g., May, 2004; Smith, 1996, 2007; Te One, 2008, 2009). 
Authors like Ritchie (1994, 1996, 2003) and Stewart and Rawhiti (2004) have 
written against cultural injustice in the hope that all cultural groups will have a 
voice in early childhood settings. And others have struggled against 
dominating discourses in the hope that alternative stories might be given equal 
attention (e.g. Cannella, 1997; Dahlberg & Moss, 2005; MacNaughton, 2005; 
Prochner, 2004).  
 
Teacher education in Aotearoa/New Zealand had been provided in Teacher’s 
Colleges or Colleges of Education since the early decades of the twentieth 
century (Partington, 1997). Early childhood education got its first diploma level 
qualification in 1988 after a hard fought campaign that stretched decades (May, 
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2009). The struggle of the courageous women and men who battled prejudice, 
lack of funding and inequality to realise their hopes is not only inspiring, it is a 
case in point about how this thesis interprets hope as a concept: as looking 
forward to a better future and acting on the possibility of its realisation. Within 
this frame, initial early childhood education is an example of fulfilled hopes, as 
well as a site for ongoing struggle.  
 
 
The introduction of sociocultural narrative into the policy, practices and 
reflections of state qualified teachers throughout New Zealand is another 
example of the struggle for social justice: of hope in action. Throughout the 
drafting of New Zealand’s first early childhood curriculum statement the hope 
for a better future was present (e.g., Carr, May & Mitchell, 1991; Carr & May, 
1993). This hope continued through out the consultation process, and into the 
final version, though as a somewhat watered down form of the original 
intention (Te One, 2003). The subsequent struggle to gain a degree programme, 
mentor students in Masters and PhD programmes, and influence government 
policy (May, 2009) are further examples of hope in action: of realisation through 
intrepid action and passionate commitment. 
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There are currently 21 initial early childhood teacher education (IECTE) 
providers in New Zealand, 7 of which are universities (Ministry of Education, 
2011).  This thesis is written within a context where statefunded Teacher’s 
Colleges have merged with Universities, those mergers occured between 1996 
and 2007. By focusing on university based IECTE programmes, this thesis 
studies post-merger universities, and therefore only a small sector within 
teacher education providers. This thesis focuses specifically on Bachelor of 
Education (BEd) programmes, as opposed to including the Diploma, Post-
graduate Diploma and Bachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Teaching programmes that 
were also provided in some university settings. Delineating IECTE programmes 
in this way allowed this research to focus on a qualification that was common 
across all universities, though it should be recognised that IECTE programmes 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand are diverse both in terms of the qualifications on 
offer as well as the method delivery (e.g., centre-based, campus-based, online). 
 
Within this context, passionate teacher educators continue to encourage and 
inspire new generations of early childhood teachers, in addition to producing 
high quality research in numerous fields of inquiry (Strathdee, 2005). The role 
of teacher educators as purveyors of hope and inspiration is never in question 
throughout this thesis. The arguments set forth are not premised on an absence 
of hope, but rather on the hope that there is still something more that can be 
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said in the struggle for social justice. This thesis is based on the assumption that 
the historical journey of early childhood education is by no means complete.  
 
This thesis takes a theoretical approach to identify structural dissonance in 
IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand and suggests a pedagogy of 
enacted hope in IECTE as a way of counteracting that dissonance. This thesis 
draws on multiple theoretical perspectives and uses neo-pragmatic 
assumptions to provide a new perspective in the ongoing conversation of social 
justice and socially just pedagogy in IECTE programmes. The central motif of 
this thesis is borrowed from peace education: It is the assumption that there 
needs to be consistency between what is being taught, and how it is being taught 
(Collinge, 1994). This thesis proposes that the content of IECTE programmes is 
contradicted by the context in which those programmes are delivered (there is 
dissonance between what and how), that that dissonance occurs in the structure 
of IECTE programmes, and that the IECTE pedagogy proposed herein offers a 
means for transforming that situation.  
 
This thesis highlights structural dissonance between the sociocultural content of 
IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/ New Zealand and the reproduction of 
individualisation within them. University based IECTE programmes are 
considered in this thesis and the term structural dissonance is applied to these 
other programmes as well due to the requirement that all programmes meet the 
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same Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 2007), and in doing so 
they are likely to be similar in a variety of ways (this is discussed in depth in 
chapters six and seven). Chapter two introduces the concept of structural 
dissonance and aligns it with the broader category of structural violence (social 
injustice). The critical (critique) part of this thesis identifies structural 
dissonance in an IECTE programme. This critical argument is advanced in part 
three (chapters five to eight). The reconstructive part of this thesis constructs a 
pedagogy of enacted hope and identifies some possibilities for application of 
this pedagogy in IECTE programmes. The reconstructive argument is advanced 
in part four (chapters nine and ten). The concepts used in developing this 
argument are initially explained below, and in greater detail in corresponding 
chapters. 
 
This primarily theoretical thesis has been constructed with the aim of 
reconceptualising IECTE programmes to promote social justice. Social justice is 
the practice creating equitable relationships between human beings in social 
spaces, and between human beings and the social spaces they inhabit. One way 
of looking at reconceptualisation for social justice is as a practice of changing 
vocabularies to highlight injustices that have not-yet been considered in 
scholarship or discourse, so that new perspectives on social justice can be 
formed (e.g., Freire, 1970; Te One, 2009; Viruru, 2001). This thesis constructs a 
discourse of structural dissonance and counteracts it with a pedagogy of enacted 
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hope. Both are new ideas within the fields of early childhood studies and IECTE. 
This thesis constructs these ideas and then applies them to IECTE programmes 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
 
Reconceptualisation for social justice is not a new endeavour in early childhood 
studies. For example, Cannella (1997) pointed out that the concept of childhood 
is monocultural in developmental discourses, Viruru (2001) pointed out that 
contemporary images of the child are by and large mono-cultural; and 
Dahlberg and Moss (2005) pointed out that border-crossing (cross disciplinary 
scholarship) is necessary to keep the conversation of early childhood and its 
goals flowing. This thesis joins in this conversation by offering a new way of 
looking at structural issues in IECTE, focusing on student teachers and their 
education. A related aim in writing this is to construct a theoretically consistent 
perspective that can be used to inform future research into teacher education 
and social justice. 
 
This thesis uses Richard Rorty’s (1979, 1982, 1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1998a, 1998b, 
1999, 2007) philosophical assumptions to underpin the methodology used, the 
structure of the argument advanced, the analysis given and to organise the 
internal coherence of the chapters and parts of this thesis. A more specific 
introduction of those assumptions will be given below, however, it is important 
to note at the outset, that this philosophical perspective offers an innovative 
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approach to early childhood studies that few scholars have taken up. Most 
noticeable of those that have are Dahlberg, Moss and Pence (1999) and Walsh 
(1993) who mentioned Rorty’s contingency based approach to knowledge 
formation, and McArdle and McWilliam (2005) who mentioned Rorty’s (1989) 
figure of the ironist in educational research. This thesis uses Rortyan 
assumptions as the lynch pin of its approach in a sustained effort of 
reconceptualisation: Both critical and reconstructive. 
 
This thesis answers three questions. How is there structural dissonance in 
IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand? How might structural 
dissonance be counteracted in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand? 
How can a neo-pragmatic research design be used to answer questions one and 
two? The following section introduces the four parts of this thesis and explains 
their function in terms of answering each of the thesis questions. 
 
1.1 Thesis overview 
Structurally, this is a thesis of four parts: Introduction; philosophy and 
methodology; critique; and reconstruction. This thesis is an example of a 
scholarship of integration. Scholarship of integration entails ‚making 
connections across the disciplines, placing the specialities in larger context, 
illuminating data in a revealing way, often educating non-specialists, too‛ 
(Boyer, 1990, p. 18). Dahlberg, Moss and Pence (1999) have called this border 
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crossing. This thesis integrates IECTE discourses with discourses of structural 
dissonance, Rortyan philosophy, individualisation theory, and enacted hope. 
The integration of these perspectives opens spaces for further 
reconceptualisation of IECTE in terms of resisting injustice and encouraging 
social justice. 
 
Part one offers an introduction to the focus of this thesis, an explanation of the 
first two research questions, introduction to the concepts of structural 
dissonance, moral hope and reconceptualist in early childhood studies.  
 
Part two is made up of a chapter outlining the neo-pragmatic assumptions used 
to answer the third research question, and a chapter that translates the 
commitment to neo-pragmatism into a research methodology and which 
introduces the particular research methods used in this thesis. The chapter on 
neo-pragmatism introduces assumptions of anti-essentialism and anti-
foundationalism expressed in the writing of American philosopher Richard 
Rorty (1979, 1982, 1989, 1999, 2007), and aligns this thesis with an ironist 
approach to scholarship, wherein writers take a sceptical approach to both 
certainty and the vocabularies commonly used to frame contemporary issues, 
e.g., Beck, 1992; Bloch, 1986; Kuhn, 1962; McArdle & McWilliam, 2005).  
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This thesis uses the term Rortyan assumptions to convey the distinguishing 
features of Rorty’s philosophical position: Anti-foundationalism and anti-
essentialism (Rorty, 1979, 1982, 1989, 1999, 2007). Anti-foundationalism is the 
idea that there is no useful distinction to be made between truth and 
justification, rather, there are only ‚sentences‛ (Rorty, 1999, p. 54) that are more 
or less useful for fulfilling the requirements of particular purposes and for 
particular communities. Truth, from a Rortyan (1989) perspective, is therefore a 
contingency of time, place, habits and language use. For this reason, there is 
little need to search for any unconditional quality called Truth because no such 
quality exists outside of the fashionable use of certain sentences in the place of 
others (e.g., we no longer think it useful to use a theological vocabulary to 
describe the rising sun, we have developed up a new vocabulary for that 
purpose). Ceasing the need to accurately represent reality offers constructivist 
theses the opportunity to suggest new metaphors with the aim of convincing 
others of their utility value.  
 
In Rorty’s thinking, anti-essentialism rejects the distinction between found and 
made, and the distinction between reality and appearances. From this perspective 
there is no essence of things that can be found by privileged methodologies (e.g., 
scientific method and the presumption of validity), nor is there an essence of 
the way things really are against which we can measure what appears before us. 
Instead there are simply more and less successful metaphors used to describe 
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those things that are important to us. Metaphors, if successful, are literalised 
insofar as they are shared by a majority of the people in a given community 
(Rorty, 1982). Less successful metaphors are either those that have been passed 
over or those which have not-yet been picked up and literalised. Anti-
essentialism grants hermeneutic methodologies a philosophical rationale as it 
encourages new edifices of knowledge (Rorty, 1979, p. 359) constructed in the 
service of making the familiar appear strange.  
 
These philosophical assumptions are important not only because they underpin 
the construction of knowledge claims made in this thesis, but also because they 
direct the methodologies used to construct that knowledge. Chapter four 
introduces an ecological interpretation of Gadamerian philosophical 
hermeneutics (Gadamer, 1975) as a method and methodology for creating an 
integrative (Boyer, 1990) bricolage (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005) that is consistent 
with those neo-pragmatic assumptions. This chapter also introduces a version 
of Weber’s (1949) ideal type method which is used as an analytic tool in part 
three of this thesis, and the focus group method used in the same part to 
provide empirical evidence in support of the argument of structural dissonance, 
as well as to counter the claim that the thesis argument works in theory but 
lacks empirical evidence. Ideal type theory idealises social and theoretical 
phenomena and converts those idealisations into research tools that can then be 
used to interpret the appearance or non-appearance of those phenomena in a 
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given research setting. Ideal types for socioculturalism (chapter 5) and 
individualisation (chapter 7) are constructed in part three. 
 
The term socioculturalism is used here to stand for a collection of sociocultural 
perspectives that are used to explain development and learning. The suffix –ism 
is used to denote a connection of related ideas (e.g., the word Buddhism covers 
Theravada, Mahayana, Vajrayana, Navayana and variations within each of 
these themes). This thesis applies the suffix –ism to sociocultural in order to 
construct a general ideal type that can be used as an analytic tool in part three. 
As a term, socioculturalism is a pluralistic conglomeration of approaches to 
development and learning that are widely considered to be sociocultural (e.g., 
Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990; Vygotsky, 1978). 
 
This thesis uses a hermeneutic methodology based on Gadamer’s (1975) 
assertion that all understanding consists of the pre-understandings or tradition 
to which the inquirer belongs, the object (e.g., text, picture, discourse) that is 
being understood and the application to which the act of understanding is 
aimed. The fusion of these concerns guides the methodology of this thesis. In 
chapter four, an ecological hermeneutics is developed by blending 
Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) metaphor of nested contexts (i.e., the micro-system sits 
within the macro-system, the macro- sits within the exo- etc) with the 
hermeneutic circle as a method for organising analysis. The hermeneutic circle 
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is the practice of relating particular instances to general accounts (Hoy, 1978), 
parts to the whole (Heidegger, 1962), and questions to answers (Gadamer, 
1975). The concept of ecological hermeneutics developed in this thesis uses the 
metaphor of nested contexts to organise analysis from the general to the 
specific. For example, chapter 7 on individualisation in the context of the case 
study IECTE programme analyses the broad socio-historical context, 
government policy, external regulatory bodies (e.g., the New Zealand Teachers 
Council), university regulations, course outlines and the feedback from focus 
groups in order to show individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
 
Part three of this thesis contains chapters five to eight. This is the phase of the 
thesis in which the case for structural dissonance is put and where justifications 
are offered in answer to the first research question. Chapter five establishes an 
ideal type for socioculturalism based on primary sources in socio-cultural 
theory (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990, 2003; Vygotsky, 1978, 1986; 
Wertsch, 1998). That ideal type model comprises the following dimensions: 
participation, co-construction, situatedness and community. In chapter six this 
ideal type is used to show that although IECTE programmes draw on a number 
of theoretical assumptions, the content of courses, in terms of theoretical 
perspective, curriculum, teaching competencies, course objectives and 
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pedagogical work (the assessed component of individual courses) draws 
heavily on socioculturalism. 
 
Chapter seven constructs an ideal type for individualisation theory using the 
work of Bauman (2001), Beck (1992) and Beck-Gernsheim (2002). That ideal type 
consists of the following dimensions: Disembedding, standardisation, 
institutional dependency and social fragmentation. Those components are 
explained in the first part of the chapter and applied to the regulatory context of 
IECTE programmes in the second. That chapter provides justification for the 
claim that the context of IECTE programmes reproduces individualisation as 
structural element in which the content of those programmes is delivered. The 
final chapter of this part answers the question: how is there structural 
dissonance in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand? In this chapter 
the notion of structural dissonance, worked out in chapter two, is applied to the 
data created in chapters five to seven. The discourses of socioculturalism and 
individualisation are shown to be dissonant and an ecological examination of 
that dissonance in the structure of IECTE programmes is presented.  
 
For the most part, this primarily theoretical thesis uses textual data sources, 
however, in an effort to include an empirical element to this thesis, four focus 
groups of second and third year students were sought at a case study 
university. The responses of these students were transcribed and analysed 
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using the ideal type models and are reported in chapters six, seven and eight. 
Generally speaking, the students from the four focus groups voiced a concern 
about the contradiction between the sociocultural content of their courses and a 
context reproduced a culture of individualisation (students highlighted 
elements of the ideal type rather than referring to Beck’s (1992) 
individualisation theory directly). The evidence provided by these student 
teachers adds empirical strength to the theoretical and text based approach 
taken in the other parts of this thesis.  
 
The final part of this thesis contains two reconstructive chapters followed by a 
concluding chapter that reflects on the thesis and its findings. In order to 
counteract structural dissonance in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand this thesis suggests a pedagogy of enacted hope. This pedagogy is 
constructed by applying a philosophy of hope to enactivist learning theory. The 
philosophy of hope is constructed in chapter nine through an integration of 
German philosopher Ernst Bloch’s (1986) hermeneutic of hope with the Rortyan 
assumptions that underpin this thesis. The philosophy of hope worked out in 
chapter nine is then fused with enactivist learning theory in chapter ten (Davis, 
1996; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). This fusion is arguably a novel, and 
theoretically coherent, approach to solving the problem of structural dissonance 
through the reconceptualisation of IECTE pedagogical practices. Implications of 
taking this approach are then discussed before finishing with an indication of 
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what a pedagogy of enacted hope in early childhood teacher education might 
look like in practice.  
 
The final part of this thesis is an exercise in utopian thought or blue skies 
thinking. It aims to make new inroads into what is possible for the construction 
of socially just learning spaces in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand. According to Dahlberg and Moss (1999, p. 179): 
 
Utopian thought both provokes and enables radical critique of the status quo – 
through ‘confrontation by imagination of whatever exists’. And it gives 
direction for future change, by ‘the exploration by imagination of new modes of 
human possibility’ that enable us to reinvent the future. It both deconstructs the 
present and reconstructs the future. It provides a provocation to politics, both 
major and minor [though not only politics], through the act of thinking 
differently (Dahlberg & Moss, 1999, p. 179). 
 
This thesis offers a radical critique of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand based on the argument that structural dissonance exists between the 
content and context of those programmes. It also offers a radical solution to that 
problem through the suggestion of a pedagogy of enacted hope. Arguably the 
major contribution of this thesis is in the philosophical coherence of each of its 
parts, the approach taken to the formation of critique and solution, and the 
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breadth of the evidence produced from textual sources along with focus group 
data. 
 
In 2004, the New Zealand Teacher’s Council and the New Zealand Ministry of 
Education co-published a literature review entitled Research on Initial Teacher 
Education in New Zealand: 1993-2004: Cameron & Baker (2004). This was the first 
systematic overview of initial teacher education undertaken in New Zealand 
(Cameron & Baker, 2004). The intention of this literature review was to ‚inform 
future policy and practice and identify key areas for further research‛ 
(Cameron & Baker, 2004, p. 3). The key findings of this review were that there 
were few research projects that follow a theme through to create new 
knowledge; that research is ‚over reliant on surveys and questionnaires‛; and 
that there was a clear lack of research studying teacher education programmes 
carried out at specialised teacher education facilities (Cameron & Baker, 2004, p. 
68). This thesis is firmly located as an attempt to meet those stated needs whilst 
continuing the theme of struggling against injustice in the hope that more 
socially just and peaceful educational environments might be constructed. 
 
My own hope for IECTE and early childhood studies is that scholars will 
continue to reconceptualise the field with new ideas and fresh integrations of 
perspectives constructed for the consideration of others.  This thesis is one more 
attempt at keeping that conversation alive in the hope that we will find ever 
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more useful ways of talking about what we do as teacher educators, and that 
future audiences will be encouraged to translate our commitments into practice, 
in the ongoing project of making the world a more just, more peaceful place. 
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Chapter Two 
 Structural Dissonance, Moral Hope and 
Reconceptualisation 
 
This chapter introduces the concept of structural dissonance and links it to the 
concept of structural violence from the field of peace studies. Structural 
dissonance is a concept constructed in this thesis to describe contradiction 
within institutional contexts. The concept of structural dissonance developed is 
used in part three of this thesis to formulate a critical perspective on IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and in part four as an impetus for 
further reconceptualisation.   
 
The second section of this chapter uses Bauman’s (1993) understanding of 
morality to construct a moral argument for transforming structural dissonance 
into more peaceful and just organisational structures. This thesis adopts the 
assumption that morality entails identifying with the plight of others and acting 
to make life better (that is, more just and more peaceful) for them. This section 
introduces the rationale used to justify reconstruction in the fourth part of this 
thesis as well as advancing the argument that it is morally useful to challenge 
injustice. 
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In the final section of this chapter reconceptualisation is introduced as an 
important part of the methodology used in this thesis. Consideration of 
reconceptualisation in early childhood studies is included in this chapter to 
introduce the particular form of scholarship that is being undertaken. This 
chapter introduces a general and specific use of the term reconceptualisation in 
the field of early childhood studies in order to identify the tradition to which 
this thesis belongs. 
 
2.1 Structural Dissonance 
 
This section integrates theories of dissonance from music and social psychology 
with Galtung’s (1996) theory of structural violence to construct the concept of 
structural dissonance. The term structural dissonance is a softening of the term 
structural violence: Injustice perpetuated by organised social 
structures/institutions. By softening the term violence to dissonance I aim to make 
the concept of structural violence more palatable to early childhood educators 
whilst at the same time extending Galtung’s (1996) original formulation to 
include contradiction. 
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2.1.1 Dissonance: Integrating music theory and social psychology. 
Synonyms for dissonance include clash, conflict, discord, disharmony, 
contradiction, and tension. There are also colloquial phrases that approximate 
the meaning of dissonance, for example up the booai, all over the show, and out 
of whack. There are also ways of describing the production of dissonance in 
language, e.g., speaking with a forked tongue, do as I say and not as I do, and 
the devil is in the detail.  
 
As a background to the concept of structural dissonance this section draws on 
two particular uses of the word dissonance, derived from music theory and 
social psychology. Constructing meaning in this way is consistent with 
Dahlberg & Moss’s (2005) idea of border crossing (using diverse perspectives to 
form new understandings) as will be explained in section 2.2. The disciplines 
chosen for this construction offer insight into specific uses of the word 
dissonance as a theoretical concept within two fields that do not necessarily 
intersect. By drawing these theoretical perspectives together this thesis 
constructs an ideal type upon which the notion structural dissonance can be 
posited as an innovative framework for the study of structural violence in 
IECTE programmes.  
 
In music theory, dissonance occurs when two or more notes combine to make a 
sound that is disharmonious, that is, they clash. For example, Hodges (2007) 
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observed that dissonant notes give one a feeling that the notes want to turn into 
something else, ‚it is almost as if you have caught them in mid-metamorphosis‛ 
(para 5). Similarly, for Hanson (2000) dissonance is a ‚tension that leads to 
release‛ (para 5) and may be vertical or horizontal; vertical in terms of 
discordant notes played together, and horizontal in terms of discordant notes 
played beside one another in sequence. Hanson (2000) observed further that 
dissonance adds dramatic intensity to music, but that it is an intensity that 
longs to be overcome. Dissonance therefore has a negative side (the side of 
disharmony), but it also has a positive side, the side that inspires counteraction.  
 
Other writers in music theory identify further types of dissonance. For example, 
Terhardt (1974) stated that dissonance is created through competing pitches; 
which begged the question of co-operating pitch. Cazdin (1980) noted that 
dissonance occurs when listeners’ expectations of what should occur are 
violated; which begged the question of harmonising expectations and 
occurrences. And Rogers (2001) explored the idea that musical theories of 
dissonance could inform other aspects of culture by identifying a link between 
the musical writing of Theodore W. Adorno (2002) and critical social theory. 
These writers are similar in their assertion that dissonance is important as a 
concept of disharmony, but also that it is a disharmony that leads somewhere 
(toward harmony or consonance).  In music theory, dissonance is a 
contradiction that has its uses in the broader design of the entire composition. 
  
23 
 
This is a useful metaphor for the concept of structural dissonance because it 
potentially leads to the question of what can be done. It is a metaphor that links 
parts three and four of this project. 
 
The notion of dissonance has been used in several different approaches to 
psychology (e.g., Piaget’s (1926) idea of cognitive conflict or disequilibrium 
which leads organisms to seek equilibrium through strategies of assimilation 
and/or accommodation, and Freud’s (1927) notion of dissonance between id 
and superego as a causal factor in neurosis). This thesis uses the concept of 
cognitive dissonance constructed by social psychologist Leon Festinger in 1957 
to inform the notion of structural dissonance because it makes a useful 
statement on how people act in contradictory ways when faced with dissonant 
situations. 
 
Cognitive dissonance ‚exists when related cognitions are inconsistent – that is, 
when they contradict each other‛ (Weiten, 1998). Festinger (1957) proposed that 
when subjects face inconsistencies in their attitudes, beliefs and experiences 
they will be motivated to reduce the tension by altering their own beliefs to suit 
the situation. Examples of dissonant cognitions include statements like the 
following: ‘I love children but I can’t stand being near them’; or, ‘I consider 
myself a Vygotskian but the zone of proximal development makes no sense to 
me’. In each case there is a tension to be overcome. Cialdini, Trost, and Newsom 
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(1995) observed that there is wide variation in what people find dissonant, the 
intensity of the tension perceived, and the need for consistency itself. Studies 
like Croyle and Cooper (1983) and Elliot and Devine (1994) also support 
Festinger’s claim that discomfort is aroused in dissonant situations and that 
subjects are motivated to reduce that tension.  
 
In their classic study of cognitive dissonance Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) 
tested and corroborated two of Festinger’s (1957) key theses: 
 
1. If a person is induced to do or say something which is contrary to his private 
opinion, there will be a tendency for him to change his opinion so as to bring it 
into correspondence with what he has done or said. 
 
2. The larger the pressure used to elicit the overt behaviour (beyond the 
minimum needed to elicit it) the weaker will be the above-mentioned tendency 
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959, p. 210). 
 
Cognitive dissonance is closely linked to socialisation, and dissonant situations 
or contexts can prompt a change in both attitude and behaviour. Festinger’s 
(1957) work showed that people faced with dissonant situations would change 
their perspective on a given subject in order to reduce the dissonance they 
experience (Piaget called this adaptation). Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) 
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showed that dissonance exerts a subtle influence on attitude and behaviour that 
often goes undetected by those affected. The idea that dissonance has the power 
to subvert authentic expression or undermine congruence in persons is one that 
points to a potentially sinister aspect to this concept. For this reason, it is a 
useful perspective to take into the following discussion on structural 
dissonance.  
 
Musical dissonance and cognitive dissonance share at least two common 
features noted here, they are catalysts for corrective action and they can have 
deeper meaning when placed into a wider context (e.g., the entire score in the 
case of music, or social reproduction in the case of cognition). These features 
will be revisited in section 2.1.3 after the introduction of Galtung’s (1996) notion 
of structural violence (from which the word structural is borrowed in the 
concept of structural dissonance). 
 
2.1.2 Structural violence 
This section uses insights from the discipline of peace studies to provide a 
definition of structural violence as the parent concept for structural dissonance. 
Authors such as Dayan (2005, 2008) and Ridgeway & Surman (2004), have 
borrowed from political and psychological vocabularies to make similar points 
about contradiction in the field of teacher education.  
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2.1.2.1 Galtung’s notion of structural violence 
Norwegian peace theorist and writer Johan Galtung (1990, 1996, 2004) described 
three types of violence that are used by many in the field of peace studies and 
peace education as the touchstone for definitions of violence (e.g., Barash & 
Webel, 2002; O’Connell, 1999; Smoker, Davis & Munske, 1990; Wulf, 1992). 
Structural violence is the name Galtung gave to one part of this triadic 
conception, the others being direct violence and cultural violence. 
 
In his threefold typology Galtung (1990, 1996, 2004) described narrow or direct 
violence as the most visible form of violence, e.g. physical violence entailing the 
aim of ‚somatic incapacitation, or deprivation of health done (with killing as 
the extreme form) at the hands of an actor [or actors] who intend this to be the 
consequence‛ (Galtung, 1990, p. 9). Other examples of direct violence include 
bullying, assault, rape, and murder, though physical intimidation and neglect 
might also be added to this by no means exhaustive list.   
 
Structural or indirect violence is a form of violence that occurs where there is no 
visible, physical actor intending violent consequences. Rather, it is a violence 
which ‚comes from the social context itself‛ (Galtung, 1996, p. 2). Galtung 
(1996) identified two forms of structural violence: repression and domination. 
Repression results in the inability to enact personal rights to equality or the 
inability to participate fully in the construction of one’s social/institutional 
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context. For example, in New Zealand the Native Schools Act (1867) outlawed 
the use of Māori language in schools, with the goal of assimilating Māori 
culture into European culture (MacFarlane, 2000).  
 
Structural domination occurs when organisational/institutional structures rule 
over (that is, dominates) a person or people. The topic of domination is no 
stranger to early childhood education literature, particularly in terms of 
teachers exercising their dominion over children (e.g., Boutte, 2008; Cannela, 
1997; MacNaughton, 2005), or governments exercising dominion over early 
childhood services (e.g., May, 2001, 2009). Structural domination may be 
intentional or non-intentional, but is a symptom of social and institutional 
structures rather than the intentions of individual actors, though the two may 
not necessarily be mutually exlusive. It is argued later in this thesis that the 
structural context of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand reproduces 
individualisation. This is a problem when the theoretical content of those 
courses is sociocultural, as it creates a situation of structural dissonance.  
 
Galtung’s (1996) third type of violence is cultural violence, which is ‚violence 
that makes direct and structural violence look, even feel, right – or at least not 
wrong‛ (p. 196). Examples of cultural violence, include the notion of a just war, 
capital punishment for heinous crime, and arguments for the right of parents to 
strike their children. Examples of cultural violence as it pertains to structural 
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violence include the exploitation of child workers in developing countries, the 
repression of minority concerns in a democratic system of government, and, as 
this thesis adds, the invisibility of individualisation and the subsequent 
structural dissonance in IECTE programmes. 
 
2.1.2.2 Symbolic violence 
In their book Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, Bourdieu and 
Passeron (1990) identified pedagogical action (educational practice in social 
institutions) as a form of ‚symbolic violence insofar as it is the imposition of a 
cultural arbitrary by an arbitrary power‛ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p. 5). 
From this perspective, symbolic violence occurs where-ever educational subject 
matter (e.g., university papers) is provided as a mandatory component of a non-
arbitrary system of education (e.g., approved teacher education programmes). 
To translate this further: Where particular papers are compulsory for particular 
courses (e.g., in BEd programmes), and where the content of those papers is 
decided by some power outside of the student, then, at least according to 
Bourdieu and Passeron (1990), symbolic violence is present.  
 
Symbolic violence extends from the symbolically powerful to the symbolically 
weak (i.e., from those who have the power to define to those who are beholden 
to pick up those definitions). For instance: From universities to individual 
student teachers, from school teachers to pupils, from older siblings to younger 
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siblings. Thus, from Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1990) perspective, IECTE is 
necessarily symbolically violent as it involves the imposition of institutionalised 
rules and regulations upon individual student teachers (for example, student 
contracts, graduating teacher standards, prescribed/proscribed courses, reading 
lists and assessments).  
 
This view of violence adds to Galtung’s (1996) triadic notion by honing in on 
the question of who has the power to make meanings? And how is that power made 
invisible through the reproduction of mandatory inequalities? Mandatory inequalities 
are inequalities that seem reasonable given the structure of the institution, and 
the structure of the rules by which it is regulated, and by which it regulates its 
own affairs. The idea that violence can be perpetrated in symbolic relationships 
(e.g., between the university as training provider and student teachers as 
dependent trainees) raises the suspicion that structural dissonance may appear 
mandatory, and therefore go unchallenged. 
 
In the context of university education, Bourdieu and Passeron (1990) use terms 
such as pedagogical authority and pedagogic work. Pedagogical authority is the 
legitimate authority that has the right to define both the context and content of 
courses, and as such, reinforces the mandate of the arbitrary power (Bourdieu & 
Passeron, 1990, p. 13). For example, imagine yourself as a student teacher about 
to begin your training. You have already undergone a selection process, you 
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receive a list of compulsory courses complete with a timetable, at the first 
lecture you receive a course outline containing required readings, non-
negotiable regulations (e.g. late work penalties) and assessment details (e.g. 
content, word count and due date). Using Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1990) 
perspective, you have just come under the influence of pedagogical authority. 
 
Pedagogic work is ‚a process of inculcation which must last long enough to 
produce a durable training, i.e. a habitus‛ (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p. 31). A 
habitus is a naturalised way of acting. A habitus combines experience and 
context and means the same as a person’s worldview or perspective, though the 
contents of the habitus are not always explicit but exist as undisclosed 
assumptions. Habitus can also refer to a desired perspective set out by 
institutional authorities. For example, the desired habitus for early childhood 
teachers is contained in the Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 
2007) and it is a regulated requirement that all early childhood training 
providers have courses approved to meet those standards (NZ Teachers 
Council, 2010). Pedagogic work produces assessable objects by which 
inculcation into the desired habitus can be ascertained. Pedagogic work consists 
of all work undertaken by students in their relationship with the university, e.g. 
attending lectures, tutorials, studio times, contribution to discussions, 
assignments and teaching practicum.  
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Bourdieu and Passeron’s (1990) perspective adds a symbolic element to the 
notion of structure set out by Galtung (1996). That symbolic element informs 
this thesis by drawing attention to the seemingly non-arbitrary regulations and 
relationships within universities as social institutions. The next section uses the 
previous work on dissonance and fuses it with these insights into structural 
violence. 
 
2.1.3 Structural Dissonance 
Structural dissonance is a term constructed to help achieve the aims of this 
thesis, for describing contradictory elements within institutional structures. 
Recalling that dissonance is synonymous with disharmony and contradiction, 
structural dissonance means contradiction within institutional settings. The 
concept of structural dissonance is intended as a subset of Galtung’s (1996) 
depiction of structural violence. It draws on the notion of symbolic violence in 
the sense that the contradiction within the institutional setting appears to be 
non-arbitrary and therefore a normal facet of institutional life. This thesis aims 
to make a particular form of structural dissonance visible and arbitrary. That 
work is carried out, for the most part, in part three of this thesis.  
 
This thesis studies the contradiction between the content of IECTE programmes 
in Aotearoa/New Zealand and the context in which they are provided. The 
argument set out in this thesis is that there is a contradiction between what is 
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being taught to student teachers and how it is being taught. This, given the non-
arbitrary nature of both content and context in IECTE programmes is framed as 
a form of structural violence, but softened to the structural dissonance between 
content and context. Specifically, it is the contradiction between a 
socioculturally based content and a context that reproduces individualisation. 
Chapters five to eight unpack this dissonant relationship using ideal types and 
ecological hermeneutics, providing numerous justifications from multiple levels 
of the dissonant relationship. 
 
Structural dissonance is linked to structural violence insofar as it perpetuates 
the inability of student teachers to challenge and change the context in which 
they are educated: repression (Galtung, 1996). On the other hand, the non-
arbitrary design of the training programmes offers no chance for students to co-
construct the curriculum, it is compulsory, pre-formed and externally 
regulated: domination (Galtung, 1996). Along these lines, the compulsory 
pedagogical work entrenches pedagogical authority by making participation 
and submission to authority a non-negotiable element of the programme 
structure.  
 
Galtung’s (1990, 1996, 2004) work on violence is used mainly as a justification 
supporting efforts that work toward peace. Similarly, Bourdieu and Passeron’s 
(1990) work on symbolic violence carries with it the will to recognise hidden 
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structures of symbolic power, in the hope that more socially just alternatives 
can be created. The first part of this chapter also showed how dissonance is a 
means for eliciting transformation (in music and in cognition). The concept of 
structural dissonance therefore opens out to the possibility of solutions, the 
impetus for which this thesis defines as moral hope.  
 
2.2 Moral hope  
          
Moral hope is a shorthand term for the notion that one of the best things we 
humans can do is enact our responsibility toward others by making their life 
better (more peaceful and more just). This assumption will be discussed in the 
next chapter. This section advances the argument that is useful to introduce the 
particular notion of morality used in this thesis as a catalyst for re-
conceptualisation: As a general background justification for the assumption 
that, given the claim of structural dissonance in IECTE, there is still the 
possibility that something can be done. Part four of this thesis is therefore an 
exercise in moral hope. 
 
2.2.1 What is morality from Bauman’s (1993) perspective? 
Bauman (1993) used Levinas’ (1998) notion of being for rather than with the 
Other. The Other, in this case, means beings other than the individual self. By 
  
34 
 
way of this definition, Bauman (1993) defined traditional ethics as rule-bound 
socially constructed codifications. By this account traditional ethics (e.g., Kant, 
1785), are both regulatory and historically specific. This thesis uses Bauman’s 
(1993) non-normative conception of morality to avoid discussion of the ethical 
frameworks that make moral action possible (e.g., Kant’s (1785) categorical 
imperative which sought to make moral action universalisable). Rather morality 
is cast as the activity of being for the other. Much of Bauman’s (1993) work 
laments the loss of moral agency in the face of societal fragmentation, 
uncertainty and enforced impersonal ethical codes. At the conclusion of his 
book Postmodern Ethics, however, his lament turns into hope – the hope that 
morality can still be meaningful in an often hostile and unforgiving world. This 
thesis picks up that hope and translates it into the will to overcome structural 
dissonance in the service of being for the other (in this case the other is student 
teachers in IECTE programmes). 
 
Bauman’s (1993) perspective is useful to this thesis because he set out a 
framework on morality that explains the meaning of moral justification and 
subsequently the meaning of moral hope. That framework highlights five theses 
that are useful to this explanation: Humans are morally ambivalent; moral 
phenomena are ‘non-rational’; morality is aporetic (fraught with difficulty); 
morality is not universalisable;  and morality privileges being for over being 
with. The remainder of this section  explains  each of these theses. At the 
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conclusion of this section the case for moral hope as a justification for re-
conceptualisation will be put.  
 
According to Bauman (1993) humans are morally ambivalent (p. 10). 
Ambivalence means prone to fluctuation. For Bauman (1993) this perspective 
sits at the crux of the separation of morality and ethics. In Bauman’s (1993) 
view, morality is embodied in face-to-face interactions between people, rather 
than through codes made by social agents, professional bodies, or philosophers. 
For Bauman (1993), morality defies rule-based relations, as that is the domain of 
traditional ethics: It is because humans are morally ambivalent that ethical rules 
are necessary in the first place. The outcome of this perspective is that morality 
can not be guaranteed even under conditions of strict ethical regulation. To 
illustrate this point take for example May’s (1997) assertion that the 
establishment of kindergartens in Dunedin, Christchurch, Wellington and 
Auckland were an expression of moral concern. Bauman (1993) would counter 
such an argument by claiming that this concern was ethically based (e.g., 
Christian ethics) rather than an expression of the face-to-face relationship that 
underpins the moral encounter.  
 
Moral phenomena are non-rational (Bauman, 1993, p. 11). This means that 
morality does not follow as means-end trajectory, as moral phenomena ‚are 
only moral if they precede the consideration of purpose and the calculation of 
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gains and losses‛ (Bauman, 1993, p. 11). Rationality, at least as far as Bauman 
(1993) was concerned, highlights the formation of rule-based relationships 
between human beings. Rational models of morality imply that third party 
adjudicators of moral activity can be employed to override the face-to-face 
morality of lived situations. Take for example, Cannella’s (1997) attack on 
developmentalism in early childhood education. In this instance Cannella 
(1997) hoped to rescue face-to-face relationships from a rationale based on 
rule/research-based foundations (e.g., developmentally appropriate behaviour). 
She wished to peel off the ethical (socially constructed) membrane to find the 
face of children and adults, as well as a place where they could meet. 
 
Morality is aporetic, or fraught with difficulty (Bauman, 1993, p. 11). 
Contemporary morality takes place in a context of uncertainty and among 
many competing and/or contradictory impulses. In our modern, pluralistic 
society the great diversity of cultural norms offers little in the way of certainty 
for moral actors. For example, is it moral to offer a hungry Muslim child pork 
sausages, or a Hindu child chips that are made using beef fat even if you are 
unaware of cultural mores? Is it moral to offer congratulation to a Māori child 
by patting them lightly on the head? In each case the moral impulse that is 
enacted face-to-face does so in a context where no firm rules fit all 
circumstances. Some people who refer to themselves as Muslim and eat bacon, 
Hindu people who eat beef burgers and Māori families that offen congratulate 
  
37 
 
their children by ruffling their hair. Instead, for Bauman (1993) the moral 
impulse is the one that worries that it has not been moral enough, rather than 
one that worries about whether an ethical standard has been maintained.  
 
Morality is not universalisable (Bauman, 1993, p. 12). Bauman (1993) defined 
universalisation as a particularly Western project of stamping out some forms 
of moral judgment in favour of a privileged few. Bauman (1993) rejects the idea 
that there is any such thing as an original or true form of morality against which 
inferior models can be measured. By saying this, Bauman (1993) rejects the 
notion of foundations and essences for similar reasons to those advanced in this 
thesis (see Ch 3). Take for example the idea that children will perform gross 
motor (and fine motor movements as well) in their own time (e.g., Gerber, 
2002), compared to the idea that gross motor movements can be scaffolded and 
enhanced (e.g. Epstein (2006) and tummy time, or the Jolly Jumper™ which 
boasts the improvement of pre-walking skills: www.jollyjumper.com.au). For 
Bauman (1993,) neither perspective approaches anything like reality in the sense 
of an essence of human development because there is no universal morality of 
development to be found. There is no moral standard that can adjudicate on 
this issue, but rather a set of more or less useful justifications that are employed 
to give weight to each side of the bargain. One person’s morality of care might 
therefore be another’s careless disaster. 
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Moral responsibility assumes that ‚being for the Other before one can be with 
the Other – is the first reality of self, a starting point rather than a product of 
society‛ (Bauman, 1993, p. 13). Being for supposes that moral responsibility is a 
non-reciprocal event in which action for the Other is offered without hope of 
reward, distinction or reparation. This is a crucial point because it shifts 
morality from noun to verb. Specifically, morality consists of what we do when 
we do not expect to get a return. This notion of non-reciprocal action is central 
to the writing of Noddings (1999, 2003) and Tronto (2006) on an ethics of care in 
early childhood teacher education. This concept is important in this thesis 
insofar as it underpins the motivation to highlight structural dissonance as an 
expression of the moral hope that something can be done to construct IECTE 
programmes where content and context are congruent. The focus groups, 
reported later in this thesis, suggest that student teachers are aware that there is 
contradiction between the content and context of their courses, even if they are 
not-yet aware that something can be done about it. 
 
Morality is a lived event that finds its material correlate in one person’s care for 
another. This thesis uses Bauman’s (1993) framework of morality as a fluid 
coping, punctuated by a will to care and a rationale for reconstruction (covered 
in part four). Moral hope is an equally ambiguous and ambitious practice of 
acting for the other in an uncertain context in ways that are as yet 
unprecedented, with the goal of making life better for others without hope of 
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reciprocation. Whilst moral hope is fraught with difficulty, it is also imbued 
with a spirit of possibility (see chapter nine for a full explanation of hope). For 
this thesis, moral hope is the hope for social justice for student teachers in 
IECTE programmes. This particular rationale is strongly linked to the 
philosophical assumptions that underpin this thesis in the next chapter.  
 
2.2.2 Moral hope and reconceptualisation 
A morality based on being for the Other (in this case student teachers in IECTE 
programmes) and a will to care for the Other in a way that does not revert to 
this or that ethical code, is central to the overall rationale of this thesis. Moral 
hope offers justification for reconceptualisation through no other means than to 
argue that being for student teachers and promoting a will to care is enough 
reason. As a reason for reconstruction, this thesis anticipates that overcoming 
structural dissonance is morally useful insofar as it empowers student teachers 
to play an active and co-constructive role in their education. This thesis is not 
alone in this assumption, as several writers in early childhood education have 
attempted (though with different objects of emancipation in mind) to do the 
same thing: e.g., Cannella (1997); Cannella & Viruru (2004); Dalli (2006); Dayan 
(2005); Dahlberg, Moss & Pence, (1999); Grieshaber & Cannella (2001); Penn 
(2004); White & Nuttall (2007). My hope is that by pointing out structural 
dissonance and suggesting a way to counter act it students may no longer 
complain that they are ‚teaching a child what empowerment, communication 
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and belonging are, but you need to feel like you belong from the college you are 
educated from, for me anyway‛ (others in the focus group enthusiastically 
agree). 
 
2.3 Reconceptualisation in early childhood studies 
 
As this is a reconceptualist thesis, this section offers a general and specific 
definition of reconceptualisation in education studies and early childhood 
studies. Introducing reconceptualisation is important to the coherence of this 
entire thesis as it sets out the scholastic community to which this project 
belongs. This thesis is situated in the reconceptualist project of early childhood 
studies, understanding this project explains the pre-understanding (see chapter 
4) that orients this research effort.  
 
2.3.1 Reconceptualisation in education: A general perspective. 
One, specifically educational way, of thinking about reconceptualisation is to 
view it as an educational paradigm alongside other educational paradigms. 
Codd et. al. (2002) in their summary of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2001) Scenarios for the Future of Schooling, mapped 
out five specific educational paradigms. Those five paradigms are: reproduction 
(carrying on the status quo), re-schooling (teaching to achieve specific 
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outcomes), de-schooling (challenging mainstream institutionalised education 
models ), socio-cognitive (using scientific research and theory to construct new 
learning theories and applications), and reconceptualist. Codd et. al. (2002) 
described the relationship between paradigms in the following way: ‚These 
competing assumptions< can be understood as five distinct discourses which 
articulate quite different understandings of teaching and learning with very 
different social and educational outcomes‛ (p. 39).  
 
Codd et. al. (2002) defines the reconceptualist paradigm in the following terms:  
 
This discourse is concerned with fundamental questions about the purpose of 
education itself. In this sense, education is not synonymous with teaching and 
learning processed A strong emphasis is placed on critical pedagogy in 
pursuing the aims of education within a democratic and networked 
society<There is a basic need to rethink the curriculum and broader 
pedagogical contexts in which teaching and technology is located. In this 
regard, the discourse seeks to create a more equitable education system and 
socially just society (p. 44).  
 
This definition highlights two key themes of reconceptualisation in education: 
First, there is a degree of scepticism about education and education systems. 
This scepticism questions whether current practices and pedagogies are the 
  
42 
 
final story on education and its uses and asks can we make things better? 
Secondly, it emphasises a concern for equity and social justice. Reconceptualist 
education views current situations as resources for change. Adopting a 
reconceptualist perspective encourages this thesis to offers a new lens for 
looking at IECTE programmes in the hope that social justice for student 
teachers might be a positive result. 
 
However, in early childhood studies, there is a group of writers who identify 
themselves as reconceptualists, and their way of writing as reconceptualisation. 
The following section identifies examples of reconceptualist writer and the 
projects they have produced to gain insight into reconceptualisation as a 
research perspective used by scholars in the field of early childhood studies, 
and as an example of the form of scholarship to which this thesis belongs. 
 
2.3.2 Reconceptualisation in early childhood studies: Origins 
Jipson & Johnson (2001) pin the origin of the re-conceptualist tradition in early 
childhood studies to a conversation between Jipson and Kessler in 1987, and 
more formally to the first annual Reconceptualising Early Childhood Education 
conference in Madison, Wisconsin in October 1991 (pp. 1-2). In the same year as 
that conference, Swadener & Kessler (1991) produced a special edition of the 
Early Education and Development journal devoted to the inclusion of ‚critical, 
interpretive, feminist and/ or phenomenological‛ discourses into conversations 
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about early childhood and early childhood curriculum (Swadener & Kessler, 
1991, p. 85). Swadener and Kessler (1991) challenged a ‚lack of recognition or 
acceptance of alternative theoretical perspectives in early childhood education‛ 
(p. 85). In their introduction to the special edition, they identified the 1973 
Bergamo Conference as the first instance in which the term reconceptualist was 
applied to those who promoted alternative perspectives in early childhood 
studies (alternative to the normal discourse of developmental psychology) 
(Swadener & Kessler, 1991). This thesis promotes an alternative perspective on 
IECTE education by introducing structural dissonance as a critical perspective 
on IECTE programmes and enacted hope as a reconstructive pedagogy, not in 
opposition to, but in addition to the currently accepted perspectives in this field 
of study. 
  
Also in 1991 Critical Perspectives on Early Childhood Education (Weis, Altbach, 
Kelly & Petrie, 1991) was published. In this edited book, the authors drew 
together alternative perspectives regarding issues of teachers voices, gendered 
pre-schools, and critical approaches to policy development in the early 
childhood sector. The editors hoped to ‚suggest new directions for research‛ 
(Weis et. al., 1991, p. xii) by offering new ways of conceptualising early 
childhood issues. These writers were critical of how developmental discourses 
dominated conversations about children, of teachers and their education, and 
about parents and families.  
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In 1992 Shirley Kessler and Beth Blue Swadener published their edited book 
Reconceptualising the Early Childhood Curriculum: Beginning the dialogue. In the 
foreword of this book Mara Sapon-Shevin (1992) provided a good definition of 
the spirit of the reconceptualist project in early childhood studies: 
 
One way to reconceptualise the early childhood curriculum, the goal of this 
book, is to ask a different set of questions than have typically been addressed. 
And perhaps the best way to identify those questions is to ask more people what 
those questions are, to represent multiple voices, particularly the voices of those 
most affected and often disregarded (p. viii). 
 
Cannella (2005, p. 21) wrote that the reconceptualist tradition in early childhood 
studies can be drawn into the single vision of challenging ‚monocultural ways 
of being and believing‛ (p. 21). For the early reconceptualists, challenge and 
reconstruction went hand in hand. This thesis is situated within that scholastic 
project through both its structure and its motivation. The following section 
strengthens that association by identifying this motif in the work of some 
reconceptualist scholars who use feminist and philosophical discourses to 
challenge the status quo. 
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2.3.3 Reconceptualisation in early childhood studies: Feminist. 
Cannella (2005) defined reconceptualist scholarship in early childhood studies 
as the attempt to generate ‚points of critical consciousness‛ (p. 21). These points 
are generated to organise and mobilise resistance in the hope that the social 
world might become more socially justice for increasingly diverse populations. 
How this insight is applied to early childhood studies however, is broad and 
diverse. 
 
Cannella (2005) organises reconceptualist writing into the following categories: 
cultural, critical, feminist and post-modern (p. 19). This thesis identifies some 
reconceptualist writing from feminist perspectives before linking this project 
explicitly to the efforts of postmodern reconceptualists in early childhood 
studies. Over-viewing some of the uses from feminist and gendered 
perspectives on reconceptualisation reiterates the theme of resistance and the 
postmodern reconceptualists relate most closely to this thesis. 
 
From the feminist and gendered perspective on reconceptualisation there are 
writers such as Maccoby and Jacklin (1989) who identified gender segregation 
as an issue for childhood development and argued for gender integration. 
Martin, Eisenbud and Rose (1995) studied children’s gender stereotyping in the 
use of toys, while Tozzo and Golub’s (1990) wrote about sex role stereotypes in 
children’s play.  Both sets of authors argued for anti-bias education around toys 
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and their uses. Writers such as Meade (1982) and MacNaughton (1996) 
provided evidence that young children reproduce socially received gender 
differences in their everyday interactions, whilst researchers such as Alloway 
(1995) and MacNaughton (2000) suggested that if we are to transform gender 
relations then more study is needed.  
 
Honig (1983) and Miedzian (1991) found strong evidence that gender role 
stereotypes are in place by the age of four and used this finding to argue that 
we need to resist gender bias. Whereas Hardcastle-Stanford (1992) and 
Matsumoto-Grah (1992) have explicitly aligned challenging sexism with a 
struggle for social justice. Feminist post-stucturalist writers like MacNaughton 
(1993, 1997, 2000, 2005) have used discourses of power and knowledge to 
highlight injustices around inclusion, exclusion and gender, whilst advocating 
an approach that reconstructs power and knowledge on the theme of anti-bias. 
Writers like Ryan and Oschner (1999) have encouraged teachers to question 
current gendered understandings of children in their care, in order to recast 
early childhood settings as spaces for practicing political action for social 
justice. And Butterworth (1991) and Massey (2008) both advocated for children 
to be actively involved in the process of recognising and resisting sexism in 
their relationships with one another.  
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Some feminist and gendered writers in early childhood studies are a good 
example of border-crossing into philosophy in order to make innovative and 
powerful points in their given field of interest. For example, Rhedding-Jones  
(1995, 1996) used poststructural notions of subjectification of and positioning to 
point out the strong link between education and socially constructed 
submission. Whereas, writers like Osgood (2006) have used poststructural 
philosophy to challenge the construction of professionalism in early childhood 
education. These writers are quasi-philosophical insofar as they do not write 
philosophy, but rather they use philosophical writing to formulate their 
arguments. They are also an example of border crossing between disciplines.  
 
2.3.3.1 Reconceptualisation in early childhood studies: Philosophical. 
Philosophical reconceptualists draw on the work of philosophers (particularly 
post-modern philosophers) to inform their perspective on early childhood 
studies. This thesis uses Rortyan philosophical assumptions to organise the 
reconceptualisation in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand in a 
similar fashion. 
  
Several writers in reconceptualist early childhood studies have used Michel 
Foucault’s (1926-1984) writing to offer insights into early childhood discourses 
and practices (e.g. Cannella, 1997, 1999; Dahlberg, Moss & Pence, 1999; Jordan, 
Cowan & Roberts, 1995; MacNaughton, 1995, 2000, 2005; Millei, 2005; 
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Walkerdine, 1988). Foucault’s writing gives those who use his approach the 
opportunity to challenge unjust power structures and to see how the 
reproduction of knowledge is closely related to moves in a power game (e.g. 
who has the power to decide, who is being positioned by that power, what 
alternative interpretations are being ignored). On this point Foucault (1980) 
writes: 
 
Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, and there is no point in 
dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend on power; this is just 
a way of reviving humanism in a utopian guise. It is not possible for power to 
be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to 
engender power (p. 52). 
 
Other aspects of Foucault’s work that lend themselves to reconceptualist 
scholarship include discourse analysis, archaeology, genealogy, effective 
history, regimes of truth, subjectification and governmentality. Australian 
writer Glenda MacNaughton has consistently used Foucault’s insights in her 
work for almost two decades, blending these with her own feminist 
perspective. In her book entitled Doing Foucault in Early Childhood Studies (2005), 
she outlined a project aimed at picking up the writing of French post-structural 
theorists like Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze and using it as a resource for 
activism in the pursuit of social justice. MacNaughton (2005) used Foucault’s 
  
49 
 
(1972, 1977, 1980) writing on history and philosophy to inform an approach to 
early childhood education with the aim of ‚making the world a better place‛ (p. 
3). MacNaughton (2005) pointed out that using Foucault in early childhood 
studies offers new resources for activism and the pursuit of social justice (p. 5). 
In doing so, she was apologetic to Foucauldian scholars who might find her use 
of Foucault’s work a partial exploration, claiming that her focus is the use of 
Foucault’s writing rather than the representation of his writing, which is work 
that she claims is already well done (MacNaughton, 2005, p. 5). MacNaughton’s 
(2005) use of Foucault’s writing is of interest to this thesis because it is a good 
example of a prolonged reconceptualisation of early childhood vocabularies 
and contexts using philosophical perspective as a resource. MacNaughton’s 
(2005) use involved picking up words and concepts developed by Foucault and 
employing them to challenge the reader to reflect on issues raised, concepts 
introduced and case studies of teacher activists. Thus, even though she used 
Foucault as a resource, her aim and methods were by in large pragmatic: She 
hoped to change habits of both thinking and acting for the sake of social 
progress. This thesis takes a similar approach. 
 
Other writers who have used Foucault’s philosophical work to reconceptualise 
early childhood studies include: Cannella (1997) who offered a genealogy 
aimed at deconstructing dominant ideas of children and childhood in order to 
reconceptualise ‚early childhood as the struggle for social justice‛ (p. 157). 
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MacNaughton and Smith (2001) who used action research to redistribute power 
in early childhood research to develop a more equitable distribution, and 
Cannella and Viruru (1999) who provided insight into how alternative 
constructions of early childhood studies are made possible by challenging the 
status quo. Similarly, authors like Dahlberg, Moss and Pence (1999) used 
Foucault’s work to challenge the notion of quality that permeates the regulatory 
context of early childhood services whilst arguing for a more democratic and 
revolutionary approach to the question of quality. Other authors that have used 
Foucault’s philosophical writing to reconceptualise early childhood studies 
include Cohen (2008), Fenech, Sumison & Goodfellow (2008), Jordan, Cowan 
and Roberts (1995), Macfarlane, Noble and Cartmel (2004), MacNaughton and 
Smith (2001), Mozere (2007), Saltmarsh (2009) and Woodrow and Brennan 
(2001).  
 
Derrida’s (1997) post-structural project centred on the idea that texts have a 
surplus of meaning that goes beyond the sentences collected between the front 
and back cover of a book. Derrida assumed that meaning is a contestable term 
and aimed to show how what is not written into the text explicitly can be just as 
interesting, if not more interesting, than the marks set down on the page. The 
marks (words) themselves are not independent things with any absolute or real 
nature of their own, but rather they depend on other marks (words) for 
meaning, and those depend on others, and those on others and on and on. 
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Derridan scholars deconstruct the power structures that form and reform 
identities and relationships, they care about binaries and positioning, and they 
seek social justice for the invisible realm of the Other by making otherness a 
conscious goal of scholarship. Derrida (1997, as cited in MacNaughton, 2005, p. 
77) explains: 
 
The very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that things – texts, 
institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs, and practices of whatever size and sort 
you need – do not have definable meanings and determinable missions, that 
they are always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the 
boundaries they currently occupy.   
 
MacNaughton (2005) used Derrida’s writing to encourage early childhood 
teachers to reinforce a spirit of activism and to challenge the notion that the big 
fights were over when women got the vote, when early childhood education 
achieved degree status, and when governments began to take a fiscal interest in 
early childhood education.  Other writers who have used Derrida’s 
philosophical writing include Kaomea (2003) who used Derrida’s (1997) literary 
deconstruction to move beyond surface meanings of words and to make new 
sense out of a diverse set of textual sources. Trifonas (2006) wrote against 
permanent essences of problems in philosophy of childhood in order to show 
that alternative injustices are subverted by the processes of essentialism. Jones 
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(2002) used Derridan deconstruction as a tool for understanding how habits can 
be challenged to encourage new early childhood practices, and Helliener (2001) 
deconstructed post-war versions of children and childhood to look beyond the 
privileged images to those images that are hidden or pushed to the periphery. 
These writers all shared the will to challenge the status quo and a hope for 
greater degrees of social justice in society and education. They are relevant to 
this thesis as they are examples of other reconceptualist writers using 
philosophical writing to develop arguments in early childhood studies.  
 
Reconceptualists using the writing of Deleuze & Guatarri (1987) are less prolific 
than the users of Foucault and Derrida in early childhood studies, but there is 
growing recognition of their work.  MacNaughton (2005) used parts of Deleuze 
and Guatarri’s (1987) work, particularly their work on rhizo-analysis which she 
described as ‚a way to explore the politics of a text in order to create new texts‛ 
(MacNaughton, 2005, p. 120). Rhizo-analysis links texts and happenings in 
disciplines that do not seem connected, to argue for the new understandings 
that can emerge from new symmetries. This, according to Deleuze and Guatarri 
(1987, p. 7) is because ‚a rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between 
semiotic chains, organisations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, 
sciences, and social struggles.‛ 
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Other authors like Sellars (2009) and Sellars and Honen (2007) use rhizo-
analysis to map out non-linear pathways between texts and subjects. These 
authors argue that there is still a lot of room for re-conceptualisation in the 
space where philosophy and early childhood studies meet. The power of 
rhizome analysis is in making connections that might otherwise not be made. It 
allows researchers to make hidden connections visible and is a powerful 
resource for discoursing new approaches to realising social justice in 
communities of practice, for example, in recognising structural dissonance in 
the context of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Similarly, Olsson 
(2009) uses the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) to challenge closed ended 
conceptions of children and childhood by using a metaphor of movement to 
convey a sense of broad horizons as yet unknown.  
 
In addition to the big three post-structuralists other writers branch out into 
alternative philosophical perspectives in order to re-conceptualise early 
childhood studies. For example, White & Nuttall (2007) and White (2007) have 
used the writing of Bakhtin (1984, 1986) to argue for new terms for describing 
inclusion and dialogue in early childhood discourses. Grace and Tobin (1997) 
used Bakhtin’s (1984) ideas to re-conceptualise the way early childhood studies 
views itself and its social practices. In terms of theses, three examples of 
philosophical reconceptualisation in Aotearoa/New Zealand are Farquhar’s 
(2008) use of Ricoeur’s (1992) narrative theory to critically explore the formation 
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of identity in early childhood contexts; Gibbon’s (2006) use of Heidegger (1962) 
to explore the interconnection between discourses of technology and play in 
early childhood settings; and Duhn’s (2006) use of Foucault (1991) to map out 
the territory of childhood in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
This thesis uses Rortyan philosophical assumptions to construct a critique of 
IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand and to suggest a pedagogy of 
enacted hope as a useful reconstruction of what IECTE programmes might look 
like in the future. The following chapter sets out those Rortyan assumptions.  
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has introduced structural dissonance and outlined a justification 
based on the moral hope that resistance and reconstruction need only the hope 
that life can be made better for others as a result. The reconceptualist 
perspective adopted by this thesis has been introduced and the central motif of 
critique and reconstruction has been identified. The reconceptualist tradition to 
which this thesis is a contribution was also detailed. These elements set the 
scene for the subsequent parts of this thesis.  
 
 
 
  
55 
 
 
 
Part Two 
 
Philosophical assumptions and 
methodology 
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Chapter Three 
Philosophical assumptions 
 
This chapter introduces Rorty’s philosophical writing and draws from it several 
assumptions which are used to approach to questions of truth (validity), reality 
(and representations) and knowledge (particularly the creation of new 
knowledge) which is taken up throughout this thesis. In a review of early 
childhood studies and initial early childhood teacher education (IECTE) 
literature there was very little evidence that the philosophical assumptions set 
out by American neo-pragmatic philosopher Richard Rorty have been used to 
inform research in early childhood studies or IECTE (outside of mention by 
Dahlberg, Moss & Pence, 1999, pp. 2, 118). 
 
This chapter is called philosophical assumptions because it deals with subjects that 
traditionally concern professional philosophers, namely: truth, reality and 
theory of knowledge. It is, however, more accurate to call them quasi-
philosophical assumptions because this thesis does not focus on a problem in 
philosophy; rather, it applies philosophical discourse to the topic of structural 
dissonance in IECTE. The difference here is subtle but important: This thesis 
uses rather than creates a philosophical perspective.  
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Adopting Rortyan assumptions gives this thesis philosophical coherence. 
Following Rorty (1989), this thesis is not going to ‚argue against the vocabulary 
I want to replace, I am going to try to make the vocabulary I favour look 
attractive‛ (p. 9), or at least, plausible. For this reason, this thesis is not 
interested in arguing that Rortyan assumptions are more adequate for 
describing what is going on in IECTE than other sets of assumptions, or that 
Rorty is in any way useful for getting to the essence of the problem of structural 
dissonance. Instead, this chapter argues that using Rortyan assumptions makes 
a certain type of reconceptualisation possible – one that focuses of vocabularies 
of usage, contingency and an ironist reconstruction of social metaphors. 
 
The first section of this chapter introduces pragmatic philosophy in order to 
situate Rorty’s neo-pragmatic approach within this wider set of concerns.  Neo-
pragmatism is then introduced against that backdrop. The second section 
introduces Rorty and some characteristics of his philosophy before identifying 
his assumptions on truth, reality and theories of knowledge. This chapter ends 
by identifying with the figure of a research ironist (see section 3.4) as a neo-
pragmatic reconceptualist and an explanation of how these assumptions 
influence the parts of this thesis. 
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3.1 Pragmatism and neo-pragmatism. 
 
Pragmatism is a set of philosophical statements that are strung together to side 
step certain philosophical problems that occupy mainstream philosophy based on 
the assumption that there is no practical benefit in continuing those 
conversations (Rorty, 1979). For example, questions that distinguish between 
truth and justification, reality and appearance, and poetry and knowledge. At 
this general level, pragmatic philosophy focuses on functions, habits and 
actions, and makes use of two kinds of philosophical distinction: the distinction 
between past and future ways of acting, and the distinction between more and 
less useful ways of acting. These distinctions are set against a background 
assumption that social salvation is most likely to be wrought by human effort, 
rather than divine providence. Pragmatists believe that it is up to us humans to 
make the world a better place for one another to inhabit.  
 
For Rorty (1990) pragmatism is the name given to a philosophical movement 
that aims to change the subject of dialogue from accuracy of representation 
toward making the world a better place. Menand (1997) sums up this sentiment 
by defining pragmatism as ‚an effort to unhitch human beings from< a useless 
structure of bad abstractions‛ (p. xi). 
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The key figures in pragmatic philosophy include Saunders Peirce, William 
James and John Dewey. These figures are American, and pragmatism is often 
characterised as a uniquely American school of philosophical thought (Menand, 
1997; Murphy, 1990). The writing of Saunders Peirce is commonly held as the 
origin of the American tradition of pragmatic philosophy (James, 1907). Peirce 
(1904) described the pragmatic perspective as one which entails ‚a certain 
maxim of logic‛ (as cited in Menand, 1997, p. 56) that seeks to trace the practical 
consequences of any thought, utterance, doctrine or action, as opposed to how 
well a thought, utterance, doctrine or action represents reality. For Peirce (1904), 
reasoning and thinking are varieties of action, they are something we humans 
do, they are ways in which we humans behave: They are habits. Belief for Peirce 
(1878), was therefore a habit of thought. Using this logic, pragmatists argue that 
if belief is merely a habit of thought then it has little, if anything to do with the 
accurate representation of reality. Pragmatists think that we can drop the 
problem of appearance or reality (the question of whether objects or issues are 
real or just appear to be real) and still have something useful to say to one 
another (e.g., Rorty, 1979). This thesis uses this insight to unhitch itself from 
questions concerning the reality or appearance of structural dissonance, in favour 
of arguing that talking in this way is useful because it makes structural 
dissonance visible and counter action possible. 
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For pragmatic theologian and psychologist William James (1907) the acid test 
for any problem is the question: does it make any practical difference? Or in other 
words does holding a belief make a difference to my practice? Under the condition of 
pragmatism, James (1907) wrote that ‚theories thus become instruments, not 
answers to enigmas, in which we can rest‛ (as cited in Menand, 1997, p. 98). 
James (1907) based his account of pragmatism in intrapersonal psychology; at 
the place where old opinions meet new experiences. James (1907) preached a 
pragmatism that does not hold what is true for us and what is better for us apart 
(as cited in Menand, 1997, p. 109), but collapses the two into a single vision. On 
this account, truth (as well as reality) exists as a distribution of possible 
perspectives and their potential for utility (James, 1909). This view is unsettling 
to those who would prefer to think of truth and reality as absolute qualities that 
can be found given the correct method (e.g., Plato and Kant). James’ (1907) 
insight is important to this thesis because it sets out a pragmatic challenge in 
terms of theoretical construction: namely, does it make a difference to practice? This 
thesis will argue that structural dissonance makes a difference to practice in 
IECTE programmes and that a pedagogy of enacted hope has the potential to 
make a difference as counter action. 
 
Dewey (1929), like James, elevated experience to the position where 
metaphysicians (those who claim reality has an absolute essence that can be 
found) placed truth. In doing so he placed the demand of practical utility ahead 
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of the quest for accurate representation. The main difference between Dewey 
and James on this count is that where James was content to talk of individual 
psychology, Dewey emphasised community and social progress. However, 
both privileged action over the quest for truth or reality. Dewey’s pragmatism 
was Darwinian in its assumption that social utility is the arbiter of human 
evolution. Dewey used the concept of progress (e.g., progressive education) as a 
metaphor for purpose in human history, as he applied the pragmatic distinction 
of old versus new. Dewey, like Peirce and James before him offered a 
naturalised version of philosophy that drops otherworldliness (metaphysics) to 
focus on the question: what are the most useful ways we can act? Dewey 
characteristically answered that question with one word: democratically.  
 
Pragmatism is, on the account given above, a philosophical perspective based 
on maxims of practical effect, a running together of truth and utility, focus on 
experience, the consequences of action and the dialectic of old versus new. 
Rorty, who considered himself a pragmatist and a disciple of Dewey (Rorty, 
1999, p. xvi), has summed up pragmatism as anti-representationalism: which he 
explained as ‚the spectator account of knowledge and the consequent 
abandonment of the appearance/reality distinction‛ (Rorty, 1990, p. 2). For 
Rorty pragmatism is ‚simply anti-essentialism applied to notions like ‘truth,’ 
‘knowledge,’ ‘language,’ ‘morality,’ and similar objects of philosophical 
theorising‛ (Rorty, 1982, p. 162). Anti-essentialism is the suspicion that reality 
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has no constant essence, but rather it is a social construct made by humans for 
humans. This view will be expanded upon in section 2.3.  
 
For Rorty (1982), pragmatism is a conscious attempt to get out from under the 
vocabulary left by Plato (who granted access to unconditional and absolute 
values) and humanised by Kant (who valorised human reason as the arbiter of 
truth). According to Rorty (1999), ‚if there is anything distinctive to say about 
pragmatism it is that it substitutes the notion of a better human future for the 
notions of ‘reality’, ‘reason’ and ‘nature’‛ (p. 27). Pragmatism is therefore the 
practice of dropping the project of discovering a true representation of reality, 
whilst picking up the hope that we can find the strength to work together to 
make better (more peaceful and socially just) societies.  
 
3.1.1 Neo-pragmatism 
The prefix neo- means new. Neo-pragmatism is a new form of pragmatism, 
related to, but different from, the traditional form. Rorty (1999) described the 
difference between pragmatism and neo-pragmatism in the following way:  
 
‚It is customary to distinguish the classical pragmatists – Pierce, James, and 
Dewey – from such living neo-pragmatists as Quine, Goodman, Putnam, and 
Davidson. The break between these two is the so-called linguistic turn. This was 
the turn philosophers took when, dropping the topic of experience and picking 
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up that of language, they began talking their cue from Frege rather than from 
Locke‛ (p. 24). 
 
The turn away from experience and toward language and its uses underpins 
the neo-pragmatic approach to philosophy. Menand (1997) described this as the 
distinction between first and second generation pragmatism. In the first 
generation he placed the individuals identified by Rorty as classical pragmatists 
(e.g., Peirce, 1904; James, 1907; and Dewey, 1929), in the second generation he 
places the people Rorty called neo-pragmatists (e.g. Rorty, 1979; and Putnam, 
1995). According to Menand (1997) the date of the birth of second generation 
pragmatism is quite precise: 1979, the year Rorty published Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature.  
 
To further differentiate neo- from traditional pragmatism Rorty (1999) wrote, 
‚we new pragmatists talk about language instead of experience, or mind, or 
consciousness, as the old pragmatists did ‚(p. 95).  
 
The neo-pragmatic approach taken in this thesis focuses on vocabularies and 
their use whilst adopting the anti-metaphysical approach to philosophy 
characteristic by first generation pragmatists, and the anti-epistemological 
approach to philosophy that is characteristic of Rorty’s (1979, 1982, 1989, 1999, 
2007) philosophical writing. These terms will be further explained in section 3.3.  
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3.2 A Rortyan perspective. 
 
Rorty was born in New York in 1931. He completed his PhD entitled The 
Concept of Potentiality at Yale University in 1956 and began his career as a 
professional philosopher at Princeton University. In 1979, with the publication 
of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty signalled a significant shift in 
pragmatic thought, away from habits of experience to the vocabularies we use 
(Rorty, 1979, p. 8). Leaving his position at Princeton, he moved to the University 
of Virginia to become Professor of Humanities. By 1989, with the publication of 
Contingency, Irony and Solidarity this shift was complete. Rorty ended his days as 
Emeritus Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford University, until his 
death in 2007. 
 
Rorty was an anti-philosopher who used philosophical writing to make his 
point. He argued for the end of analytic philosophy, sketching out in its place a 
post-philosophical culture (one in which philosophy is seen as just another type of 
literature among the many types available) (Rorty, 1979, p. 372). Rorty (1989) 
hoped to do away with the figure of the scientist, as the vanguard of the human 
species and replace it with Harold Bloom’s strong poet as a person ‚capable of 
telling the story of their own production in words never used before‛ (p. 28). 
The poet, for Rorty, is one who excels in making new metaphors. Within this 
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frame, Rorty argued that inquiry (philosophical and scientific) can be thought 
of as metaphor making, and that discovery is really a project of consensus 
building wherein those metaphors are literalised. From this perspective, 
reconceptualisation is the process of offering new metaphors for consideration. 
 
Rorty’s (1999) self description goes as follows: ‚If there is anything to the idea 
that the best intellectual position is one which is attacked with equal vigour 
from the political right and the political left, then I am in good shape‛ (Rorty, 
1999, p. 3). Rorty goes on (Rorty, 1999, p. 4): ‚The left’s favourite word for me is 
complacent, just as the right’s is irresponsible.‛ However, Mendieta (2006) offers a 
useful description of Rorty in the introduction to his edited collection of 
interviews with Rorty: Take Care of Freedom and Truth Will Take Care of Itself. In 
that introduction Mendieta (2006) wrote the following:  
 
‚Richard Rorty is a uniquely American anomaly< His work is cosmopolitan, 
ecumenical, multilateralist, trans-American, anti-imperial, and confessedly 
ethnocentric, so that it can be critical of his moral community, both 
antischolastic and antidisciplinary. He is utopian, hopeful, and optimistic 
without being reckless, unrealistic, and antidemocratic‛ (pp. xi, xii). 
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3.2.1 Rortyan philosophy. 
Rortyan philosophy is the sum total, and useful parts, of Rorty’s writing 
concerning philosophy and philosophical questions. As a pragmatist, Rorty made 
it his stock and trade to drop the philosophical problems/distinctions that had 
occupied traditional Anglophone philosophers (Rorty, 1999, pp. xii, xxii), e.g., 
distinctions between truth and justification, reality and appearance, discovered 
and made. The implications of his position open themselves to application in a 
great number of diverse fields of inquiry in much the same way as 
MacNaughton (2005) has picked up Foucault’s assumptions on power and 
knowledge and used them in her writing. On the topic of utility, Rorty (1999) 
pointed out: ‚any philosophical view is a tool which can be used by many 
different hands‛ (p. 22). This approach is consistent with the reconceptualist 
perspective set out in the previous chapter.  
 
This thesis uses Rorty’s philosophical writing to map out the philosophical 
assumptions that underpin this research, particularly Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature (1979), Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), Contingency, Irony and 
Solidarity (1989), Philosophy and Social Hope (1999), and Philosophy as Cultural 
Politics (2007).   
 
To further illuminate Rorty’s approach to philosophy it is useful to identify how 
his work relates to the work of other philosophers. In this way the reader gets 
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an idea of where Rorty is situated in the broader philosophical landscape. 
Again, Mendieta (2006) offers a useful insight into Rorty’s philosophical 
perspective, consequently it is quoted at length. 
 
‚Rorty is anti-Platonist, that is, he rejects the appearance-essence, or contingent-
eternal distinction that is fundamental to Platonism. He is anti-Aristotlian, that 
is, he rejects the convention-nature distinction. He is also anti-Thomist, that is, 
he rejects the natural law-human law distinction. He is also an anti-Kantian, 
that is, he rejects the noumena-phenomena, analytic-synthetic, a priori-a 
posteriori distinctions. He is also anti-Cartesian, that is, he rejects the mind-
matter, innate-acquired distinctions. He is anti-Hegelian, that is, he reject the 
notion that there is a logic of history, and that this logic is the nature of reason, 
and that this reason is tied to freedom. He is also anti-Marxist, that is, he rejects 
the idea that all history is the history of class struggle, and the notion that the 
ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling classes< Rorty is avowedly pro-
Humean, that is he endorses the education of moral sentiment over the alleged 
power of reason. He is pro-Derridean, that is, he endorses the ways in which 
deconstruction is another name for jostling and redescription, brilliant 
bricolage, and a form of polytheistic criticism. He is pro-Davidson, that is, he 
endorses the ways in which Davidson’s view of language is a form of pan-
relationalism, in which triangulation means submitting to the authority of 
reasons that are offered as justifications rather than as ways of finding 
something outside and beside what is merely human. He is pro-Wittgenstein, 
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that is, he endorses the ways in which language use is tied to forms of life, and 
how changing ways of talking and describing the world entail changing 
practical relations. He is also pro-Heideggerian, but he endorses only the 
Heidegger who is interested in language as poetic novelty, the one who offers 
metanarratives that allow us to see how we may begin to be disenchanted with 
old mythologies and begin to articulate new languages and narratives. He is 
also pro-Habermasian, that is, he endorses the kind of shift from monological 
subjectivity to intersubjectivity and communicative rationality that Habermas 
has so eloquently described‛ (pp. xv, xvi). 
 
I would also add that he is consistently pro-Dewey, that is, he sees himself as a 
continuation of the Deweyan tradition which unhooks itself from assumptions 
that can no longer be deemed useful (even some of his own – see Rorty in 
Brandom, 2000). He is also pro-Gadamer, at least as far as Gadamer views 
understanding as an interaction between pre-understanding, text (this includes 
utterances), and intended application.  
 
This section has taken a very broad overview of Rorty’s position in order to 
construct a consistent and internally coherent approach to the formation of new 
knowledge claims in the field of IECTE studies.  
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3.3 Rortyan assumptions. 
 
Rorty (1999) claimed that pragmatists usually ‚define ourselves in negative 
terms. We call ourselves ‘anti-Platonists’ or ‘anti-metaphysicians’ or ‘anti-
foundationalists’‛ (p. xvi). The Rortyan method adopted in this thesis is to 
explain what I am against (anti-) and what I am for (pro-) in its place. There are 
two parts of this section that use that method: anti-metaphysics/anti-
essentialism– pro-utility (3.3.1 and 3.3.2), and anti-epistemology/anti-
foundationalism – pro-constructivism/abnormal discourse (3.3.3 and 3.3.4). A 
third part explains and aligns this thesis to the Rortyan figure of the ironist 
researcher/scholar. These assumptions underpin the methodology and methods 
used in this research, analysis of data, and the subsequent justification of 
structural dissonance in IECTE, and the pedagogy of enacted hope. 
 
3.3.1 Assumption one: Anti-metaphysics, anti-essentialism. 
Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy that investigates Reality-As-It-Is or first 
principles. Anti-metaphysics is the conviction that there is no such thing as 
Reality-As-It-Is or a first principle, that these things are made by people, formed 
in language, and prone to change (Rorty, 1999). Metaphysics is the tradition of 
identifying objects beyond physical appearance e.g. Truth, Reality, Justice, 
Human Rights. Anti-metaphysics is the tradition of saying truth, reality, justice 
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and human rights are things we humans do, that is, they are products of human 
interactions, histories and hopes (Rorty, 1982).  
 
Essentialism is the belief, often held by metaphysicians, that there is an essence 
to be found that is unconditional, absolute, and unalloyed. Anti-essentialism is 
the belief that such essences do not exist independently of human needs (Rorty, 
1999). For example, essentialists like to think that there is something specific 
and objective that we can call childhood, they might make statements like the 
essence of childhood is play, or they might come up with statements like 
children’s rights are universal. Anti-essentialists respond that childhood is a 
social construction (e.g., Cannella, 1997), and that rights are products of social 
history rather than ahistorical and absolute. By taking an anti-
metaphysical/anti-essentialist position, this thesis does not maintain that 
structural dissonance has an essence or that the essence of the contradiction 
being studied is structural dissonance. Rather, it takes the view that structural 
dissonance is one metaphor among many that can be used to describe 
contemporary practices in IECTE programmes, which is in itself, an expression 
of human hope that less contradictory, more just approaches to IECTE are 
possible. 
 
Neo/pragmatic philosophy is an anti-metaphysical/anti-essentialist endeavour. 
Pragmatists think that there is no such thing as truth as an absolute and 
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unconditional quality of things or people, and that there is little use in 
attempting to define or represent it. This thesis picks up that assumption. 
‚Pragmatists – both classical and neo – do not believe that there is a way things 
really are. So they want to replace the appearance-reality distinction with that 
between different descriptions of that world and ourselves which are less useful 
and those which are more useful‛ (Rorty, 1999, p. 27). In the place of this quest 
for true representation of reality Rorty (1999) suggested a version of utility based 
on ‚our ability to trust and cooperate with other people, and in particular to 
work together so as to improve the future‛ (p. xiii). Rorty’s approach to utility 
is not a quest for certainty, but a quest for how best to cope with the 
contingencies of human life. This is the crux of the argument between 
essentialists and anti-essentialists: the former think that certainty is possible, the 
latter think that agreement (or fruitful disagreement) is the only goal we can 
hope to achieve. This thesis assumes that latter. 
 
According to Rorty (1999), ‚for pragmatists, there is no such thing as a non-
relational feature of X, anymore than there is such a thing as the intrinsic 
nature, the essence, of X‛ (Rorty, 1999, p. 50). X is always understood using 
language, language is a human construction, and human constructions are 
relative to time, place and participants. Therefore, so too is the manner in which 
we understand X. If X is education, then those approaches to education that 
identify essential skills or key competencies are buying in to the idea that 
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education has a set of non-relational features or essences. This thesis does not 
take that view. For neo-pragmatists essential skills and key competencies are 
one way among many to talk of education. From this perspective, the question 
is: does our way of talking about education make for more just and peaceful 
relationships between human beings? Rather than, how well does education 
represent an essence. 
 
According to Rorty (1999), ‚there is nothing to be known about an object except 
what sentences are true of it< We anti-essentialists try to substitute the picture 
of language as a way of hooking up objects to one another for the picture of 
language as a veil interposed between us and objects‛ (p. 55). What Rorty is 
getting at here is that language has no way of corresponding to reality (i.e., 
truth), because reality is constructed of sentences that refer only to other 
sentences and not to objects as they exist unconditionally (that is, outside of our 
human uses). For example, the sentence learning is a situated activity would not, 
on Rorty’s account, refer to the way things really are, rather it refers to the fact 
that this metaphor for learning has currently achieved more popularity than 
alternative metaphors in a given community, for the particular purpose of 
coming to some form of agreement on what it means when we talk to each 
other about learning.  
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In place of unconditionality, Rorty used contingency. For Rorty (1989) ‚truth 
can not be out there – cannot exist independently of the human mind – because 
sentences cannot exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions 
of the world are not< The world does not speak. Only we do‛ (pp. 5, 6). On 
this account, where truth is articulated it is a truth that is made rather than 
found. Essentialists maintain that truth can be found and that it is possible to 
draw up a correct criterion for finding it. A typical Rortyan reply to this 
assertion is that it makes no sense to engage in this type of sense making 
activity because it is no longer useful to talk in such a way, just as scientists no 
longer find it useful to talk in the terms used by theologians. To this the 
essentialist may reply: then you are a relativist. To which Rorty (1999) would 
retort: 
 
‚I think it is important that we who are accused of relativism stop using the 
distinctions between finding and making, discovery and invention, objective 
and subject< we must repudiate the vocabulary our opponents use, and not let 
them impose it on us< We pragmatists shrug off charges that we are relativists 
or irrationalists by saying that these charges presuppose precisely the 
distinctions we reject‛ (pp. xviii, xix).  
 
Rorty’s (1982, p. 166) approach to philosophy is not relativistic, he does not 
believe that anyone believes that all positions are equally valid. He thought, 
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instead, that some ways of speaking are more useful than others for helping us 
create more socially just and less violent communities (Rorty, 1982, p. 167). 
Clearly not all sentences that humans can utter are up to this task. 
 
According to Rorty, there is no useful distinction between truth and 
justification, just as there is no useful distinction between appearance and 
reality, or found and made. These distinctions are part and parcel of a 
vocabulary he has gone out of his way to drop (see Philosophy and the Mirror of 
Nature, 1979). Rorty talked instead of metaphors and re-descriptions where 
others talk of objectivity and correspondence to reality. He opted for a 
conversational version of truth, offering the following as an alternative to the 
metaphysical desire for essences:  
 
We call something fantasy rather than poetry or philosophy when it revolves 
around metaphors which do not catch on with other people – that is, around 
ways of speaking or acting which the rest of us cannot find a use for< 
Conversely, when some private obsession produces a metaphor which we can 
find a use for, we speak of genius rather than of eccentricity or perversity 
(Rorty, 1989, p. 37). 
 
These anti-metaphysical/anti-essential assumptions inform this thesis by 
allowing it to bypass the question of whether the reconceptualisation being put 
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forward corresponds to reality or not. From a neo-pragmatic perspective the 
question of correspondence to reality makes like sense. Instead, like Rorty, this 
thesis asks if the reconceptualisation put forward is useful for the purpose of 
constructing a more socially just context for student teachers in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
 
3.3.2 Utility. 
In a general sense, utility is ‚a matter of adjusting the relation between an object 
and other objects, a matter of putting an object in a profitable context‛ (Rorty, 
1999, p. 65). Rorty is saying that usefulness is aligned with attaining the best 
result. There are many alternatives available that could suffice as profitable 
contexts, from downright exploitation (e.g., child labour in England’s industrial 
revolution) right through to the hope for social justice. For Rorty, ‚hope for 
social justice is nevertheless the only basis for a worthwhile human life‛ (Rorty, 
1999, p. 204). This assumption fits the reconceptualist tradition of resistance and 
the will for social justice by drawing utility and social justice into a single 
vision. Further to this point, Rorty (1999) wrote ‚my candidate for the most 
distinctive and praiseworthy human capacity is our ability to trust and 
cooperate with other people, and in particular to work together so as to 
improve the future‛ (p. xiii).  
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Rorty (1989) also followed the traditional pragmatic line by defining utility as 
socially useful:  
 
The view I am offering says that there is such a thing as moral progress, and 
that this progress is indeed in the direction of greater human solidarity. But that 
solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self, the human essence, in 
all human beings. Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see more and more 
traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as 
unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and 
humiliation – the ability to think of people as wildly different from ourselves as 
included in the range of us (p. 192). 
 
This thesis uses the assumption of social utility as a rationale for identifying 
structural dissonance in IECTE programmes, as a philosophical orientation to 
the notion of moral hope introduced in the previous chapter, and as the 
impetus for suggesting a pedagogy of enacted hope (introduced in chapter 10). 
 
3.3.3 Assumption two: Anti-epistemology, anti-foundationalism. 
Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that studies knowledge and beliefs, 
particularly the nature of knowledge and the means of its production. A fairly 
literal definition of epistemology is theory of knowledge. Epistemology depends 
on metaphysics for the assumption that there is an unconditional object called 
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knowledge in the first place. Epistemologists hold that this object called 
knowledge has a structure, and, that that structure can be used as the foundation 
to discover more knowledge on a given subject. Anti-epistemology is the 
conviction that no such structure or object exists outside of contingency and 
human uses (Rorty, 1979).  
 
Foundationalism is the attempt to establish a structure/foundation and apply 
this to diverse subjects in order to establish objectivity. Anti-foundationalism is 
the conviction that objectivity is just a word used by people who like to talk 
about foundations and as such it does not exist outside of language and the 
communities to whom such a language makes any sense (Rorty, 1999).  
From the perspective of Rortyan scepticism, epistemology is an attempt by 
professional philosophers to keep themselves in work after metaphysics was 
disintegrated by physics. Rorty (1979) credits Emmanuel Kant as the creator of 
epistemology noting that ‚it was not until after Kant that the philosophy-
science distinction took hold‛ and that: 
 
The eventual demarcation of philosophy from science was made possible by the 
notion that philosophy’s core was theory of knowledge, a theory distinct from the 
sciences because it was their foundation… Without this idea of a theory of 
knowledge, it is hard to imagine what philosophy could have been in the age of 
modern science< Kant, however, managed to transform the old notion of 
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philosophy – metaphysics as queen of the sciences because of its concern with 
what was most universal and least material – into the notion of a most basic 
discipline – a foundational discipline. Philosophy became primary no longer in 
the sense of highest but in the sense of underlying (pp. 131-132).  
 
Rorty (1979) argued that ‚the theory of knowledge is a desire for constraint – a 
desire to find foundations to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which 
one must not stray, objects which impose themselves, representations which 
cannot be gainsaid‛ (p. 315). Rorty therefore equated being anti-epistemological 
with being anti-foundational, the two being different ways of arriving at the 
same point.  
 
The difference between Rorty and epistemologists is that Rorty does not try to 
establish certainty through his assumptions, whereas epistemologists do. To 
Rorty (1979, 1989, 1999) the idea that objectivity is possible or that there is a way 
to be objective is a relic of those assumptions he believed we would benefit 
from dropping. Like Rorty (1979), this thesis assumes that we can drop these 
ways of talking with no harmful consequences; that we can drop the quest for 
foundations of knowledge and still have something potentially useful to say to 
our respective communities. 
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For Rorty (1979), we are being epistemological when we do the following: 
assure ourselves that there are foundations of knowledge which are ‚truths 
because of their causes rather than the arguments given for them (p. 157); when 
we think that knowledge mirrors (accurately represents) nature/Reality as it is; 
when we try to prescribe knowledge through a ‚permanent ahistorical 
framework for inquiry‛ (p. 257); when we assume that ‚all contributions to a 
given discourse are commensurable‛ (p. 316): can be brought under a set of 
rules; when we think that being rational is the same as finding common ground 
(p. 318); and, when ‚we understand perfectly well what is happening but want 
to codify it in order to extend, or strengthen, or teach, or ground it‛ (p. 321). This 
thesis rejects these assumptions and for this reason is anti-epistemological in its 
approach to the question of structural dissonance in IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. Taking this perspective has methodological 
consequences as discussed in the following chapter. 
 
The anti-foundationalist argument is that there is nothing to be found except 
the words/metaphors that we have made, and the consensus these words have 
inspired in different communities over time. On this account, if there is to be a 
foundation then it is at best a shifting one, one that takes on different forms in 
different epochs, for different audiences.  
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In assuming that there is no such thing as correspondence to reality in the first 
place, let alone better or worse ways for corresponding, the focus of this thesis 
shifts away from attempts at discovery toward attempts to reconceptualise 
IECTE programmes in a way that has the merit of utility to a given audience (in 
this case, those early childhood practitioners and theorists interested in social 
justice). By dropping the metaphor of finding and picking up the metaphor of 
making, the onus shifts from justifying correspondence to reality to justifying 
the utility of sentences and concepts. The outcome of adopting this 
philosophical assumption is that this thesis is an example of what Rorty (1979) 
called abnormal discourse. In this thesis abnormal discourse is a synonym for 
reconceptualist writing wherein new perspectives are integrated and implicated 
in scholarship within particular fields of inquiry. 
 
3.3.4 Normal and abnormal discourse. 
A normal discourse is one that is accepted by the mainstream of a given 
community (e.g., in chapter five the argument is advanced that sociocultural 
theory is a normal discourse used in the content of IECTE programmes today). 
An abnormal discourse is one that is not commonly used by the mainstream of 
a given community, but which may, in future, with luck and/or good 
management, become a normal discourse. Examples of discourses that were 
abnormal to the contexts in which they were written include Rousseau’s (1762) 
idea that childhood is a developmental stage distinct from adulthood, Holt’s 
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(1965) discourse on how children fail, and Cannella’s (1997) deconstruction of 
the concept of childhood. 
 
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979) Rorty used Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) 
argument that normal science is the practice of furthering an already 
established research paradigm and extends it to discourse in general, and 
philosophical discourse in particular. A paradigm is normal when ‚research is 
directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the paradigm 
already provides‛ (Kuhn, 1962, p. 24). A paradigm is revolutionary when it has 
become uneasy about anomalies in normal science to the point where an 
altogether new paradigm is established; one in which research no longer 
articulates the paradigm of the normal science but changes the worldview 
altogether, that is, it begins a new paradigm, or forces a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 
1962).  
 
Rorty (1979) converted the term normal science into normal discourse and 
revolutionary science in abnormal discourse. For Rorty (1979), a vocabulary 
counts as normal discourse when it ‚is conducted within an agreed-upon set of 
conventions about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as 
answering a question, what counts as having a good argument for that answer 
or a good criticism of it‛ (p. 320). An abnormal discourse is ‚what happens 
when someone joins in the discourse who is ignorant of these conventions or 
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who sets them aside‛ (Rorty, 1979, p. 320). Rorty identified the drive to be 
epistemological as the drive to the produce normal discourse. Alternatively, he 
called the drive to describe the familiar in unfamiliar terms the practice of 
producing abnormal discourses.  
 
According to Rorty (1979), ‚the product of abnormal discourse can be anything 
from nonsense to intellectual revolution‛ (p. 320). The challenge, therefore, is to 
create an abnormal discourse that is useful for the purposes of achieving social 
justice within a given field of interest, in a way that is coherent, consistent and 
reasonable to the community to which the discourse is addressed. If this 
discourse is deemed useful then it becomes normalised insofar as the 
vocabulary set forward is picked up and used by a given community. This 
thesis is an abnormal discourse insofar as it constructs new possibilities for 
conversation on the topic of social justice by introducing the notion of structural 
dissonance and suggesting a pedagogy of enacted hope. Quality, from this 
perspective, extends from the plausibility of the argument set out and its utility 
in terms of supporting the development of a more socially just programme for 
IECTE students.  
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3.4 Ironist scholarship 
 
In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) Rorty sketched the ironist a figure 
who has lost faith in both metaphysics and epistemology. This thesis identifies 
strongly with that figure. Rorty (1989) used the concept of final vocabulary to 
describe theoretical projects that promote certainty and the closure of the 
possibility. According to Rorty (1989), we adopt a final vocabulary when we 
cling to one particular vocabulary (to describe ourselves, others, our world, 
purpose etc.), and can not resort to anything other than circular arguments 
when that vocabulary is challenged. In opposition to that project, Rorty (1989) 
cast his figure of the ironist as one who fulfils three conditions: 
 
(1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she 
currently uses, because she has been impressed by other vocabularies, 
vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) she 
realises that argument phrased in her present vocabulary can neither 
underwrite nor dissolve her doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophises about her 
situation, she does not think that her vocabulary is closer to reality than others, 
that it is in touch with a power not herself (p. 73).  
 
This thesis is an example of ironist scholarship, of the type set out by Rorty 
(1989). From that ironist perspective, this thesis does not hold out any hope that 
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the vocabulary used here is a final vocabulary. However, holding that view 
does not mean that the proposed vocabulary is not useful, or justifiable, but 
rather that its author is also open to using other vocabularies, vocabularies not-
yet read, or perhaps that have not-yet been written, in future. The vocabulary of 
structural dissonance and enacted hope worked out in this thesis is not 
intended to stifle the urge to move beyond those vocabularies. The attempt to 
be normative contradicts the ironist goal of keeping conversation open. 
 
This thesis does, however, hope that the vocabularies and perspectives woven 
together in these chapters will be interesting enough that others will make use 
of them to approach structural dissonance in IECTE programmes. This thesis 
offers a new way of talking about IECTE programmes by drawing together 
vocabularies, philosophical assumptions and text. The Rortyan assumptions 
used in this thesis permeate methodology as well as the way in which truth 
claims are constructed and justified (i.e., as moves within a broader 
conversation rather than as certainties attained by a privileged method). Using 
these assumptions across all chapters enables a coherent and consistent 
approach to the construction of new vocabularies and their application to the 
study of structural dissonance in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand. 
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Summary 
This chapter has introduced the neo-pragmatic perspective taken in this thesis 
by defining neo-pragmatism in relation to traditional pragmatic writers. 
Rortyan neo-pragmatism has been introduced and situated within a wider 
context of philosophical perspectives. The key assumptions of anti-metaphysics, 
anti-essentialism and anti-epistemology, anti-foundationalism have been 
explained and the figure of the ironist has been used to describe the approach to 
scholarship undertaken in this thesis. The next chapter introduces the 
methodology and methods used in this thesis. 
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Chapter Four 
Methodology and Methods 
 
This chapter outlines the methodology and research methods used in this 
thesis. The methodology adopted to organise data generation and analysis is a 
Rortyan version of Gadamer’s (1975) philosophical hermeneutic blended with 
an ecological structure promoted through the writing of Bronfenbrenner (1979). 
The first part of this chapter sets out Gadamer’s (1975) philosophical 
hermeneutic and Rorty’s (1979) inversion of that hermeneutic approach. The 
research design used in this thesis is integrative (Boyer, 1990) and draws on the 
bricolage and constructivist perspectives in qualitative educational research 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). The methods employed in this thesis consist of an 
ecological approach to philosophical hermeneutics, a Rortyan perspective on 
Weber’s (1949) ideal type method (used subsequently as a tool for textual 
analysis in chapters five to eight), and four focus groups of year two and three 
IECTE student teachers from a case study New Zealand university.  
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4.1 Methodology: Hermeneutics. 
 
The methodology of this thesis is based on the concept of understanding set out 
by Gadamer (1975) in his book Truth and Method.  This thesis converts 
Gadamer’s (1975) philosophical hermeneutic into a methodology by proposing 
that those elements which Gadamer thought constitutes all understanding can 
also be employed to construct new understandings. Gadamer’s perspective is 
then further reconceptualised using Rorty’s (1979, 1989) ironist hermeneutics.  
 
4.1.1 Hermeneutics: A general perspective. 
Hermeneutics is a set of techniques for understanding and interpreting text/s or 
utterances. It is both a means by which understanding takes place (Gadamer, 
1975) and a method for distinguishing truth from interpretations (Hirsch, 1967), 
depending on the philosophical assumptions one subscribes to. The former 
approach adopts an anti-epistemological perspective whereas the latter is 
epistemological (insofar as it holds there is a distinction to be made between 
reality and appearances). Hermeneutics is, therefore, a tool that can be, and has 
been, used in a number of ways, epistemological and anti-epistemological. This 
thesis takes an anti-epistemological approach which is consistent with the 
philosophical assumptions outlined above. 
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Another way of understanding the hermeneutic approach to research is offered 
by Ricoeur (1974) who delineated between hermeneutics of suspicion and 
hermeneutics of understanding. Hermeneutics of suspicion is a critical project 
whereby injustices are identified and a way forward to emancipation is set out 
(e.g., MacNaughton, 2005). Hermeneutics of understanding is a constructivist 
project whereby new understandings are encouraged through the integration of 
diverse perspectives (e.g., Dahlberg, Moss & Pence, 1999).This thesis uses both 
styles of hermeneutic inquiry: it is suspicious of structural injustice in IECTE 
programmes and aims to produce a new pedagogical approach in this context. 
 
As a research methodology hermeneutics is a disconnected grouping of diverse 
perspectives on the interpretation and understanding of textual sources 
(Bleicher, 1980). Hermeneutics is diverse in much the same way that qualitative 
research contains a number of diverse and divergent paradigms (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2005), or the history of science is a history of paradigmatic change 
(Kuhn, 1962), or the history of early childhood education is inflected with the 
changing gazes of state (May, 1997, 2001).  
 
Bleicher (1980) identified four specific genre in hermeneutics: The first is 
hermeneutical theory which ‚focuses on the problematic of a general theory of 
interpretation as the methodology of the human sciences‛ (p. 1). This 
hermeneutic theory is structure bound, positivistic/objectivist and 
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epistemological. For Bleicher (1980) the paradigm figure of hermeneutic theory 
was Betti (1962) who pronounced that the only true and objective meaning of a 
text is that which the author originally intended. On this account there was a 
distinction between appearance and reality which only entering the 
psychological space of the author, context included, could divine.  
 
Bleicher’s (1980) second category is philosophical hermeneutics, which rejects 
objectivity as the goal of hermeneutic inquiry and draws attention to the 
foreunderstandings of the interpreter/researcher. This approach casts the 
hermeneutic act as one that necessarily involves ontology (being) in the ongoing 
interpretation of texts and utterances. This approach to hermeneutics rejects the 
quest for certain understanding and focuses on those elements that contribute 
to a person’s understanding. Paradigm figures in this approach are Heidegger 
(1962) and Gadamer (1975). Within this frame, Gadamer (1975) believed he had 
formulated an universalisable approach to understanding. 
 
The third category is critical hermeneutics, which situates interpretations in a 
context of socio-historical power relations and emphasises the power of 
interpretation to change the world and bring about emancipation (Bleicher, 
1980). Critical hermeneutics is another name for what Ricoeur (1974) called the 
hermeneutics of suspicion. Critical hermeneutics treats commonly accepted 
social discourses with suspicion and looks for the power relations that privilege 
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one text over another in different social contexts. According to Bleicher (1989), 
the paradigm figure in this perspective is Habermas, who championed a 
hermeneutics which highlights intersubjectivity over the objectivity/subjectivity 
binary, and who sought out the traces of distorted communication which 
circulate in the collective unconscious of our native language/s.  
 
Bleicher’s (1980) final category of hermeneutic inquiry is phenomenological 
hermeneutics in which interpretations of literal meanings are investigated in 
terms of the hidden meanings that are also conveyed within (and beneath) a 
text. Bleicher’s (1980) paradigm case in this field is Ricoeur (1974) who 
translated Freud’s notion of human unconscious to describe hidden levels of 
meaning operating within a single piece of text. Each of these perspectives on 
hermeneutics has its own particular way of going about the interpretation of 
textual sources. As noted, this thesis uses Gadamer’s (1975) philosophical 
hermeneutics as the basis of its methodology. This is detailed in the following 
section. 
 
4.1.2 Gadamerian hermeneutics. 
Gadamer’s (1975) philosophical hermeneutics borrowed heavily from 
Heidegger’s (1962) philosophy of Being/being as the precondition for all 
understanding. Gadamer used Heidegger’s notion of foreunderstanding to 
propose that the perspective of the interpreter/researcher influences the 
  
91 
 
interpretation of textual sources. Using that methodology:  Reconceptualisation 
and Rortyan assumptions are the foreunderstandings that guide this thesis. 
From the perspective of philosophical hermeneutics, these foreunderstandings 
are methodologically important to disclose. Gadamer’s (1975) hermeneutics 
revolves around the idea that the person reading a text (the interpreter) is just 
as important as the words that the text itself contains: both are partners in the 
co-construction of understanding.  
 
Gadamer (1975) used the idea of horizons to describe spheres of influence at work 
in the act of interpretation/understanding: (i)There is the horizon of the text 
which is, for the purposes of interpretation, considered a complete and coherent 
entity in its own right, divorced from its author and open to new 
interpretations. (ii)There is the horizon of pre-judgment (Heidegger’s 
foreunderstanding) which brings the life-world (Husserl, 1936) of the 
interpreter/researcher into the hermeneutic equation. And (iii) there is the 
horizon of application (why the text was consulted in the first place, and the 
purpose the text will be put to). Understanding, for Gadamer (1975), occurs 
through the fusion (integration) of these horizons.  
 
4.1.2.1 Horizon of the text. 
According to Gadamer (1975), a text is not interpreted against the authors 
original meaning (e.g., Betti, 1962; Hirsch, 1967), or in relation to the context in 
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which it was written: ‚what is fixed in writing has detached itself from the 
contingency of its origin and its author and made itself free for new 
relationships‛ (Gadamer, 1975, p. 357). This means that that the quest to find a 
true or intended meaning of a given text can be set aside in favour of asking the 
more pragmatic question: what can this text be used for?  In Gadamer’s view, 
multiple readings of a single text are not only possible, but to be expected, as 
readers differ and their perspectives change over time. On this point Gadamer 
(1975) remarked: ‚the understanding of something that is written is not a 
reproduction of something that is past, but the sharing of a present meaning‛ 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 354). The meaning in the case of this thesis is open and 
flexible. This perspective supports reinterpretation, multiple uses and 
reconceptualisation. 
 
Although the text is open to multiple interpretations, Gadamer (1975) points 
out that it must also be considered complete, that is, considered an authoritative 
or important text in a given discipline or context. This consideration ensures 
that the hermeneut is consulting texts that are appropriate not only to the task 
at hand, but to the literary context to which those texts belong (e.g., academia). 
For the most part, this thesis uses primary texts on neo-pragmatism, 
socioculturalism, individualisation, enactivism and hope in the construction of 
the thesis argument. It is for this reason that the following chapter uses original 
key texts to describe socioculturalism rather than relying on secondary texts. 
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Where secondary texts are used, they are used in support of, or introduction to, 
the primary sources. 
 
4.1.2.2 Horizon of the interpreter. 
According to Gadamer (1975), the horizon of the interpreter contains the 
perspective to which the interpreter belongs (e.g. their philosophical 
assumptions, cultural identity, the research community with which they 
identify). Gadamer’s (1975) hermeneutic perspective rests on the assumption 
that ‚all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice that gives the 
hermeneutical problem its thrust‛ (p. 239). That prejudice is the pre-judgment 
or foreunderstanding that the interpreter brings to the act of understanding. 
Thus, it is assumed that ‚the interpreter’s own thoughts have gone into re-
awakening the meaning of the text‛ (Gadamer, 1975, p. 350). This thesis 
approaches textual sources from the perspective of a neo-pragmatic ironist who 
thinks that the business of reconceptualisation in IECTE is not-yet over. If I 
were to approach my textual sources believing that the author’s original 
intention is the only true interpretation, and that the possibilities for 
redescription should be countered where ever possible, the way of reading 
socioculturalism, individualisation, Rorty and key texts in IECTE programmes 
adopted in this thesis would be quite different to the present case (i.e., adopting 
anti-epistemological assumptions would be contradictory and there would be a 
great deal of writing to justify that a true and absolute interpretation has been 
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found). Furthermore, that way of reading texts would contradict the 
philosophical assumptions used which would weaken the internal consistency 
of this project.  
 
4.1.2.3 Horizon of application. 
The third of Gadamer’s (1975) horizons is the horizon of application. This is the 
reason why the text is being consulted in the first place and the particular use 
for which a given text or fragment of text is intended to fulfil. This thesis has 
introduced its horizon of application in chapter two: The proposition of 
structural dissonance in IECTE programmes and the hope that something can 
be done about it. For Gadamer (1975), ‚understanding always involves 
something like the application of the text to be understood to the present 
situation of the interpreter‛ (p. 274). The inclusion of application into 
hermeneutic inquiry is arguably Gadamer’s greatest innovation in the field of 
philosophical hermeneutics. Previously, Heidegger (1962) had brought only the 
ontology of the interpreter and the ontology of the text into conversation. The 
horizon of application is consistent with the neo-pragmatic assumptions (see 
section 4.2) underpinning this thesis, especially where utility is given primacy 
over the search for essences or foundations. Methodologically, this means not 
only the words of the text, nor the foreunderstandings of the interpreter go into 
the act of understandings, but also the task at hand, the reason for consulting 
the text in the first place.  
  
95 
 
Hermeneutics, from a Gadamerian stand point, is the dialogical practice of 
entering into conversation with texts and between texts, between interpreters 
and between applications. Following Heidegger (1962), Gadamer (1975) used 
the hermeneutic circle to organise conversation and to aid the integration of 
sources. The hermeneutic circle is the technique of moving between the whole 
and the parts, and back to the whole again. Heidegger (1962) thought of the 
hermeneutic circle as the relationship between individual and the whole of 
Being, whereas Gadamer (1975) used the term to mean the technique of relating 
specific texts to the broader application at hand. This thesis uses the 
hermeneutic circle as a strategy for organising inquiry, meaning that 
throughout this thesis interpretive discussion moves from the general to the 
specific through out the structure of the chapters, and in the sections that make 
up the chapters. In section 4.3 this general hermeneutic strategy is converted 
into a specific method for inquiry and reconceptualised as ecological 
hermeneutics. 
 
4.1.3 A Rortyan appropriation. 
A Rortyan (1979) appropriation of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutic, of the 
type outlined in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, highlights two important 
aspects of Gadamer’s work whilst rejecting his presumption that the system he 
proposes can be universalised. The first is the idea of conversation as 
edification:  That hermeneutics is a conversation that encourages ever more 
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diverse perspectives, texts, and applications resulting in the construction of new 
edifices of knowledge; new vocabularies for re-describing the world. The idea 
of edifice is important here because it replaces the need for a foundation. An 
edifice is a structure to which one can cling in order to formulate new spaces for 
new conversations, or reconceptualisations (Rorty, 1979).  
 
For Rorty (1979), edification: 
 
Stands for [the] project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful 
ways of speaking‛< consisting in ‚the poetic activity of thinking up new aims, 
new words, or new disciplines, followed by, so to speak, the inverse of 
hermeneutics: the attempt to reinterpret our familiar surroundings in the 
unfamiliar terms of our new inventions (p. 360, brackets added).  
 
Hermeneutics as the practice of edification is aligned to adopting an anti-
epistemological stance to methodology. In this regard, being anti-
epistemological is not merely the rejection of foundations, but also an 
expression of hope in the enduring nature of human conversation. This thesis is 
methodologically bound to carry on the conversation of reconceptualisation for 
social justice in early childhood studies in general and IECTE in particular.  
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In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Rorty argued against the 
epistemological worldview, asking that we reject the notion of theory of 
knowledge or foundation of knowledge, as we dropped the idea that the world 
is flat, or the sun revolves around the earth. Without advocating that 
hermeneutics should be the successor subject to epistemology (Rorty, 1979, p. 
315). Rorty argued that ‚hermeneutics is an expression of hope that the cultural 
space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled‛ (Rorty, 1979, p. 315). 
From this perspective, there is little point in arguing against the many 
alternative methodological perspectives that are available (nor is there any 
point in the next section arguing against the research methods not used in this 
thesis). The question of difference in each is merely a question of philosophical 
orientation. To claim that the methodology (and methods) adopted herein are 
better than any other at finding the truth of structural injustice would be a 
contradiction between philosophy and methodology. For a similar reason this 
thesis rejects Gadamer’s (1975) claim to the universability of his approach and 
instead understands it as one approach among many (see Rorty, 1979, p. 380). 
 
A second idea for Rorty (1979) was that hermeneutics meant synthesis: Bringing 
together sentences and perspectives in the hope that something new and useful 
might emerge as a result. Rorty’s hope was that this type of synthesis might 
bring about as yet un-thought of edifices that have the power to woo future 
audiences and change the way we talk about the things that are important to us, 
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or open up the possibility of talking about altogether new subjects as we 
continue our conversations. On this point, Rorty (1979) wrote: ‚edifying 
discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old selves by the 
power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings‛ (p. 360). Rorty’s (1979) 
ironist hermeneutics, on this count, whilst it shares an open approach to 
knowledge formation, is an inversion of the Gadamerian project. Gadamer 
(1975) claimed that hermeneutics is the process of making the strange appear 
familiar, where-as in Rorty (1979) it is the process of making the familiar appear 
strange. This thesis takes up the later claim as it reconceptualises IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand along the lines of structural dissonance 
and enacted hope. Both propositions have the net effect of making the familiar 
appear strange. 
 
4.2 Methodology: Qualitative Research. 
 
This section links the methodology used in this thesis to broader perspectives 
on qualitative educational research. The links in this section are important 
because they identify hermeneutics as a legitimate research methodology amid 
alternative approaches. The alternative approaches are recognised but not 
introduced in any depth, they are highlighted for the purposes of 
contextualisation; through the articulation of difference. This section links this 
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thesis to integrative scholarship, and the bricolage and constructivist research 
paradigms in qualitative research. The three parts of this section explain those 
terms.  
 
4.2.1 Integrative scholarship. 
Integrative scholarship is a research practice that brings together multiple 
sources into a single scholarly project (Boyer, 1990). In his book Scholarship 
Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate, Boyer (1990) argued that the simple 
dichotomy of teaching and research had outlived its usefulness in the modern 
university. He proposed that the idea of scholarship within universities be 
given a ‚broader, more capacious meaning, one that brings legitimacy to the 
full scope of academic work‛ (Boyer, 1990, p. 16). To this end, he concluded 
that: ‚The work of the professoriate might be thought of as having four separate, yet 
overlapping, functions. These are: the scholarship of discovery; the scholarship of 
integration; the scholarship of application; and the scholarship of teaching‛ (Boyer, 1990, 
p. 16). 
 
Using scholarship of integration, as an academic metaphor, highlights a 
commitment to the multiplicity that is at the heart of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutic and the reconceptualist perspective in 
early childhood studies. The metaphor of depth, or expert use, of a single 
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research method is replaced in this thesis by multiple methods being brought 
into conversation with multiple perspectives: Multiple border crossings.  
 
4.2.2 Research bricolage. 
To further extend this idea of integration, this thesis identifies with Denzin & 
Lincoln’s (2005) metaphor of the research bricoleur. A bricoleur is a quilt maker, a 
maker of bricolage; a person skilled at combining many parts in the service of the 
whole. In another sense the bricoleur is a mat weaver; a maker of whāriki 
(mats). This is a metaphor that holds great currency in early childhood 
education given that the New Zealand curriculum statement for early 
childhood education is Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996). As a document 
Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) bases its structure on a metaphor of 
weaving together strands and principles: It is itself a form of bricolage. 
 
Denzin & Lincoln (2005) identified several types of research bricoleur: 
‚interpretive, narrative, theoretical, political, methodological‛ (p. 4). This thesis 
integrates the interpretive, theoretical, methodological types of bricoleur into a 
unified approach to research. The interpretive bricoleur brings together a 
variety of methods and interpretations with a number of possible effects. 
Likewise, the theoretical bricoleur brings together multiple theoretical 
perspectives in an attempt to create an alternative approach to a given subject 
or question. This thesis weaves diverse philosophical and theoretical 
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perspectives together to reconceptualise IECTE programmes in terms of 
structural dissonance and enacted hope. The methodological bricoleur brings 
multiple methods of data collection and analysis to bear on their research effort. 
This thesis combines hermeneutics, ideal type theory and focus groups as 
methods of inquiry. The result is a multifarious abnormal discourse.  
 
The notion of weaving multiple perspectives to form a unified whole; a 
bricolage, is not only in line with the Rortyan philosophical assumptions 
presented in the previous chapter, and the hermeneutic approach set out above, 
but is a normal mode of operation for Rorty in his writing. Mendieta (2006), in 
the introduction to his edited collection of interviews with Rorty, called him an 
‚ingenious mixer and masterful producer of modern bricolage‛ (p. xi). It was 
Rorty’s style to draw writers (of philosophy, literature, history etc.) together 
into conversations that support the point he wished to make at the time. For 
this reason, the metaphor of qualitative research bricolage sits well with the 
assumptions that underpin this thesis.  
 
4.2.3 Constructivist research. 
As a general theoretical framework for understanding the diverse possibilities 
encompassed under the umbrella term qualitative research, Guba & Lincoln 
(2005) borrow Kuhn’s (1962) notion of paradigms and paradigm shifts. The 
different research paradigms diverge not only in their basic beliefs over such 
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questions as being, knowledge, and methodology, but they also differ in 
specific issues such as criteria of quality, ethics, and the position of the inquirer 
(Guba & Lincoln, 2005, pp. 195, 196). The research paradigms outlined by Guba 
and Lincoln (2005) are: positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, 
constructivism, and participatory practices. 
 
This thesis identifies with the constructivist paradigm of qualitative research. 
For Guba and Lincoln (2005), the constructivist paradigm encompasses the 
following assumptions: realities are co-constructed, findings are created and 
involve the researcher as participant, methodology is hermeneutical 
(interpretative), quality means authenticity/internal coherency, ethics are 
process driven (goodness is in the authenticity of the construction itself), and 
the inquirer’s voice is ‚as facilitator of [a] multi-voice reconstruction‛ (p. 196).  
 
Constructivism is conducive to neo-pragmatism because it does not assume that 
there is an object called knowledge that can be found, or a real world that can 
be discovered, anymore than it thinks that the world is flat is a useful metaphor 
for modern day sailors. According to Guba & Lincoln (2005), ‚constructivists< 
tend toward the anti-foundational‛ (p. 204), they have little use for 
epistemology in the sense that knowledge has a certain structure that must be 
protected, maintained, and reproduced. Rather, constructivists take it upon 
themselves to create abnormal discourses, build edifices, and draw new 
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vocabularies into existing conversations. Identifying this paradigm in 
qualitative research supports the legitimacy of the methodology set out above. 
 
4.3 Research methods. 
 
The primary methods for data collection and interpretation used in this thesis 
are ecological hermeneutics, a Rortyan approach to ideal type theory and focus 
groups. This section introduces those methods and their uses. 
 
4.3.1 Using Gadamer and ecological hermeneutics. 
Ecological hermeneutics is a method developed in this thesis through the 
integration of Gadamer’s (1975) hermeneutic fusion, the hermeneutic circle and 
insights from Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological theory. This section identifies 
how these are applied as a method of data collection and analysis. 
 
Gadamer (1975) did not intend his approach to philosophical hermeneutics to 
be a method for understanding, he thought he had found the universal means 
by which all humans arrive at understanding. However, this thesis converts 
Gadamer’s insights into a method of inquiry. It does so by switching his 
approach from a passive theory (one which describes understanding) to an 
active theory (one which enables the construction of new understandings). The 
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distinction here is between an approach that seeks to explain understanding 
and one that uses that explanation to construct new knowledge. The elements 
of Gadamer’s hermeneutic fusion are then transformed into elements that can 
be manipulated and rearranged to produce innovative understandings within 
research contexts. This approach is aligned to the Rortyan attempt to make the 
familiar appear strange. 
 
In this thesis, the horizon of the text includes philosophical writing, theoretical 
perspectives, policy documents, curriculum artefacts and transcribed responses 
from focus group meetings. The horizon of foreunderstanding has been 
identified in chapter two in the section on reconceptualisation, and throughout 
chapter three in terms of the philosophical assumptions that underpin this 
thesis. In terms of method, those particular parts of this thesis are important 
because they set out how and why the fusion of horizon occurs, as well as what 
counts as successful fusion (i.e., a coherent and innovative reconceptualisation 
of IECTE programmes). In chapter 2, the application of this thesis was 
introduced as resistance to injustice and the hope for social justice.  
 
This thesis integrates Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological theory with the 
hermeneutic circle to construct a method of organising data in chapters six, 
seven and eight. Bronfenbrenner used the Russian doll as a metaphor for the 
nesting of contexts within which individuals and groups of individuals are 
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situated. This metaphor was used to show the different layers of contexts 
within which everyday human development occurs. Bronfenbrenner described 
these layers as systems and named them micro-, meso-, exo-, macro-, and 
chrono-. The content of these systems is not important to the method of 
ecological hermeneutics, but the metaphor of nested contexts is. In chapters six 
to eight, the interpretation of texts pertaining to the content and context of 
IECTE programmes is organised ecologically. Analysis moves from the general 
socio-historical context, to policy external to the university, to internal 
university policy and finally to findings from the focus groups. Movement from 
the general to the specific is therefore organised ecologically. 
 
4.3.2 Ideal type method. 
As noted above, this thesis uses a variation of Weber’s (1949) ideal type method 
as a theoretical tool for showing socioculturalism in the content of an IECTE 
programme and individualisation in the context of that programme. This is an 
important tool because it supplies a means for justifying the thesis of structural 
dissonance. The logic of part three of this thesis is as follows: 1. Define 
socioculturalism – show socioculturalism in the content of IECTE programmes. 
2. Define individualisation – show how individualisation is reproduced in the 
context of IECTE programmes. 3. Show how socioculturalism and 
individualisation are dissonant – show how content and context of IECTE 
programmes are structurally dissonant. Ideal type theory offers the means by 
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which socioculturalism and individualisation can be defined as well as the 
method by which their presence in content and context is justified.  
 
The theory of ideal types is part of the sociological method developed by 
German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920). Weber constructed ideal type 
method in his essay entitled ‘Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy’ 
(first published in English in Shils & Finch’s (1949) Max Weber – On the 
Methodology of the Social Sciences). In this essay, Weber coined the term ideal type 
to describe ‚an ideal picture of events‛ (Weber, as cited in Rogers, 1969, p. 17) 
that is ‚arrived at by the analytical accentuation of certain elements of reality‛ 
(Weber, as cited in Rogers, 1969, p. 17). What this means is that the ideal type ‚is 
not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression 
to such a description‛ (Weber, as cited in Rogers, 1969, p. 17). Weber’s ideal type 
is a tool (or construction) that can be used to analyse complex social 
phenomena. Analysis is achieved by asking the question: how closely does a 
context match the ideal type?  
 
According to Weber (as cited in Rogers, 1969, p 17), the ideal type is ‚formed by 
the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of 
a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-
sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.‛ On this 
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account, ideal types are created (rather than found or discovered), by bringing a 
number of nameable elements together into an intensified, idealised depiction. 
Weber (as cited in Rogers, 1969, p. 17) went on to say ‚in its conceptual purity, 
this mental construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a 
utopia.‛ By utopia, Weber meant a place that does not exist – the ideal type is not 
an empirical, or even a grounded (theory-style) construction, but rather, it is a 
theoretical construction – the construction of an idealised idea.  
 
The ideal type method applies the simple description (ideal type) to a complex 
situation (e.g., institutional structure). The simple description is Weber’s (1949) 
one-sided accentuation and the complex situation is, in this case as in Weber’s, a 
particular social process (e.g., IECTE programmes). Ideal type analysis works 
by comparing the simple description to the complex situation, asking, in 
Weber’s (1969) words, what is ‚the extent to which this ideal-construct 
approximates to or diverges from reality?‛ This thesis uses that method to 
construct ideal types for socioculturalism and individualisation and asks 
Weber’s question. 
 
4.3.2.1 Using ideal types in this thesis. 
Following Rorty (1979, 1989, 1999), this thesis has a deep suspicion of Weber’s 
belief that objectivity is attainable, his assumption that the true form of social 
processes/conditions can be found, and his assertion that reality exists as an 
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essence to be discovered. This thesis uses Weber’s method as a way of 
interpreting the content and context of IECTE programmes. This renovation is 
achieved by rejecting the distinction between interpretation and understanding, 
as well as the will to accurately represent reality. Thus, where Weber wanted to 
use his method to show real qualities of social institutions and their processes, 
this thesis uses his method to show how IECTE programmes can be interpreted 
using the vocabulary and concepts used to construct the ideal types. 
 
The ideal types used in this thesis are constructed from key texts associated 
with each category, namely: Out of the primary texts of socio-cultural writers 
such as Vygotsky (1986), Rogoff (1990, 2000), Lave and Wenger (1991), and 
Wertsch (1998); and out of the primary texts of individualisation theory i.e. Beck 
(1992), Beck & Beck-Gernsheim (2002), and Bauman (2001). The perspectives (in 
the form of language) of these authors are integrated to construct ideal types 
that contain key words that act as abbreviations for broader theoretical 
concepts. The method of analysis used in this thesis is interpretive insofar as the 
ideal type is used to justify claims of socioculturalism in the content and 
individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes. For the purposes of 
analysis the ideal types are organised using the following grid (fig. 1). The 
empty boxes in this grid will be filled by interpreting sociocultural theories 
(chapter 5) and individualisation theory (chapter 7). 
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  Socioculturalism Individualisation 
View of people     
Ideal social structure     
Social agency     
Participatory 
framework     
Fig 1. Grid of ideal types.  
 
4.3.2 Focus groups. 
As noted earlier (see 1.0) this is a theoretical thesis. However, focus groups are 
used to provide empirical support the thesis of structural dissonance in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Focus groups were used to counter the 
possible assertion that even though there is theoretical and textual evidence that 
structural dissonance exists, there is no empirical evidence to support this. This 
thesis used focus groups made up of year two and three student teachers in an 
IECTE programme with one university.  
 
The focus group method was chosen because focus groups are particularly 
useful in generating ‚large quantities of material from relatively large numbers 
of people in a relatively short time‛ (Kamberelis & Dimitriadis, 2005, p. 903). 
Focus groups were used as a point of contact with student teachers’ experiences 
gaining access to group meanings and shared experiences (Bloor, Frankland, 
Thomas & Robson, 2001, p. 4). Focus groups are often used for gaining initial 
insight into a topic, and are often followed by depth interviews of individual 
members (Bloor, Frankland, Thomas & Robson, 2001). This thesis used focus 
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groups to collect the responses and conversations of second and third year 
university students enrolled in an IECTE programme, but did not follow this up 
with in-depth interviews. The data generated from the focus groups was 
sufficient for the purposes of this thesis, namely, to analyse the language 
generated in student conversations using the ideal types for evidence of 
discourses associated with socioculturalism and individualisation.  
 
Duncan & Marotz-Baden (1999) observed that focus groups are useful for 
identifying how multiple perspectives fit together into a combined local 
perspective. Focus groups are often used in educational research to gauge 
group reactions to educational programmes (e.g., Nordstrom, Wilson, Kelsey, 
Maretzki & Pitts, 2000), and this thesis has adopted a similar approach. 
According to Krueger & Casey (2000) the goal of focus group research is to 
include between 10-15 respondents in order to get elicit a good number of 
responses. The focus groups at the case study university numbered between 6 
(for the smallest group) and 11 (for the largest group). This number of 
respondents worked well because it gave everyone a chance to speak and 
allowed for conversations to emerge beyond the scope of the initial question. It 
also allowed for easy return to the research agenda (questions) when 
conversation strayed from the topic of students’ experiences of their IECTE 
programme.  
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Using the focus group method for the empirical component of this study fits 
well with the linguistic turn taken in other parts of this thesis because the data 
type generated by focus groups is language (Creswell, 1998). Responses from 
each of the four focus groups were recorded and then transcribed by the 
researcher to form a text which could then be analysed. The transcriptions were 
coded based on the ideal type grid set out above and particular quotations were 
used in chapters 6 to 8 of this thesis as justifications for the proposition of 
structural dissonance in IECTE programmes.  
 
4.3.2.1 Focus group method. 
The focus group method was applied as follows: In the first instance ethical 
approval was sought for conducting focus groups at an IECTE degree 
providing institution and was approved by the Faculty of Education Ethics 
Committee on 26/02/2007 (see Appendix A). Considerations of confidentiality, 
anonymity, informed consent, voluntary participation and deception were all 
met. Information sheets and informed consent sheets were constructed to meet 
the guidelines for research that involves human subjects.  
 
Participants were recruited through posters pinned up around key student 
areas (lockers, café, early childhood education notice board) inviting second 
and third year early childhood student teachers to participate in focus groups to 
discuss their experience of their teacher education programme. The day before 
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the focus groups were to commence, students were given a personal invitation 
to participate in the research in three lectures containing second and third year 
initial early childhood student teachers. Students were also given the 
opportunity to have any questions they may have answered over the lunch 
break and throughout the morning of the first focus group.  
 
Two focus groups an afternoon over two afternoons (total=4) were offered and 
accepted by student participants. The total number of participants over the four 
focus groups was 32. Those focus groups took place in a room set aside on the 
campus of the case study university. The researcher waited outside the room at 
the appointed times to welcome participants and guide them to the focus group 
area. 
 
Focus groups began five minutes after the advertised time to allow for 
participants who might have been running late, and so as not to disturb the 
flow of the group. No participants arrived after the advertised time. 
Participants were verbally thanked for volunteering their time and handed an 
information sheet which identified the project and ethical considerations (e.g., 
privacy, the right to terminate participation, confidentiality and anonymity: see 
Appendix B). The researcher read through the sheet and answered any 
questions. No participants had questions, but they were all told that if questions 
did arise they could contact either myself or my supervisors on the numbers at 
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the bottom of the information sheet. Participants were then walked through the 
consent form and invited to sign at the bottom if they agreed to the clauses. All 
participants signed the form. 
 
Participants were then given a sheet of six questions to look at and told that 
these would be the questions we would be discussing in the focus group. 
Participants were also informed that supplementary questions may be used to 
extend or clarify conversation on a particular topic. Participants were invited to 
note down some initial responses before the focus groups began. Those notes 
were useful as conversation starters and ensured that participants were given 
time to reflect on their experiences before commenting. Those questions were:  
 
1. How would you describe your experience of teacher education so far? 
2. What do you enjoy the most about your experience as a student teacher? 
3. How does this make you feel? 
4. What do you enjoy least about your experience as a student teacher? 
5. How does this make you feel? 
6. How do you think that your educational experience could be improved? 
 
In each of the focus groups conversation tended to move away from the topic 
and several supplementary questions were asked in order to re-focus 
discussion. I have accounted for this in my reporting of statements generated in 
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focus group discussions by highlighting the general question or the 
supplementary question to which the statements were addressed. 
 
A recording device was placed in the centre of the table and each question was 
put to the group in sequence allowing as much time as participants required to 
answer to each one.  The ensuing conversation was recorded, transcribed and 
then analysed using the ideal types for socioculturalism and individualisation 
theory. The focus group method proved difficult to transcribe in places with 
participants often talking over one another resulting in some of the data being 
lost to noise. There was also a tendency across the groups for one or two 
participants to take over the conversation leaving little space for more quiet 
members of the group to voice their opinions. In hindsight I think that using an 
interview method with single participants would help to account for these 
difficulties. 
 
Once transcription was complete, sentences in the transcripts were coded using 
coloured highlighters into either sociocultural statements, individualisation 
statements, statements of dissonance, or neutral statements based on the themes 
conveyed by the speakers. Statements that related to each of the ideal types 
were then organised into groups according to the aspects of each ideal type to 
which they aligned. Those statements were then used in chapters six, seven and 
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eight to provide empirical evidence to advance the argument of structural 
dissonance. 
 
4.3.2.2 Discussion of focus group method. 
Using the focus group method in this thesis raises a methodological issue in 
relation to the tension between philosophical assumptions and hermeneutic 
methodology on the one hand, and the empirical project of accurate 
representation on the other.  
 
The philosophical assumptions used in this thesis make little sense of the claim 
that there can be more or less accurate representations of reality. This 
perspective challenges the data generated by the focus groups in terms of the 
participants own ability to represent the reality of their experience, and in terms 
of whether or not the sentences uttered by participants bare any wider 
(generalisable) significance in relation to IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand. The philosophical assumptions used in this thesis make both concerns 
obsolete by proposing that both concerns presuppose a vocabulary that I have 
argued, echoing Rorty (1979, 1989, 1999), that we can well do without. From this 
perspective, the value of the sentences generated in the focus groups does not 
exist in their ability to represent the reality of the situation, or to provide insight 
into a general(isable) dilemma, but rather, it exists in their ability to provide 
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examples of particular themes (namely, socio-culturalism, individualisation, 
and structural dissonance).  
 
Methodologically, once the words left the lips of the participants they opened 
themselves to new associations and new interpretations (Gadamer, 1975). From 
this perspective, there is no question over the author’s original intentions 
because that is the very question that Gadamer (1975) was at pains to avoid. 
This thesis has adopted that approach. A consequence of using this 
methodology is that the participants’ motivation for joining the focus groups 
does not come under scrutiny, meaning that whilst it is possible that only those 
students with an axe to grind participated, that is not a concern for the 
interpretation of focus group data. Interpretation instead hinges on thematic 
analysis (namely, associating the sentences with the ideal types for socio-
culturalism, individualisation, and the theme of structural dissonance).   
A second methodological consequence is that the sentences collected in the 
focus group sessions are assumed open to reinterpretation based on fusion with 
the reconceptualist preunderstandings used herein, and an application to ideal 
type analysis in general, and the argument of structural dissonance in 
particular. This treatment of the focus group data challenges epistemological 
understandings of the focus group method by presenting an 
antiepistemological alternative to data interpretation and its uses. 
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In terms of the difference that philosophical assumption and methodology 
make to my use of the focus group method, the net result circulates around how 
sentences are used to premise arguments of socio-culturalism, 
individualisation, and structural dissonance. By avoiding the need to accurately 
represent reality, and by opening the sentences generated in the focus groups to 
reinterpretation, this thesis side steps the positivist assumption that something 
real has been found, and replaces it with the pragmatic assumption that the 
generated can have uses beyond those perceived by the original speakers. In 
this thesis the data generated in the focus groups are useful not as empirical 
truths, but as sentences derived from alternative sources (i.e., the mouths of 
student teachers), and as such, provide another means of philosophical 
justification. 
 
Summary 
This chapter has set out the research methodology and methods used in this 
thesis. Links to philosophical assumptions were identified and the particular 
uses of research methods have been described. The methodology and methods 
set out in this chapter will be used in the next part of this thesis to justify the 
proposition that IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand are structurally 
dissonant. 
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Chapter 5 
Socioculturalism: An Ideal Type 
 
This chapter constructs an ideal type for socioculturalism, as a first step in 
investigating socioculturalism in the content of an IECTE programme. This 
chapter is divided into two parts. The first part identifies definitions and 
theories of socioculturalism from primary texts within this tradition. The 
second part draws on those definitions and theories to construct an ideal type. 
Much like MacNaughton (2005) in her use of Foucault, this thesis apologises to 
socioculturalists for not providing an exhaustive overview of socioculturalism 
and sociocultural theories. Like MacNaughton (2005), I believe that others (such 
as Wertsch, 1991 and John-Steiner and Mann, 1996) have made a much better 
job of this. This present chapter constructs an ideal type for socioculturalism by 
integrating general and specific conceptualisations of socioculturalism with the 
parameters set out on the ideal type grid (see Fig. 1).   
 
5.1 Socioculturalism: Definitions and theories 
 
This chapter is based on the methodological consideration that the texts 
consulted for hermeneutic construction should be considered complete, 
authoritative and important to the context to which they belong (Gadamer, 
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1975). This section begins with some general definitions of socioculturalism 
before turning to the primary texts of key sociocultural theorists in order to 
construct a database of vocabulary and concepts that will be used to construct 
an ideal type in the next section.  
 
5.1.1 Socioculturalism: General perspectives 
In a general sense, sociocultural theories of development assume that 
participation and participants are socially engaged, socially interactive and 
socially constructed. This means that the social and cultural world in which we 
find ourselves lends us the words by which we define ourselves. Gadamer 
(1975) called these words our pre-judgement, Heidegger (1962) our 
foreunderstandings. Generally speaking, socioculturalists assume that human 
development occurs through social and cultural interaction, specifically the 
formation of relationships (e.g., Bruner, 1975; Chaiklin & Lave, 1993; Cole, 1985; 
Tharp & Gillmore, 1988).  This group of theorists understand learning to be 
dependent on social contexts (e.g., Altman & Rogoff, 1987; Kublin, Wetherby, 
Crais & Prizant, 1989, p. 287; Nuttall & Edwards, 2007). Other writers pick up 
on the claim that human experience is developed and mediated by socially 
constructed tools, signs and actions (e.g., Rogoff, 1992; Smith, 2003; Wertsch, 
1991), and use this as a means for social justice.  
 
From some perspectives, socioculturalism is a movement that resists the 
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dominant discourse of developmentalism exemplified by Bredekamp’s (1989) 
notions of developmentally appropriate practice (e.g., Fleers, 1995). 
Socioculturalism, on this account, uses sociocultural theory as a means of 
resistance in the hope that something more can be made of human interactions 
(i.e., learning, facilitation, social peace). Socioculturalism in education acts as a 
set of discourses that make the social and cultural components of experience 
and learning primary pedagogical concerns (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nuttall, 
1997; Rogoff, 1990, 2003 and Wertsch, 1998), rather than focusing on intrinsic 
and individual psychological development (e.g., Piaget, 1926). Socioculturalism 
is therefore a way of describing and explaining behaviour that has been used to 
oppose individualised accounts of human development (Fleer, 1995). 
 
Lave (1991) defined socio-cultural theory as the theoretical claim that ‚learning, 
thinking and knowing are relations among people in activity in, with, and 
arising from the socially and culturally constructed world‛ (p. 67). Minick, 
Stone and Forman (1993, p. 6) sketched out a vision of socioculturalism that 
highlighted the cultural impact of social institutions, language development as 
a social and institutional practice, interpersonal relationships within shared 
contexts, and the social nature of both belief and cognition. Other writers like 
Wood, Bruner and Ross (1976) operationalised socioculturalism to develop 
pedagogies that express the importance of society and culture in teaching and 
learning (e.g., scaffolding).  
  
122 
 
Writers like Leont’ev (1981) and Saxe (1991) argued that all problem solving is a 
sociocultural event in which institutional, cultural, social and situational forces 
not only impact perception of problems, but also place limitations on the 
available possibilities for solution. This perspective is similar to the problem-
solving approach to early years education advocated by Dewey (1900, 1902). 
Other socio-cultural writers, such as Eckhoff and Urback (2008), have linked 
socioculturalism to childhood imagination by proposing that experience, 
imagination and emotion actively expand learning.  Others again, like Siu and 
Lam (2005), have applied sociocultural ideas to technology education in the 
early years and have observed that the background of parents and children, 
social expectation and society’s perception of technology and its uses, are all 
important factors in ascertaining the potentials of educational experiences. 
 
These authors are similar on two counts. The first is that they understand that 
context directly influences the course of development. The second is that each 
of these authors have a common point of theoretical reference, namely, the 
writing of Lev Vygotsky (1896-1934). These authors, however, are not alone in 
identifying Vygotsky as the origin of sociocultural theory, others include 
Damon (1984), Kozulin (2001), Lantolf (2000), Moll (1990), Slavin (1983, 1987), 
and Tudge and Rogoff (1989). The next section on key theorists begins with 
Vygotsky (1978, 1986) for this very reason, drawing on aspects of his theoretical 
perspective before drawing on other influential theorists who have offered 
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alternative interpretations of socioculturalism.  
 
5.1.2 Sociocultural theory.  
Vygotsky was the Russian Marxist philosopher and psychologist who, along 
with his colleagues in the 1920’s and 1930’s, first systematised sociocultural 
theory (John-Steiner & Mann, 1996). Much of his work was not translated into 
English until the late 1970’s, but since that time it has taken the interest of social 
theorists, psychologists, and in particular, educationalists (John-Steiner & 
Mann, 1996). In particular, Wertsch (1991) highlighted three major themes that 
reoccur throughout Vygotsky’s writing: That mental functions originate from 
social sources; that human action is mediated by social tools and shared 
language; and that developmental analysis is the best method for highlighting 
social and cultural influences. 
 
According to Vygotsky (1978), ‚every function in the child’s cultural 
development appears twice: first, on the social level, and later, on the 
individual level‛ (p. 57). Vygotsky (1978) called the mechanism for this process: 
internalisation. He believed that children (and humans in general) are socially 
and historically situated beings. For Vygotsky (1978, p. 56), this approach meant 
that learning, even from the earliest experiences, is not purely object-directed, 
but rather, it is directed by the reactions of others and interactions with others 
in the person’s social context. Along these lines, Vygotsky (1978) thought that 
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‚the internalisation of socially rooted and historically developed activities is the 
distinguishing feature of human psychology‛ (p. 57). Human development and 
learning, on this account, is determined by the social and cultural context in 
which a person is situated. 
 
By taking this particular line, Vygotsky (1978) avoided separating human 
development and learning. He perceived the human condition as an active, 
open ended, dialectically driven social and historical phenomenon where 
learning and development are folded into one another. Vygotsky’s (1978) socio-
historical method includes the principle that ‚to study something historically 
means to study it in the process of change‛ (p. 65). With this insight, Vygotsky 
(1938/1978) challenged theories that proposed that development leads learning 
(e.g., Piaget) and confirmed Dewey’s (1938) idea that learning is a matter of 
using social tools (e.g. signs and symbols) and their use. The upshot of 
Vygotsky’s approach to human development was that it navigated a path 
between universalism and individualism by using history to carve off the 
hubris of the former, and society to do away with the isolation of the latter. It is 
this turn toward the social as a way to explain questions of learning and 
development that is emblematic of Vygotsky’s (1978) version of psychology 
(Wertsch, 1995).  
 
Central to Vygotsky’s (1978) innovation in psychological thought is the notion 
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of the zone of proximal development. For Vygotsky (1978, p. 86) the zone of 
proximal development (ZPD) is the difference between a person’s independent 
problem solving skills and the possible level that could be reached with the 
help of others. Through the notion of ZPD, Vygotsky (1978) proposed that 
‚what children can do with the assistance of others might be in some sense even 
more indicative of their mental development than what they can do alone‛ (p. 
85). Along these lines, Vygotsky (1978, p. 88) emphasised the role of imitation in 
learning, by proposing that human development is enhanced when people 
work together for common goals. This position is similar to Dewey’s (1938) idea 
that learning is made meaningful through cooperation with others.  
 
According to Vygotsky (1978), ‚human learning presupposes a specific social 
nature and a process by which children grow into the intellectual life of those 
around them‛ (p. 88). From a Vygotskyan perspective, therefore, learning is a 
socially embedded process brought about ‚when the child  is interacting with 
people in his environment and in cooperation with his peers‛ (Vygotsky, 1978, 
p. 90). Further to this point, Vygotsky (1986) wrote about a ‚unique form of 
cooperation between the child and the adult that is the central element of the 
educational process‛ (p. 169). Clearly then, it was Vygotsky’s assertion that 
humans are social beings whose perception of the world and its contents is 
synonymous with being in a world of culturally mediated perceptions, 
languages and contents.  
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Vygotsky and Luria (1930, p. 4) claimed that sociocultural development is the 
‚cultural growth of behaviour. It is based on the mastery of devices and means 
of cultural behaviour and thinking.‛  Socioculturalism is, therefore, a 
framework that describes not only the situations that humans find themselves 
in, but also the activities that humans engage in within those situations. 
Vygotsky (1981) believed that human development occurs from the outside in 
and that ‚humans master themselves from the outside‛ (p. 141). Society and 
culture, on this view, profoundly influence human development and learning.  
 
Authors like Leont’ev (1981), Luria (1976), Rogoff (1990) and Wertsch (1984, 
1985) claim that Vygotsky is the proto-socioculturalist. However, the real 
influence of Vygotsky’s writing was not simply in the discourses that he 
personally produced, but also in the discourses that his work inspired, for 
example, Bakhtin (1981), Leont’ev (1981), and Zinchenko (1985). This thesis 
picks up the work of four Western writers who have been influential in further 
developing Vygotsky’s socio-historical perspective and in further expanding 
the vocabulary on socioculturalism identified in Vygotsky’s perspective. Those 
writers are Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Barbara Rogoff and James Wertsch. 
These authors have been chosen because they offer related but significantly 
different perspectives on socioculturalism. Taking this broader view of 
socioculturalism allows the integration of a group of perspectives under the 
banner of socioculturalism offering a richer set of resources than if only one 
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author (e.g., Vygotsky) was used. The remainder of this section will overview 
the perspectives set out by these authors as a data set from which 
socioculturalism as an ideal type will be constructed.  
 
In their book Situated Learning: Legitimate peripheral participation Lave and 
Wenger (1991) drew on Vygotsky’s idea that learning is socially and historically 
constructed to formulate a perspective on learning that draws together 
community and participation. Their vision of learning as a situated activity runs 
as follows: 
 
Learning viewed as situated activity has as its central defining characteristic a 
process that we call legitimate peripheral participation. By this we mean to draw 
attention to the point that learners inevitably participate in communities of 
practitioners and that the mastery of knowledge and skill requires new comers 
to move toward full participation in the socio-cultural practices of a community 
(p. 29). 
 
Lave and Wenger (1991) rescued the notion of apprenticeship from a relational 
conception of master and student tied into an object-based notion of mastery, 
and to broaden its meaning to include all of culture, history and the 
construction of social spaces. To this end, these authors developed a socio-
cultural theory of learning that embraced both generality (in the notion that all 
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learning is situated) and specificity (in the understanding that the situations in 
which learning occurs are diverse and possibly endlessly varied). To achieve 
this, Lave and Wenger (1991) developed the notion of legitimate peripheral 
participation which they defined as a ‚constitutive element‛ (p. 35) of learning in 
general. Lave and Wenger (1991) described peripheral participation in the 
following terms: 
 
Peripherality suggests that there are multiple, varied, more- or less-engaged 
and –inclusive ways of being located in the fields of participation defined by a 
community. Peripheral participation is about being located in the social world. 
Changing locations and perspectives are part of actors’ learning trajectories, 
developing identities, and forms of membership (pp. 35, 36). 
 
For Lave and Wenger (1991), legitimacy is a facet of a particular social interface 
that either empowers participants as they move into fuller forms of 
participation in a given community, or disempowers participants, where a 
community works to keep participants from full entry until the time is deemed 
(usually by the community) to be right. Lave and Wenger (1991) draw upon a 
Marxist tradition of viewing development as social practice  to propose that 
their notion of legitimate peripheral participation is less a grand theory aimed 
at an accurate representation of reality, but is rather, an analytic tool for 
exploring interconnections ‚through time and across cultures‛ (p. 39). 
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Socioculturalism, for Lave and Wenger (1991) highlights the situatedness of 
human activity, the movement from peripheral to full participation in those 
situations, and the relationship between settings and persons, contexts and 
human action.  
 
Lave and Wenger’s (1991) theory is important to include because it sets out a 
sociocultural project that integrates the social world with the transformation of 
individual participants within particular social and cultural contexts. To this 
end, they place ‚emphasis on connecting issues of sociocultural transformation 
with the changing relations between new comers and old-timers in the context 
of a changing shared practice‛ (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 49). For Lave and 
Wenger (1991), identity, practice and knowing are inherently social practices. 
From this perspective, when attempting to understand people, practices and/or 
learning, it is necessary to understand also the social, cultural and historical 
contexts to which people, communities and social institutions belong. The 
particular insight that Lave & Wenger (1991) offer this thesis, in terms of 
understanding socioculturalism, is that not only are people embedded within 
society, but they are part and parcel of what their setting entails. 
 
Lave and Wenger (1991) also introduce the notion of communities of practice. A 
community of practice is a ‚set of relations among persons, activity, and world, 
over time and in relation with other tangential and overlapping communities of 
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practice‛ (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 98). For example, if we were to refer to 
IECTE as a community of practice, we would be referring to those persons 
involved in the endevour of early childhood teacher education (students, 
teachers, administration, policy makers), those involved in the pedagogical 
experience (students, lecturers, tutors, course coordinators, administrators, 
policy makers) and those whose work in other disciplines (e.g. economics, 
social development, teachers council, early childhood settings, professional 
bodies) intersects that community. This means that sociocultural communities 
are not necessarily bound by space but rather by common concern or common 
history.  
 
The point of Lave and Wenger’s (1991) sociocultural theory is not that we 
merely learn in relation with others, but that we humans transform, reproduce 
and change ourselves within a wider context of social and historical 
relationships. For Lave and Wenger (1991), learning is a situated activity 
wherein participants move from peripheral toward full and active participation 
within a given community of practice, which is itself related to broader 
communities of practice within the wider social world. In my view, Lave and 
Wenger (1991) offer a tool for sociocultural analysis; one that can be used to 
investigate social practices in terms of legitimate participation (i.e., who can and 
who can not move from the periphery to the centre of a community of practice), 
and in social settings in terms of how communities of practice use rules to 
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include and exclude persons from participation. 
 
Wenger (1999) went on to develop the idea of communities of practice into a 
sociocultural theory of learning in his book Communities of Practice: Learning, 
meaning and identity. The theme of this book is that communities construct 
themselves through shared practices and reifications (documents, texts, policies 
etc), and that communities are established through mutual engagement (doing 
things together), joint enterprise (negotiating activity/meaning), and a shared 
repertoire (communal artefacts/reifications) (Wenger, 1999, p. 73). In Wenger’s 
(1999) view, communities of practice not only influence how we come together 
in common practice, but also how we form an identity in relation to that 
practice, the shared meanings through which that practice is invoked, and even 
the practices by which new meanings are integrated into the given 
communities.  
 
A third author, Barbara Rogoff offered another take on sociocultural theory that 
also builds on Vygotsky’s socio-historical theory. This thesis uses two of 
Rogoff’s books in particular to contribute to a database of vocabulary from 
which an ideal type for socioculturalism can be constructed. The first book is 
Apprenticeship in Thinking: Cognitive development in social context published in 
1990. The second book is The Cultural Nature of Human Development published in 
2003. 
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In Apprenticeship in Thinking Rogoff (1990) set out a ‚framework for 
conceptualising the development of mind in socio-cultural context‛ (p. 7). 
Rogoff’s (1990) approach used Vygotsky’s work to emphasise understandings 
of the social nature of development using apprenticeship as a metaphor for 
learning relationships. The central theme of this book is Rogoff’s (1990) idea 
that guided participation is a key concept for the collaboration and sharing that 
underpins human development (but with a particular emphasis on child 
development). This approach is closely related to Vygotsky’s zone of proximal 
development insofar as development depends on social connection. On this 
point Rogoff (1990) wrote: ‚Children use social resources for guidance – both 
support and challenge – in assuming increasingly skilled roles in the activities 
of their community‛ (p. 8). The idea of development as a form of social 
participation is echoed by Lave and Wenger (1991) when they linked 
development within social contexts with movement from peripheral to full 
practice.  
 
Rogoff’s (1990) use of apprenticeship as a metaphor framed children’s cognitive 
development as a relationship between novice and skilled partners, a notion 
that echoed Bruner’s (1961) idea of cognitive apprenticeships. However, she 
expanded this insight with the declaration that: ‚it is essential to view the 
cognitive activities of individuals within the cultural context in which their 
thinking is embedded‛ (Rogoff, 1990, p. 42), and not simply as an interaction 
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between two isolated individuals. This notion of embeddedness is important to 
the sociocultural perspectives constructed by both Rogoff (1990) and Lave and 
Wenger (1991). For Rogoff (1990), the cultural context extends beyond the 
institutions in which children learn (e.g., early childhood settings, schools) to 
include broader social and historical practices which influence the development 
of a person (e.g. language, economics, human rights). In Rogoff’s (1990) view, 
both novice and skilled partners (e.g., parents, teachers, older or more 
experienced participants) are embedded within contexts that extend beyond the 
formal face-to-face interaction.  
 
According to Rogoff (1990), guided participation is encouraged in communities 
and settings through the development of intersubjectivity. Intersubjectivity 
entails the mutual understanding that is developed between people over time. 
Intersubjectivity emphasises ‚that understanding happens between people; it 
cannot be attributed to one person or the other in communication‛ (Rogoff, 
1990, p. 67). Communication is the bridge that Rogoff (1990) used to connect 
novice and skilled participants by linking ‚familiar skills or information and 
those needed to solve new problems‛ (p. 66). Rogoff’s (1990, p. 100) point was 
that children, embedded within cultural historical contexts, through a process 
of collaboration increasingly take on more responsibilities for managing 
situations as they become familiar with particular tasks. Rogoff (1990) 
suggested that the phenomenon of guided participation is a world-wide 
  
134 
 
phenomenon, which embraces diverse contents, contexts and outcomes. Unlike 
Lave and Wenger (1991) she did not propose guided participation as an analytic 
tool (as in Wenger, 1999), but rather, she aimed to draw attention to contextual 
influences as powerful conditions for teaching and learning from a sociocultural 
perspective.  
 
Rogoff (1990) linked cognition with social interaction. She echoed Vygotsky in 
proposing that ‚the collaborative process seems to lead to a level of 
understanding unavailable in solitary endeavour or non-collaborative 
interaction‛ (Rogoff, 1990, p. 178). Rogoff’s (1990) socio-cultural theory 
embedded individuals in broader social and cultural contexts. Development, 
from this perspective, is a process of mutual engagement in culturally 
significant practices whereby learning is a function of becoming ever more 
proficient in socially and historically mediated skill sets (i.e., those skills which 
are important to the context in which the learner is embedded). The outcome of 
Rogoff’s (1990) view is that the space between participants and their context/s 
diminishes to the point that it disappears altogether, for learning is an 
interdependent affair that links persons and contexts into a single but richly 
diverse whole. 
 
In The Cultural Nature of Human Development Rogoff (2003) maintained her 
sociocultural view that ‚people develop as participants in cultural 
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communities‛ (p. 3), and that ‚children everywhere learn skills in the context of 
their use and with the aid of those around them‛ (p. 69). However, she added 
the assertion that ‚in the emerging socio-cultural perspective, culture is not an 
entity that influences individuals. Instead, people contribute to the creation of 
cultural processes and cultural processes contribute to the creation of people‛ 
(Rogoff, 2003, p. 51). On this account, participants and contexts co-specify one 
another. The novice in this case also takes on the role of skilled participant in 
the sense that the personal history of the novice (in a partial way) co-determines 
the character of the cultural context itself. Rogoff (2003) summed up this 
sentiment in the following fashion: ‚humans develop through their changing 
participation in the socio-cultural activities of their communities, which also change” 
(p. 11). From this sociocultural perspective, development occurs through the 
creation of relationships both human and environmental.     
 
Rogoff (2003) moved beyond Vygotsky’s socio-historical approach to develop 
an appreciation of the forward/future facing aspect of communities that are in 
the process of becoming other: that are involved in an ongoing process of 
change. Another way to say this is that: Participants and contexts co-determine 
one another in ways that transform not only relationships between persons, but 
also relationships between people and their environments, and their personal 
and communal histories. The idea that humans develop in cultural contexts that 
change with time and place opens the possibility for a forward facing 
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dimension of history (Bloch, 1986). This forward aspect contains relationships 
between persons and settings that have not-yet-been-achieved, modes of 
participation that are not-yet-conscious, and social and cultural settings that are 
yet to be constructed.  
 
Rogoff (2003) noted that ‚cognitive development is an aspect of the 
transformation of people’s participation in socio-cultural activities‛ (p. 237). But 
it is also plausible that she is also making the point that participants themselves 
transform activities, contexts and cultures as they interact, make choices, and 
develop together in unprecedented directions and in ways that may also break 
completely with the social and cultural spaces to which their histories belong. 
Socioculturalism is therefore not only bound to the past and the present, but 
also contains an element of what has not-yet-become (Bloch, 1986). For this 
reason, socio-cultural theory, as a theory of unfinished activity opens onto the 
vista of hope. This theme will be further developed in chapter ten. Suffice it to 
say that from Rogoff’s (2003) perspective, sociocultural theory is as much to do 
with transformation as it is to do with interpreting or describing society. 
 
In 1998, James Wertsch published Mind as Action (though he had written several 
books on sociocultural theory prior to this, e.g., Wertsch, 1984, 1985, 1991. In 
this book, he set out a sociocultural research agenda focusing on agents and 
their use of cultural tools. Wertsch (1998) claimed that ‚the task of a 
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sociocultural approach is to explicate the relationships between human action, 
on the one hand, and the cultural, institutional, and historical contexts in which 
the action occurs, on the other‛ (p. 24). This claim builds on an assumption, 
which is common to Dewey, Vygotsky, Lave and Wenger and Rogoff: That 
human development can not be effectively understood in terms of the 
individual alone, but instead, it must be viewed in terms of the activities of 
human agents within their cultural context. That said, Wertsch (1998) advocated 
a view that, ‚one of the tasks of sociocultural analysis< is to find a way to 
avoid the pitfalls of < individualistic reductionism‛ (p. 21). Holding that view 
encouraged Wertsch (1998) to not only argue against the pitfalls of viewing 
individuals in isolation, but also to position sociocultural theory in the space 
where individual and society interface, and to argue for an understanding of 
sociocultural theory that has its basis in human action (p. 23).  
 
By human action, Wertsch (1998) meant mediated action. Mediated action 
occurs as agents within socio-cultural contexts use cultural tools (e.g., artefacts, 
language, ritual) for diverse purposes. According to Wertsch (1998), ‚almost all 
human action is mediated action‛ (p. 25). This assertion opens another vista in 
sociocultural analysis by focusing analysis on agents and their use of culturally 
mediated tools rather than on interactions between agents and the settings in 
which they are situated. Wertsch (1998) viewed his project as a continuation of 
the perspective put forward by Vygotsky (1986), insofar as participants within a 
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culture use the tools of that culture, e.g., language, social structures, objects. 
Wertsch’s (1998) emphasis on utility and activity aligns him well will pragmatic 
philosophers such as Dewey and James. 
 
In terms of the transformational qualities of mediated action, Wertsch (1998) 
explained that ‚the introduction of novel cultural tools transforms the action‛ 
(p. 42). Wertsch (1998) gives the example of the switch from bamboo poles to 
aluminium poles in Olympic pole vaulting and the influence this had on pole 
vaulting practice. However, we might just as easily use examples such as the 
implementation of Te Whāriki in 1996, or introducing a new toy to a preschool 
sandpit. In each example, the introduction of the tool makes new action 
possible; the tool itself, complete with its culturally appropriate uses, becomes 
the catalyst for change within each setting. By itself, it is only a potential, but in 
human hands that potential is realised. The point Wertsch (1998) makes is 
similar to Rogoff’s (2003) notion of co-determination, wherein development is 
viewed as an interaction between learners, their communities and the cultural 
tools used in diverse contexts. In both cases, transformation is not only possible, 
but a necessary aspect of activity in sociocultural domains, and in both cases 
development is situationally embedded but at the same time potentially 
culturally transformative. 
 
According to Wertsch (1998), cultural tools do not operate as value independent 
  
139 
 
artefacts: Issues of power (who created them and why) and authority (who 
sanctions particular uses) permeate their production and consumption within 
diverse sociocultural contexts. For example, the New Zealand early childhood 
curriculum is a tool used by early childhood teachers for a number of purposes 
within early childhood settings (e.g., planning, assessing, informing practice). 
This document is not a neutral tool, but was constructed out of a series of 
assertions that have been privileged over possible alternatives (e.g., 
developmental theories over post-structural considerations of power and 
knowledge: MacNaughton, 2005), it has power over practice insofar as its use is 
audited by the Education Review Office, and it also provides a degree of 
authority that teachers can use to justify their practice to parents, to the 
Teachers Council, and to each other. Wertsch (1998) makes the point that ‚by 
invoking the appropriate cultural tools [within a given sociocultural setting] it 
is possible for one’s actions to take on a kind of power and authority‛ (p. 72, 
brackets added). In this view, sociocultural theory not only accounts for 
development and transformation, but also involves a hermeneutics of suspicion 
(Ricoeur, 1974) regarding how cultural tools are used by agents to exert power 
(both over others and for the purposes of self determination).  
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5.2 Socioculturalism: An Ideal Type. 
 
In this section, an ideal type for socioculturalism is constructed as a one-sided 
accentuation of the vocabulary set out above. This section explains the ideal 
type for socioculturalism in greater detail, working through each of the parts. 
The ideal type grid is set out on the following page, using the headings 
discussed in 4.3.1.  
 
  Socioculturalism 
View of people  
 
Embedded/Situated (culture, history, time, place), 
agents of change, connected to contexts 
Ideal social structure Participatory, co-constructed 
Social agency Contextualised, supports equitable transformation 
Participatory 
framework 
 
Inclusive, communicative, community-based, 
relationship-based. 
 
Fig. 2. Ideal-type for socioculturalism 
 
5.2.1 Socio-culturalism: A view of people. 
As noted, soci-culturalism views people as beings embedded within wider 
social and historical networks (e.g., Vygotsky, 1978, 1986; Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
Rogoff, 1990, 2003; Wenger, McDermott & Snyder, 2002; Wertsch, 1998). For this 
reason, to understand a person or group of people, it is necessary to also take 
into account considerations of cultural experience, the history of that experience 
in the life of the person and in the life of their culture, and the actual physical 
and social spaces that the person or people inhabit (Lave & Wenger, 1991). 
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From this perspective, people are not merely figures set against a background 
of social, cultural and historical importance: The social, cultural and historical 
contexts to which the person belongs are part and parcel of that person or 
people (Rogoff, 2003). Within this framework the idea of the independent 
individual makes little or no sense (Rogoff, 1991).  
 
Socioculturalism focuses on human activity (Vygotsky, 1978, 1986; Wertsch, 
1998). Humans are viewed as agents that both change and are changed by their 
environments (Rogoff, 2003). Likewise, specific tools (e.g., language, artefacts, 
habits) are integrated into the life experience of persons. Human development 
from this perspective is the product of human activity within contexts, history 
(personal and contextual), in relationship with other human beings. For 
socioculturalism, humans are actively involved in the shaping and re-shaping 
of their own experience (Rogoff, 2003), and the contexts in which they are 
situated whilst at the same time they are shaped and reshaped by those contexts 
and wider networks of action (e.g., natural disaster, change of government, 
employment). From this perspective humans are viewed as contextually 
situated, interconnected and part and parcel of wider relationships and 
histories of experience.  
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5.2.2  Socio-culturalism:  Ideal social structure. 
Sociocultural analyses of institutions has focused on participation (e.g., Lave & 
Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990; Wenger, 1999; Wenger, McDermott & Snyder, 
2002). Institutions act as social, cultural and historical contexts to which people 
belong in varying degrees (Lave & Wenger, 1991). People’s interactions with 
one another within institutions, interactions between those who are more 
experienced in the context and those who are new to it, and the relationship 
between the culture of the institution and the culture of participants are all 
areas of interest to sociocultural perspectives (e.g., Rogoff, 2003; Wenger, 1998). 
Institutions are viewed as matrixes of social and cultural interactions where 
diverse participants are brought into dialogue with one another and with the 
wider institutional culture (e.g., Wenger, McDermott & Snyder, 2002). For this 
reason, at the interface of participant and institution there is diversity, 
especially insofar as diverse participants interact with institutional cultures in 
multiple ways. Take, for example, participant responses to the death of a loved 
one. Anglicised European cultures have a very different view of funeral 
arrangements than Māori or Islamic people. For most Muslims, the funeral 
happens on the day of the death; Māori will leave the body to rest in the home 
and the funeral (tangi) will last a period of three days, and for most Anglicised 
Europeans the body of the deceased will stay at a funeral home until the day of 
burial or cremation.   
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Given that participants within institutions belong to a number of social and 
cultural contexts (e.g., ethnicities, sports affiliations, cultural groups, hobby 
communities, political affiliations), and that there is also a great diversity within 
people’s personal experiences of living in those contexts, socioculturalism 
embraces, and indeed expects diversity as a matter of course (Lave & Wenger, 
1991; Rogoff, 1990, 2003). A sociocultural perspective on institutional structure 
encourages the acceptance of diversity within the institutional culture, for 
instance through charters that recognise and encourage multicultural 
perspectives, and through team building activities that bring people from 
diverse backgrounds into dialogue with one another in the pursuit of shared 
goals. Acceptance of diversity may also be achieved through the 
celebration/authentication of events important to particular participants within 
an institution for example Holi for Hindu people, Ramadan for Muslims, 
Christmas (in both the religious and the secular sense), and Matariki (Māori 
new year). Socioculturalism maintains an inclusive stance toward diversity 
insofar as diversity is encouraged within socio-cultural frameworks of analysis 
(e.g., as applied in many contemporary early childhood education settings).  
 
5.2.3 Socioculturalism: Social agency. 
Social agency is a key focus of socioculturalism (Rogoff, 1990; Wertsch, 1998). 
Socio-culturalism, although it is a tool for describing and explaining activities 
and events within social and cultural settings, can also be used as a tool to 
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encourage the distribution of power and authority among participants within 
social contexts (Wertsch, 1998). Control is exerted through the relationships 
between participants, the contexts to which they belong, and their history 
within a given context. Control is embedded in the rules by which the context is 
formed and maintained (e.g., purpose, regulations, best practice). It is also 
embodied in the activity of experienced participants as they interact with one 
another, and with those who are new to the context (Lave & Wenger, 1991). 
Over time, as they gain experience, new participants also gain a greater degree 
of autonomy as they become accustomed to the practices, expectations and 
procedures inherent in that context. For example, first year university students 
might reasonably be expected to be more dependent on library staff than third 
year students when it comes to the use of research databases. Over time, power 
(in terms of the ability to research) moves into the hands of students as they 
become more accustomed to using the databases (which can be considered 
cultural tools in a university context). Lave and Wenger (1991) describe this as a 
centripetal movement toward full participation. 
 
Although power is distributed within social and institutional contexts it should 
be noted that power is not necessarily distributed evenly (Bourdieu & Passeron, 
1990). Some participants have more authority than others within various 
sociocultural contexts (e.g., lecturers, priests, head teachers, bank managers, 
company directors and so on). Socioculturalism is, therefore, not necessarily a 
  
145 
 
tool for achieving equal distribution of control in different contexts. It is a lens 
through which relative degrees of participation may be analysed (Wenger, 
1999). The distribution of power and authority is one concern that is 
highlighted when using a sociocultural lens (Wertsch, 1998) and as such it 
opens on to the possibility of transforming social relationships for social justice 
purposes (e.g., Smith’s (1966) work on children’s rights, and Te One’s (2009) 
PhD thesis on rights in early childhood settings). Through a sociocultural lens, 
humans are social agents, therefore social agency, in terms of relations between 
people and the contexts in which they are embedded, is a central concern (e.g., 
Fleer, 1995). 
 
Social cultures are developed through the action of social agents who both 
transform and are transformed by their context (Rogoff, 2003; Wenger, 1998). It 
is arguable as to whether this leads to equity for all participants within a given 
context, suffice it to say that this is a topic that might attract the attention of 
sociocultural researchers interested in explaining the cultural determinants of 
social agency (e.g., Wenger, McDermott & Snyder, 2002).  
 
If socioculturalism is itself a cultural tool, and if this tool, like all cultural tools 
(Wertsch, 1991, 1998) is available to mediated action, then the tool itself can 
undergo the same sort of transformations that all tools do when they are picked 
up and used. The pole remains a pole when it is used to hold open a gate, the 
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curriculum remains a legal document when it is used as a fan on a hot day, and 
the dump truck remains a dump truck even when it is used as a doorstop. It is 
the use that transforms the object. This thesis argues that although 
socioculturalism is commonly used to explain and describe phenomena, it has 
also been used to inspire cultural change (e.g., to challenge developmental 
discourses: Fleer, 1995). From this perspective, socioculturalism supports social 
agency for the transformation of social and cultural spaces. 
 
5.2.4 What is a sociocultural view of participatory frameworks? 
Socioculturalism identifies participation as a key attribute of social, cultural and 
historical development (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990, 2003; Vygotsky, 
1938/1978). Socioculturalism describes the construction of mutually beneficial 
communities where participants are encouraged to form bonds of belonging 
and a sense of shared identity (Wenger, 1998). For socioculturalism, issues of 
more or less, central or peripheral, inclusive or exclusive, mark central concerns 
when it comes to explaining the role of participation in social settings (e.g., Lave 
& Wenger, 1991). For this reason, socioculturalism explains participatory 
frameworks as being community oriented, wherein communities are formed 
and re-formed through co-mutual action between participants, and between 
participants and the contexts in which they are embedded. Communication is a 
key means by which participation occurs (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990; 
Vygotsky, 1938/1978; Wertsch, 1998). 
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In IECTE programmes communication takes many forms including official texts 
(e.g. induction texts, curriculum, workplace rules), regulations, lines of 
authority (e.g. director, manager, supervisor, teacher), between participants at 
each of those levels, through the use of jargon, and in the explanations of shared 
habits of action (e.g., talking to infants before during and after their nappy 
change). Sociocultural notions of embeddedness, participation and inclusion 
may be used to encourage communication between people, institutions and 
cultural contexts. That interaction is, to varying degrees, open insofar as 
participants and their contexts may be transformed as a result of that 
communication. For example, when a Muslim child enrols in an early 
childhood centre and they are the only Muslim child (or the only child from a 
particular tradition in Islam, e.g., Shi’i or Sunni), it can be expected that two 
things may happen. First, the child will be introduced to the culture of the 
particular centre (e.g., spaces that have specific functions, activities that are 
organised for certain times, games and songs that children already at the centre 
know). Over time, it can be expected that the child will transform some of their 
own habits as a direct result of interacting with this new context. Second, the 
centre as a community will transform by introducing aspects of Islamic culture 
to the setting and the other participants in that setting (e.g., respect for 
Ramadan, recognition of halal (food regulations) and an understanding of Silat 
(prayer) and its role in the day-to-day life of Muslim children). In this example, 
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through communication and interaction, transformation is a two-way event. 
The participatory framework is co-mutual in theory.  
 
A sociocultural framework of participation involves a concerted effort aimed at 
inclusivity and developing a sense of belonging (Rogoff, 1991; Wenger, 1998). 
The concept of inclusivity in this case uses a rationale of shared activity, shared 
language, and shared space to organise interactions within social contexts. The 
key to this aspect of socioculturalism is in the degree to which diverse 
participants and their social and cultural histories are included in diverse social 
settings. Inclusion in this case means that not only do people from diverse social 
and cultural backgrounds have equal access to social and institutional contexts, 
but also that they are given the opportunity to express their identity without 
censure. Socio-cultural researchers such as Rogoff (2003) have informed us that 
inclusion itself is a notion that has different meaning to different cultural 
groups, so for the most part it is best considered a negotiated event.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has used sociocultural texts to construct an ideal type for 
socioculturalism. The components of that ideal type included understandings of 
people as embedded/situated (culture, history, time, place), agents of change, 
and connected to contexts; participatory and co-constructed social structures; 
contextualised, equitable and transformative understandings of social agency; 
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and inclusive, community based and communicative participatory frameworks. 
The concepts incorporated in this ideal type are used in the following chapter to 
justify the claim that the content of IECTE programmes is greatly influenced by 
socioculturalism.  
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Chapter Six 
Socio-culturalism in the content of IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
 
This chapter uses the ideal type for socioculturalism developed in the previous 
chapter to interpret the content of an IECTE programme in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand. The point of this chapter is to show the variety of ways that 
socioculturalism influences content, as the first step in showing how structural 
dissonance occurs within an IECTE programme. Analysis in this chapter is 
organised using the ecological hermeneutic introduced in chapter four (see 
section 4.3.1). The first part of this chapter uses May’s (1997, 2001) idea of the 
shifting gazes of the state to make the point that the focus of early childhood 
education has moved from the individual to the social. This is the socio-
historical level of the ecological hermeneutic (see fig 3).  
 
The next part of the chapter analyses texts that are external to the university but 
which influence the content of IECTE programmes: Graduating Teacher Standards 
(NZ Teachers Council, 2007) and the New Zealand Early Childhood Education 
Strategy (Ministry of Education, 2002). Following that analysis, this thesis 
studies two core texts used in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa: The early 
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childhood curriculum - Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996), and the 
assessment handbook Kei Tua o te Pae (Ministry of Education, 2004 – 2007). They 
are core texts because they relate directly to the Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ 
Teachers Council, 2007) stipulation that graduating teachers ‚have knowledge 
of the relevant curriculum documents of Aotearoa New Zealand‛ (NZ Teachers 
Council, 2007, S1:c) and that graduating teachers ‚have knowledge of a range of 
relevant theories, principles and purposes of assessment and evaluation‛ (NZ 
Teachers Council, 2007, S2:b). 
 
Following the analysis of core texts this chapter investigates the content of the 
2007 course outlines of the seven New Zealand universities that offer IECTE 
programmes. The sociocultural content of each IECTE programme is 
highlighted as specific examples of what I am calling socioculturalism in IECTE 
programmes. Multiple sites are used in this analysis in order to show that the 
case study university is not unique among IECTE programmes offered in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. Following that, the 2007 programme from one case 
study IECTE provider is analysed in depth, focusing on the achievement 
objectives of each course, the pedagogical work (assessed work) and required 
readings for each course. Finally, the findings from the focus groups, 
concerning the content of IECTE programmes, are introduced. This will show 
that there is also empirical evidence that supports the argument being 
advanced. 
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The parts of this chapter work together to provide evidence to support the 
claim that the content of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand is 
greatly influenced by socioculturalism.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Ecological hermeneutic for chapter 6. 
 
6.1 Socio-historical context. 
 
In her historical analysis of early childhood education in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, May (2009) used the notion of gaze as a metaphor for understanding 
how society has viewed early childhood education over time. Following May 
(1997, 2001), this thesis defines gaze as the official/mainstream/general 
Socio-historical and 
External texts 
IECTE programmes in 
NZ universities 
Focus 
Groups 
Core texts 
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perspective on early childhood education. This thesis does not argue that 
alternative gazes on early childhood education have not emerged in each of 
May’s (1997, 2001) epochs, but rather, that for the purposes of analysis, May’s 
(1997, 2001) metaphor is useful as it shows movement away from 
individualistic to social agenda over time. The following chapter points out the 
irony that contemporary institutional structures socially enforce the 
individualisation of persons, resulting in the fragmentation of social settings.  
 
May (2005, p. 23) identified six historical gazes: Survival, moral, physical, 
psychological, equity, and economic and asserted that the progression of each 
gaze is chronological, with overlaps and unresolved concerns, meaning that in 
many instances the gazes are overlaid upon one another. May (2004) used the 
following depiction to illustrate her chronology of shifting gazes: 
 
 
Fig. 4. Shifting Gazes of State (May, 2004, p. 75). 
 
This thesis divides May’s (2004) metaphor of gazes into two categories: 
individual focused and society and culture focused. The survival, moral, 
Survival gaze (18th C.)-----------------------------------------------------------------------------> 
 Moral gaze (late 19th C.)------------------------------------------------------------------> 
  Physical gaze (early 20th C.)----------------------------------------------------> 
   Psychological gaze (mid 20th C.)-------------------------------------> 
    Equity gaze (late 1960’s)--------------------------------------> 
     Economic gaze (1990’s)------------------------------> 
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physical and part of psychological gaze takes the individual, as the basic 
element of analysis. In this group, the overarching idea is that if one looks to 
individuals and their development in a systematic and deliberate fashion then 
society will benefit as a result. Wertsch (1998) called this individualistic 
reductionism. The survival gaze responded to the high mortality rate of 
children in the 19th century, particularly in England, but also throughout 
Europe (May, 1997). With this gaze individual lives of individual children were 
the key focus of legislation (e.g., Children’s Protection Act, 1890) and efforts at 
early childhood care (e.g., Thomas Coram’s foundling schools).  
 
 The moral gaze, whilst concerned with the creation of a better society (May, 
1997), responded to the problem of immorality by rescuing children from the 
immoral influences of their social context. The first Free Kindergarten in New 
Zealand is a case in point where ‚they wanted to lay hold of the little ones, who 
came into the world burdened with evil tendencies‛ (Dunedin Free 
Kindergarten Association, 1891, p. 11, as cited in May, 1997, p. 69). The goal, in 
this case, was to save individual souls from damnation through Christian virtue 
and the inculcation of moral habits. The physical gaze, drawing on early child 
development literature as justification, reacted less to the moral behaviour of a 
person and more to the development of a healthy, normal body (May, 1997).  
 
The psychological gaze straddles the individualistic and sociocultural divide. In 
  
155 
 
pre-1980’s in NZ, psychology had dropped the religiously infused notion of soul 
to pick up the more secularly appropriate notion of mind. At the same time 
behavioural psychologists like B.F Skinner (1968) maintained a focus on the 
things that bodies do, Freud’s (1923) psychoanalytic psychology brought a 
concern for the wellbeing of children’s subconscious selves. Freud’s 
intrapersonal psychology influenced not only his daughter Anna Freud, who 
worked with children rather than neurotic adults as her father had, but also 
Susan Issacs whose Malting House School provided research evidence in favour 
of a free play approach to education (e.g. Intellectual Growth in Children, 1930). 
New Zealander Moira Gallagher was strongly influenced by Issacs’ work (May, 
1997), as was Gwen Sommerset, who was to become the intellectual matriarch 
of the Playcentre movement in New Zealand. Both women had a lasting 
influence on early childhood education in New Zealand (May, 1997, 2001). 
 
More relevant to contemporary early childhood education in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, and highlighting the movement from the individual to the social in 
child development discourses, is the movement from Piaget’s (1935/1971) 
personal constructivism to Vygotsky’s (1978) social constructivism. Piaget’s 
(1935/1971) personal constructivism centred on the biological development of 
individual children and the biological basis of learning (e.g., children learn 
differently at different stages of development). Piaget (1935/1971) held that a 
child understands the world through their own actions on that world and their 
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subsequent experiences: That is, children personally construct their 
understandings of the world through acting on that world with the resources 
that they possess as biological beings who adapt to their environment. 
 
The shift from using Piaget to using Vygotsky is a historical fact in New 
Zealand discourses of child development. For example, Smith (1998), in her 
fourth edition of Understanding Children’s Development, a text used in human 
development papers at one New Zealand university, remarked that ‚earlier 
editions of this book placed a great deal of emphasis on the theory of Swiss 
psychologist Jean Piaget‛ (p. 5). In the fourth edition only 17 pages mention 
Piaget’s work whilst thirty eight pages are devoted to Vygotsky, and a further 
seven to Rogoff. The shift from Piaget to Vygotsky is indicative of the 
dominance of socio-cultural discourses in contemporary early childhood 
education and development.  
 
May’s (2001) final gazes evoke a social perspective in their rationale for early 
childhood education. The equity gaze is linked with what she calls liberation 
politics, where groups within New Zealand society (e.g., Māori: Ritchie, 1993) 
advocated against exclusion and assimilation on the one hand and for inclusion 
and self-determination on the other. During the time that May characterises as 
the equity gaze past wrongs began to be righted. In regards to Māori issues of 
equity, this began with Lange government’s recognition of the Treaty of 
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Waitangi (1840) as New Zealand’s founding document which led to changes in 
the charters and strategies of Crown agencies (e.g., Ministry of Social 
Development, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health), and opened space for 
the development of programmes aimed at the reinvigoration of Māori culture 
(i.e., the Kohanga Reo movement). The equity gaze, though sharing common 
ground with individualism and personal liberty, shifted the focus toward a 
social and cultural vista. For example, in 1984, in summing up the government’s 
position on issues of culture William Renwick, the then Director General of 
Education, stated that ‚concern for cultural diversity and cultural respect... [are 
issues+ to be faced to in every aspect of our lives as New Zealanders‛ (Renwick, 
as cited in May, 2001, p. 185).  
 
This shift toward what Wertsch (1998) would call social reductionism is the 
shift away from viewing the individual as an isolated agent toward viewing 
humans as essentially social agents. This social reductionism continued into the 
1990’s and 2000’s in the form of an economic reasoning that situated early 
childhood education within a broader national project for economic 
sustainability. For example, the ten year strategic plan for early childhood 
education: Pathways to the Future: Ngā Huarahi Arataki (Ministry of Education, 
2002) stated at the outset ‚our social, educational and economic health can only 
benefit from efforts and resources focused on young New Zealanders. We 
cannot leave to chance the quality and accessibility of early childhood 
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education‛ (p. 1). Economic sustainability, on this account, benefits the entire 
country, and it is a significant tool for establishing national prosperity.  
 
The above analysis, using May’s (1997, 2001) metaphor of shifting gazes offers 
justification for thinking that the socio-historical context of contemporary New 
Zealand early childhood education, and subsequently IECTE programmes is 
societally focused. This is not to say that focus on the individual is lost. This is 
certainly not the case (e.g., Ministry of Education, 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004).  
Rather, it points out that over the course of time, descriptions of early 
childhood education and its uses have taken a sociocultural turn where by 
individuals are viewed as embedded within inclusive social settings and 
intricately linked to the communities in which they feel they belong.  
 
At this general level in the ecological hermeneutic, the contemporary socio-
historical context of the content of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand socioculturalism has an important influence. This discussion has 
shown how the gaze that directs early childhood education has come to view 
people as embedded within their social context; has come to value inclusion 
and diversity; and has come to encourage active participation within social and 
socio-economic settings.  
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6.1.1 Socioculturalism and the Graduating Teacher Standards. 
 
The Teachers’ Council of New Zealand is mandated by the Education Act (1989) 
to encourage best teaching practice, issue practicing certificates to registered 
teachers, maintain standards for qualifications that lead to registration; and 
approve quality teacher education courses (part 10b, 139AE). In 2007 the 
Teachers Council published the Graduating Teacher Standards (2007). The 
purpose of Graduating Teacher Standards (2007) is to ‚describe what a teacher at 
the point of graduation from an initial teacher education programme will know, 
will understand, will be able to do, and the dispositions they will have that are 
likely to make them effective teachers‛ (NZ Teachers Council, 2007, p. 2). This 
document regulates the content of IECTE programmes. For this reason, this 
thesis examines the Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 2007) in 
the content of IECTE programmes. 
 
IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand are expected to ‚develop a 
graduate profile for each programme that will be aligned with the Graduating 
Teacher Standards‛ (NZ Teachers Council, 2007, p. 2). The Teachers Council 
(2007) stipulates that ‚the profession will expect that the Provisionally 
Registered Teachers entering their school or early childhood services will meet 
the Graduating Teacher Standards‛ (Teachers Council, 2007, p. 2). This 
stipulation influences the construction of IECTE programmes by ensuring that 
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teacher education institutions provide evidence to the Council that will give 
assurance that the Graduating Teacher Standards will be met by all graduates 
(NZ Teachers Council, 2010).  
 
Within the Graduating Teacher Standards (2007), there are three categories of 
competencies that IECTE providers are expected to develop through their 
teacher education programmes: professional knowledge, professional practice, 
and professional values and relationships. Professional knowledge contains the 
first three standards: Graduating teachers must know what to teach; know 
about learners and how they learn; and, understand how contextual factors 
influence teaching and learning. Professional practice contains a further two 
standards: Graduating teachers must use professional knowledge to plan for a 
safe, high quality teaching and learning environment; and, use evidence to 
promote learning. And professional values and relationships contain the final 
two standards: Graduating teachers must develop positive relationships with 
learners and the members of learning communities; and, be committed 
members of the profession (NZ Teachers Council, 2007).  
 
According to the Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 2007), it is 
essential that graduating early childhood education teachers have knowledge of 
Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996). Discussion of Te Whāriki (Ministry of 
Education, 1996) is undertaken in the following section. This curriculum is 
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commonly held to be a sociocultural curriculum document (e.g., Carr & May, 
1993; Cullen, 1996, 2003; May, 2001; Nuttall, 2003). Making knowledge of Te 
Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) a prerequisite for graduating early 
childhood teachers means that the content of IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand are necessarily sociocultural. Furthermore, within the 
context of IECTE programmes, an understanding of relevant learning theories, 
theories of development and pedagogies, whilst not exclusively sociocultural is 
also necessarily sociocultural in great part. This is because Te Whāriki (Ministry 
of Education, 1996) is framed using a socio-cultural perspective on 
development, teaching and learning (Nuttall, 2003).   
 
Graduating teachers are expected to ‚have an understanding of the complex 
influences that personal, social, and cultural factors may have on teachers and 
learners‛ (NZ Teachers Council, 2007, p. 1). This document understands 
humans as being connected to the contexts of which they are an integral part. 
Social agency, within this frame, is localised to the communities to which 
teachers and learners belong, and to human interactions within those 
multifaceted contexts. Understanding teachers and learners is therefore a matter 
of understanding the sociocultural contexts within which they are embedded 
and to which they feel a sense of belonging.  
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A more specific link to sociocultural assumptions in teacher education is 
standard six which requires that ‚graduating teachers develop positive 
relationships with learners and the members of learning communities‛ (NZ 
Teachers Council, 2007, p. 2). On the one hand there is the recognition that 
education is about forming relationships, and on the other is the notion of 
learning communities. Graduating teachers are required to: 
 
a. ‚Recognise how differing values and beliefs may impact on learners and their 
learning. 
b. Have the knowledge and dispositions to work effectively with colleagues, 
parents/caregivers, families/whānau, and communities. 
c. Build effective relationships with their learners. 
d. Promote a learning culture which engages diverse learners effectively. 
e. Demonstrate respect for te reo Māori me ngā tikanga-a-iwi in their practice‛ 
(NZ Teachers Council, 2007, p. 2).  
 
Recognition of diversity, assumptions that teachers and learners are embedded 
in multiple contexts, a focus on building relationships, a commitment to 
inclusion and participation and a respect for culture are all hall marks of 
socioculturalism as this thesis understands it. That IECTE programmes are 
required to develop these competencies in graduating student teachers, 
combined with a requirement to use sociocultural curriculum and assessment 
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tools, means that the content of IECTE programmes, if they are to be certified by 
the New Zealand Teachers Council (and the Committee on University Academic 
Programmes) need  necessarily to incorporate sociocultural ways of understanding the 
world.  
 
6.1.2 Socioculturalism and the New Zealand early childhood strategy. 
The New Zealand strategic plan for early childhood education is Pathways to the 
Future: Ngā Huarahi Arataki (Ministry of Education, 2002). This strategy was 
advanced by the Labour-led government that created it as ‚a journey towards 
increased participation, improved quality and stronger relationships‛ (Ministry 
of Education, 2002, cover). Although aspects of that strategy were retrenched by 
the incoming National government in 2009, the strategy was still influential to 
the context of IECTE programmes during the time of data collection for this 
thesis (2007-2008). The strategy not only aimed to increase participation, meet 
the needs of individual communities, promote collaborative relationships and 
‚be more responsive to the needs of children, parents, families and whānau‛ 
(Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 3), but it also aimed to ‚increase the numbers of 
registered teachers‛ (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 14). 
 
Socio-cultural notions of participation (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 11), 
inclusivity (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 14), cultural responsivity (Ministry 
of Education, 2002 p. 15), co-construction (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 17) 
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and scaffolding (through the now terminated Centres of Innovation action 
research project), permeate this document. Pathways to the Future (Ministry of 
Education, 2002) provides links to the socio-cultural content of Te Whāriki 
(Ministry of Education, 1996), specifically stating the assumption that: 
‚children’s learning and development are fostered if the well-being of their 
family and community is supported; if their family, culture, knowledge and 
community are respected; and if there is a strong connection and consistency 
among all aspects of the child’s world‛ (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 16). 
Pathways to the Future (Ministry of Education, 2002) aims to build stronger links 
to communities, community groups and support networks in an effort to 
improve participation and quality, and promote collaborative relationships. For 
these reasons, Pathways to the Future (Ministry of Education, 2002) is a strategy 
that reflects a dominant framework of socioculturalism as it is focused on 
improving outcomes through forming effective relationships between children, 
centres, teachers, family, whānau and external interest groups (e.g. schools, 
health and social services). Improving life for individuals by improving the 
quality of their context is implicitly linked to Vygotsky’s (1978) idea that the 
external context directs human development.  
 
I have argued that the improvement of social and cultural contexts through 
quality early childhood education is a primary focus of policy in contemporary 
early childhood education policy. This focus assumes that the contexts in which 
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children are embedded have a lasting influence on their development. I have 
also argued that teachers have an important role to play in the lives of children 
as they work to construct inclusive environments that encourage the 
participation of children and their families in early childhood services.  
 
6.2 Socioculturalism in the common texts used in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand are diverse in their content (see 
section 7.3), however all use the early childhood curriculum – Te Whāriki 
(Ministry of Education, 1996) and the early childhood assessment handbook Kei 
Tua o te Pae (Ministry of Education, 2004-2007). This thesis calls those texts 
common texts. 
 
6.2.1 Socioculturalism and the New Zealand early childhood curriculum. 
Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) is a socio-cultural curriculum (Carr & 
May, 1993, 2001; Nuttall, 2003). As a curriculum document, it draws on a 
number of theoretical discourses in addition to socio-culturalism (namely 
Piaget’s personal constructivism – particularly in the exploration strand which 
proposes that ‚the child learns through active exploration of the environment‛ 
(Ministry of Education, 1996, p, 16); Erikson’s psycho-social theory of 
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development – in the assumption that children develop through stages with 
specific developmental needs such as the idea that infants need security for 
socio-emotional development (Ministry of Education, 1996, p, 22); and 
Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) socio-ecological theory of nested contexts (Ministry of 
Education, 1996, p, 20). However, a large part of the content of Te Whāriki 
(Ministry of Education, 1996) is heavily influenced by socioculturalism. This 
section identifies those influences in the text of Te Whāriki (Ministry of 
Education, 1996) as further defence of the claim that socioculturalism heavily 
influences the content of IECTE programmes. 
 
The stated focus of Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) uses a sociocultural 
vocabulary. For example, the curriculum aspiration for children is as follows: 
‚to grow up as competent and confident learners and communicators, healthy 
in mind, body, and spirit, secure in their sense of belonging and in the 
knowledge that they make a valued contribution to society‛ (p. 9). Whilst it is 
also asserted that the curriculum ‚is about the individual child‛ (Ministry of 
Education, 1996, p. 9), the child is not understood as an entity isolated from 
social and cultural context, but rather, the curriculum uses sociocultural 
understandings of the children being embedded within familial contexts and 
multiple communities (Ministry of Education, 1996). Providing a case in point 
for the argument of sociocultural assumption, Te Whāriki (Ministry of 
Education, 1996) clearly states the following: 
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This curriculum emphasises the critical role of socially and culturally mediated 
learning and of reciprocal and responsive relationships for children with 
people, places, and things. Children learn through collaboration with adults 
and peers, through guided participation and observation of others, as well as 
through individual exploration and reflection (p. 9). 
 
Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) consists of four principles: 
empowerment/whakamana, holistic development/kotahitanga; family and 
community/whānau tangata; and, relationships/ngā hononga. Three out of 
those four principles are based on sociocultural assumptions of embeddedness 
and connection. Within this principle ‚the child’s whole context, the physical 
surroundings, the emotional context, relationships with others‛ (Ministry of 
Education, 1996, p. 41) contribute to a child’s development. This principle 
requires adults working with children to not only understand child 
development, but also to have ‚a clear understanding of the context in which 
they are working‛ (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 41). Bi-cultural 
considerations are also highlighted as well as the assertion that ‚children 
should be encouraged to understand and respect the different cultures which 
make up our society‛ (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 41). These socio-cultural 
concerns for the contexts (physical and social) in which children are embedded, 
the formation of strong communal relationships and the importance of cultural 
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inclusion relate positively to the ideal type for socioculturalism worked out in 
the previous chapter. 
 
The principle of family and community/whānau tangata emphasises that: 
 
Children’s learning and development are fostered if the wellbeing of their 
family and community is supported; if their family, culture, knowledge and 
community are respected; and if there is a strong connection and consistency 
among all the aspects of the child’s world (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 42).  
 
Furthermore, teachers are directed to foster culturally appropriate 
communication, community participation in ECE programmes and a 
commitment to Māori language, culture and communities. These commitments 
further strengthen the link between socioculturalism and the early childhood 
curriculum in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
The principle of relationships/ngā hononga values ‚co-operative aspirations, 
ventures and achievements‛ (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 43). Socio-cultural 
learning theories are encompassed in this principle as well as the learning 
environments will encourage ‚active and interactive learning opportunities for 
children to have an effect and to change the environment‛ (Ministry of 
Education, 1996, p. 43). The development of transformative relationships, focus 
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on co-operation, and the importance of relationships between children and 
adults strongly links Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) with 
socioculturalism. 
 
Interwoven with the principles are the five strands and their associated goals, 
which arise from the principles (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 15). Those 
strands are: well-being/mana atua, belonging/mana whenua, contribution/mana 
tangata, communication/mana reo, and exploration/mana aotūroa. Because 
contemporary New Zealand notions of health and well-being are holistic (see 
Ministry of Education, 1999; Ministry of Health, 2000) well-being necessarily 
encompasses social well-being/taha whānau and links to others and the wider 
community. Belonging/ mana whenua is socio-cultural insofar as it encourages 
‚connecting links with the family and the wider world are affirmed and 
extended‛ (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 15). Contribution/mana tangata 
picks up on the transformative notion of sociocultural theory identified iby 
Rogoff (2003), and communication/mana reo highlights the importance of 
language development, use of symbols, and shared understandings that is at 
the heart of Vygotskyan (1986) social constructivism. The only strand that 
appears non-sociocultural is exploration/mana aotūroa, which is based on a 
more personal constructivist (Piagetian) understanding of children and 
development as children ‚develop working theories for making sense of the 
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natural, social, physical, and material worlds‛ (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 
16).  
 
Socio-culturalism heavily influences Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) 
from the introduction right through to the learning outcomes. My analysis of 
the vocabulary used in this document found that sociocultural concepts are 
used consistently throughout the document, for example the word 
culture/cultural appears 45 times in the text, context appears 32 times, 
community appears 45 times, relationship/s appears 59 times and the word 
social/ly appears 63 times (the words individual, individuals and individually 
appear a total of 56 times). The evidence outlined offers support to the 
proposition that the content of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand is 
heavily influenced by socioculturalism, insofar as Te Whāriki (Ministry of 
Education, 1996) is a core text used in IECTE programmes at all New Zealand 
universities. 
 
6.2.2 Socioculturalism and Kei Tua o te Pae (Ministry of Education, 2004). 
It is central to the graduating teacher standards: that students ‚have knowledge 
of relevant theories, principles and purposes of assessment and evaluation‛ 
(NZ Teachers Council, 2007, p. 1). Kei Tua o te Pae (2004) is a core text for 
understanding the use of sociocultural assessment in early childhood settings.  
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According to the Ministry of Education (1996), ‚the purpose of evaluation is to 
make informed judgements about the quality and the effectiveness of the 
programme‛ (p. 29). However, Carr (2003) has stated that Te Whāriki (Ministry 
of Education, 1996) itself gave little real guidance on how that situated 
assessment should occur. Carr, May and Podmore (1998) have observed that 
from the mid-1990s early childhood services were required to keep records of 
assessment procedures for external auditing. The lack of concrete explanation 
and example in Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) over how sociocultural 
assessment might take place coupled with mandatory accountability, led to the 
development of Kei Tua o te Pae: Assessment for Learning (Ministry of Education, 
2004).  
 
In developing Kei Tua o te Pae (2004), the Ministry of Education cited in its 
rationale the development of ‚a resource to support and guide assessment 
practice that is embedded within the dynamics of teaching and learning and the 
context of Te Whāriki‛ (Ministry of Education, 2006, p. 3). As a resource, Kei 
Tua o te Pae (2004) was targeted at learning communities and their ongoing 
professionalisation (Ministry of Education, 2004, p. 2), drawing, from the outset, 
upon a sociocultural reservoir of language. Similar to scaffolding, or 
tuakana/teina notion of integrated participation, Kei Tua o te Pae (Ministry of 
Education, 2004) uses the platform of exemplars to identify quality assessment 
practices to assist teachers and student teachers to develop their own 
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assessment practices.  
 
Explicit links to sociocultural theory are made in the exemplars to ‚indicate that 
there is a learning community involved in both curriculum and assessment. The 
learning community includes children, families, whānau, teachers and others‛ 
(Ministry of Education, 2004, p. 1:3). A link to Vygotsky is made on page 16: 
‚arguing that belonging and participating in ‘what we all do here and what we 
value’ is a prerequisite for individual learning‛ (Ministry of Education, 2004, p. 
1:16).  
 
Book two of Kei Tua o te Pae (Ministry of Education, 2004) focuses specifically on 
sociocultural assessment, whilst book five highlights the importance of inviting 
multiple participants into ‚a particular community designed to foster children’s 
learning‛ (p. 5:2). This particular exemplar emphasises the importance of 
developing learning communities and draws directly on Wenger (1999, p. 271) for 
its rationale, going on to state ‚it is helpful to think of the early childhood 
setting as a learning community constructed through the everyday responsive 
and reciprocal relationships that develop between those who belong to it‛ 
(Ministry of Education, 2004, p. 16).  
 
Sociocultural assessment practices aim to empower learners in their contexts 
and enable them to develop learning dispositions (Katz, 1993) that encourage 
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them to bring their own lived experiences to bear on local educational settings. 
Katz (1993) identified five learning dispositions: taking an interest, being 
involved, persisting with difficulty or uncertainty, communicating with others, 
and taking responsibility. In her book, Assessment in Early Childhood Settings: 
Learning Stories, Carr (2001) identified learning dispositions as ‚responsive and 
reciprocal relationships between the individual and the environment‛ (p. 22). 
Carr (2001) provided a sociocultural perspective on learning dispositions 
wherein ‚learning dispositions are< located in activities, in places, and in 
communities‛ (p. 35). 
 
It is because the idea of learning dispositions leads to the development of 
learning stories as a socio-cultural assessment tool that they are worth mention 
in the context of this thesis. For Carr (2001) learning stories ‚illustrate the 
domains of learning dispositions in action‛ (p. 95); this necessarily involves 
protecting and enhancing the early childhood setting as a learning community: 
 
‚Assessment will protect and enhance the centre as a learning community in 
whatever way the community defines learning and provides for it. Assessment 
will be about participation: it will be of the learner-in-action-mediational-means 
in terms of mediational means that are locally available‛ (Carr, 2001, p. 94). 
 
Learning stories and learning dispositions are key concepts in Kei Tua o te Pae 
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(Ministry of Education, 2004), and assessment is crucial to the measurement of 
both learning and quality, and quality learning experiences are essential to both 
Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) and Pathways to the Future (Ministry of 
Education, 2002). Focus on embeddedness, relationship building, contextual 
influences, participation and cultural appropriateness are all factors that firmly 
link Kei Tua o te Pae (Ministry of Education, 2004) to socioculturalism.  
 
This discussion has shown that the core texts used throughout IECTE 
programmes are heavily influenced by socioculturalism. Both texts view people 
as being intricately connected to familial, community and cultural contexts. 
Both documents encourage participation, relationship building, and the co-
construction of knowledge, learning spaces and assessment, and both texts 
provide a communicative, community based perspective that encourages and 
supports equitable transformation (of persons and places). 
 
6.3 Socioculturalism in New Zealand Universities  
 
This section now considers the next layer of the hermeneutic ecology to identify 
the influence of socioculturalism in the compulsory papers of Bachelor of 
Education (Early Childhood) courses in seven New Zealand universities. The 
2007 programme outlines (found online) for each university are used as the data 
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set upon which analysis is performed. These texts were chosen because of their 
accessibility, their relevance to the programmes they summarise, and their 
function as guiding documents describing the content of IECTE programmes in 
each of the universities. These courses reflect the sociocultural emphasis of 
external agencies (i.e., the New Zealand Teachers Council and the New Zealand 
Ministry of Education) and the socio-cultural impetus of the New Zealand early 
childhood curriculum and assessment guide. They are important to survey as 
they provide further textual evidence that socioculturalism heavily influences 
IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
6.3.1 Socioculturalism and IECTE programmes in New Zealand universities.  
At present there are seven New Zealand universities offer a three year Bachelor 
of Education (Early Childhood) programme: Auckland University, Auckland 
University of Technology, Massey University, Otago University, University of 
Canterbury, Victoria University, and Waikato University. This section shows 
that in 2007 each of them used socioculturalism as a core for their IECTE 
programmes. This section will focus on the compulsory courses for the campus 
based Bachelor of Education degree (BEd). The universities outlined in this 
section are organised into alphabetical order for the purposes of analysis.  
 
Each university followed a similar format of course construction: practical 
courses, pedagogical courses and academic courses. Practical courses were 
  
176 
 
courses that include sections of teaching practice in ECE settings or reflection on 
that practical experience. Pedagogical courses were campus-based courses 
concerned with curriculum and assessment, professional teaching practice, and 
cultural studies. Academic courses were campus-based courses which are 
closely aligned to sociology, history, politics, and philosophy. However, it 
should be noted that practical courses contained both pedagogical and 
academic components to greater and lesser degree depending on the course. 
Likewise, pedagogical courses contained both academic aspects and practical 
and reflective applications, whilst academic courses may encompass pedagogy 
and an application to practice.  
 
Methodologically, this thesis uses a grid for each university to organise the foci 
of all compulsory courses within each of the three types of courses (practice 
based, pedagogical and academic). All courses used Te Whāriki (Ministry of 
Education, 1996) as a core document and were reconciled with Graduating 
Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 2007). 
 
6.3.1.1 Socio-culturalism in IECTE: Auckland University. 
Relationships and relationship building, contextual influences on teaching and 
learning (embeddedness), the construction of effective learning environments 
and the promotion of diversity key aspects of my interpretation of the 
Auckland University IECTE BEd programme. A focus on participation and 
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macro-influences in some papers contributes to the sociocultural perspective 
that underpins this programme. Sociocultural theory was used throughout the 
programme with explicit mention in the first year courses. 
 
Level Practice-based  Pedagogical Academic Ideal type 
100 Developing 
professional 
relationships in 
ECE settings.  
Construction of learning 
environments; 
understanding diversity; 
using sociocultural 
assessment tools; 
understanding Māori 
culture; developing a 
sociocultural approach to 
understanding children’s 
wellbeing; curriculum 
areas. 
Diversity in 
education and 
developmental 
theory; 
understanding 
diversity and 
teaching 
practice. 
Inclusive, 
contextualised, 
relationship 
based. 
200 Constructing 
learning 
environments; 
managing 
relationships in 
ECE settings 
Social science (improving 
participation, belonging and 
cultural understanding); 
relationship building with 
infants; cultural identity, 
languages and literacy; 
development of holistic 
learning environments; 
curriculum areas. 
Integrating 
teaching, 
learning and 
assessment; 
understanding 
the citizenry 
rights of 
learners. 
Participatory, 
connected to 
contexts, 
relationship 
based, agency 
focused. 
300 Extending and 
deepening 
relationships in 
diverse 
contexts. 
Contextual influences on 
play; play and citizenship; 
play and society; 
ethical/political/social 
dimensions of learning 
environments. 
Macro 
influences on 
education; 
socio-historical 
approaches to 
understanding 
educational 
contexts; 
contextual 
influences on 
teacher practice. 
Relationship 
based, 
contextual, 
inclusive, 
agency 
focused. 
Fig. 5 Socioculturalism in compulsory IECTE courses at Auckland University (2007). 
 
7.3.1.2 Socioculturalism in IECTE: Auckland University of Technology. 
Specific focus on bi- and multi-cultural contexts of teaching and learning, 
understanding contextual influences on children, their parents and early 
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childhood settings, and use of sociocultural theories of learning and 
development are hallmarks of this programme. ECE settings, teachers and 
children and their families were viewed as being embedded within diverse 
sociocultural contexts. Sociocultural theory was used in each course particularly 
in the third year.  
 
Level Practice-based  Pedagogical Academic Ideal type 
100 Linking ethical 
and regulatory 
contexts with 
reflective 
practice. 
Māori customs and 
language; 
maintaining healthy 
and safe 
environments; 
curriculum and 
young children; 
socio-cultural 
learning and 
relationship building 
with young children. 
Sociocultural 
development; 
learning in socio-
cultural contexts; 
developing respectful 
relationships with 
parents/whānau. 
Contextual 
connections, 
participation 
focused, 
inclusive, 
relationship 
based. 
200 Documentation; 
reflect on 
practice in 
relation to 
DOP’s. 
Working with parents 
and families; critical 
assessment of 7 
curriculum areas in 
relation to infants, 
toddlers and young 
children. 
Learning theories in 
cultural contexts; 
working with children 
with special needs; 
child development in 
New Zealand; 
advocacy & 
wellbeing. 
Co-
constructive, 
contextual 
connections, 
inclusion. 
300 Contexts of 
student 
learning; policy 
and regulation 
relating to 
communities 
and families. 
Historical and current 
approaches to 
curriculum, use of 
sociocultural 
assessment tools; a 
sociocultural 
approach to second 
language, music and 
arts development. 
Sociocultural 
perspectives in ECE; 
critical approaches to 
teaching philosophies, 
learning theories, 
professional practice; 
designing effective 
learning  environs. 
Community 
based, 
contextual 
connections, 
agency 
focused,  
Fig. 6 Socioculturalism in compulsory IECTE courses at Auckland University of 
Technology (2007). 
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6.3.1.3 Socioculturalism in IECTE: Massey University (Palmerston North). 
A focus on inquiry into social and cultural contexts of children and their 
parents, socio-political contexts in which ECE programmes operate and 
appreciation of the cultural contexts in which children and their families are 
embedded are hallmarks of this programme. This programme highlighted 
inclusivity, social teaching and learning and emphasis on children’s 
participation. 
 
Level Practice-based  Pedagogical Academic Ideal type 
100 Functions and 
responsibilities 
of teachers in 
learning 
environments. 
Introduction to Māori 
language; principles 
and practices of Te 
Whāriki (1996) (the 
role of adults in 
children’s learning); 
arts and maths in 
ECE. 
Learning, learning 
styles, teaching 
strategies; social 
cultural and political 
contexts of ECE in 
NZ. 
Relationships, 
contextual, 
supporting 
equity, 
cultural. 
200 Strategies for 
fulfilling 
responsibilities 
in ECE settings. 
Social and cultural 
issues for Māori 
learners; social 
science, maths, 
science and health 
and physical 
education.  
Sociocultural 
assessment and 
teaching and learning; 
inclusive pedagogy 
and building 
networks; children’s 
construction of 
knowledge and 
contextual influences. 
Inclusive, 
connected to 
context, co-
construction. 
300 Critical inquiry 
into children’s 
social, political 
and cultural 
contexts and 
the ethical and 
social aspects of 
teaching 
practice. 
Programme 
planning and 
sociocultural 
assessment in 
learning contexts; 
arts; curriculum 
integration. 
Socioecological 
perspective on 
children and their 
development; 
analysis on national 
and international 
ECE programmes; 
inclusive education 
and the 
development of 
inclusive settings. 
Contextual, 
participatory, 
inclusive. 
Fig. 7 Socioculturalism in compulsory IECTE courses at Massey University 
(2007). 
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6.3.1.4 Socioculturalism in IECTE: Otago University. 
A focus on contextual influences of ECE programmes, socio-cultural contexts of 
children, their families and teachers, the social and cultural foundations of 
education and human development are all hallmarks of this programme. Socio-
historical analysis, social constructivism and use of bi-cultural and multi-
cultural perspectives on participation link this programme closely to 
socioculturalism.  
Level Practice-based  Pedagogical Academic Ideal type 
100 Professional 
and 
regulatory 
context of 
ECE. 
Introduction to Te 
Whāriki (1996); 
language and literacy 
development in the 
early years; ECE in the 
NZ context; Māori 
language and customs. 
Teachers in 
sociocultural 
contexts; social 
foundations of 
education; human 
development in 
sociocultural 
contexts. 
Contextual, 
embedded, 
contextualised, 
communicative. 
200 Knowledge 
recognition 
and 
promotion of 
complex 
learning. 
Analysis of Te Whāriki 
(1996); quality 
education and care of 
children; developing 
collaborative 
relationships with 
children and parents; 
Māori language and 
customs. 
Teaching and 
learning 
(cognitive, 
behavioural, 
social 
constructivist); 
socio-historical 
context of ECE in 
NZ. 
Relationship 
based, co-
constructed, 
contextualised. 
300 Implementing 
and 
evaluating 
integrative 
programmes 
for learning. 
Implementation of Te 
Whāriki (1996) in bi- 
and multi-cultural 
settings; professional 
practice in diverse 
contemporary 
contexts; individual 
research project; Māori 
language and customs. 
Practical 
implications of 
research and 
educational 
theory; research 
methods in ECE. 
Supports 
equity, 
inclusive, 
connected to 
contexts. 
 
Fig. 8 Socioculturalism in compulsory IECTE courses at Otago University 
(2007). 
 
 
  
181 
 
6.3.1.5 Socio-culturalism in IECTE:  University of Canterbury. 
A focus on relationship building, contextual influences on children, families 
and development, socio-cultural assessment and emphasis of bi- and multi-
cultural settings is a hallmark of this programme. Links between quality and 
cultural awareness, promotion of children’s participation, awareness of 
diversity and a focus on inclusivity link this programme to socioculturalism. 
Level Practice-based  Pedagogical Academic Ideal type 
100 Professional 
practice and 
self- reflection. 
Developing 
relationship building 
skills; understand bi- 
and multi-cultural 
responsibilities; 
regulatory context of 
ECE; curriculum, 
diversity and effective 
learning environments; 
Māori language & 
culture. 
Learning, learning 
styles, teaching 
strategies; social 
cultural and 
political contexts 
of ECE in NZ. 
Relationship 
based, 
contextual, 
communicative, 
inclusive. 
200 Self-reflection 
and centre 
management. 
Adult/child learning 
relationships; quality 
and culturally aware 
learning experiences; 
planning for learning in 
bi-cultural settings; 
curriculum and 
assessment. 
Sociocultural 
assessment and 
teaching and 
learning; inclusive 
pedagogy and 
building 
networks; 
children’s 
construction of 
knowledge and 
contextual 
influences. 
Relationship 
based, supports 
equity, 
inclusive, co-
construction, 
contextual. 
300 Self-reflection, 
the Treaty of 
Waitangi and 
continued 
professional 
development. 
Developing inclusive 
practices; development 
of reciprocal 
relationships in ECE 
settings; working 
collaboratively; Māori 
language and culture. 
Action research; 
developmental 
context of the 
curriculum. 
Supporting 
equity, 
inclusive, 
relationship 
based, 
inclusive. 
 
Fig. 9 Sociocultural in compulsory IECTE courses at the University of 
Canterbury (2007). 
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6.3.1.6 Socioculturalism in IECTE: Victoria University of Wellington. 
A focus on building professional and inclusive relationships, enhancing a sense 
of belonging, encouragement of community involvement in ECE and a 
sociocultural perspective on human development are hallmarks of this 
programme. Use of socio-historical analysis, a focus on constructing responsive 
bi- and multi-cultural settings, and an emphasis on the participatory rights link 
to socioculturalism. 
 
Level Practice-based  Pedagogical Academic Ideal type 
100 Professional 
relationships within 
ECE settings; 
Developing 
relationships with 
parents/whānau. 
Exploring Te 
Whāriki (1996); well 
being and 
belonging needs; 
culture and Māori 
language and 
protocols. 
Sociocultural 
perspective on 
child development; 
socio-historical 
analysis of ECE in 
NZ. 
Relationship 
based, 
community, 
inclusive, 
supporting 
equity. 
200 Practices for 
building inclusive 
relationships with 
parents and 
whānau; relating 
links with the 
wider community. 
Language and 
communication in 
diverse contexts; 
music and 
expression in 
diverse contexts; 
curriculum areas; 
language 
acquisition and 
Māori culture. 
Children’s rights 
and socio-
contextual 
issues. 
Supporting 
equity, 
relationship 
based, 
communicative, 
inclusive. 
300 Leadership and 
community 
involvement; 
regulatory contexts of 
ECE; context and the 
development of 
quality programmes. 
Facilitating and 
extending 
children’s 
thinking 
processes. 
Socio-emotional 
development in 
sociocultural 
settings; 
advocacy for 
children in 
diverse settings. 
Contextual, 
community, 
supporting 
equity, 
inclusive, 
participatory. 
 
Fig. 10 Socioculturalism in compulsory IECTE courses at Victoria University of 
Wellington (2007). 
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6.3.1.7 Socioculturalism in IECTE:  Waikato University. 
A focus on bi-culturalism in ECE settings, use of sociocultural theories of 
human development, and emphasis on belonging, social wellbeing, 
relationships and participation are all hallmarks of this programme. Use of 
sociocultural assessment tools, links to the wider community, focus on 
developing cultural and multi-cultural relationships all link this programme 
strongly to socioculturalism. 
 
Level Practice-based  Pedagogical Academic Ideal type 
100 Links between 
theory and 
teacher practice. 
Cultural studies 
(intro to Māori 
language and 
culture); personal 
and professional 
relationship building, 
health and children’s 
wellbeing.  
Influence on 
family, 
educational 
settings and mass 
media on 
children; 
philosophical 
perspectives in 
ECE programmes. 
Inclusive, 
relationship 
based, 
connected to 
context. 
200 Links between 
theory and 
teacher practice. 
Art and creativity; 
participation in 
learning 
environments (maths 
and technology); 
language acquisition; 
Māori language and 
culture. 
Philosophy and 
theory in ECE 
(focusing on 
sociocultural 
relationships); 
theoretical 
frameworks and 
practice 
(sociocultural). 
Participatory, 
embedded, 
relationship 
based, 
inclusive, 
supporting 
equity. 
300 Links between 
theory and 
practice - 
developing a 
personal 
teaching 
philosophy. 
Developing and 
assessing quality 
ECE programmes; 
managing 
transition to 
school.  
Facilitation of 
belonging and 
contribution 
within socio-
cultural contexts 
for the 
development of 
social wellbeing. 
Co-
construction, 
connected to 
context, 
participatory. 
 
Fig. 11 Socioculturalism in compulsory IECTE courses at Waikato University 
(2007). 
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The content of these IECTE programmes are all greatly influenced by socio-
culturalism. The words used in the online programmes for the 2007 year drew 
heavily on the vocabulary and concepts outlined in the ideal type for 
socioculturalism. To further deepen this analysis of socioculturalism in IECTE 
programmes, this thesis makes a case study of the course outlines of one New 
Zealand university. The following section presents the findings of that case 
study. 
 
6.4 Socioculturalism in the content of the IECTE programme at a 
case study university 
 
In order to assess the influence of socioculturalism in a more detailed way, this 
section analyses the course outlines of compulsory courses in the BEd (ECE) 
programme at one New Zealand university.  The compulsory courses at this 
university are made up of three types of courses: practice-based courses which 
are the courses that structure and assess teaching practice; pedagogical courses, 
which are curriculum studies courses; and academic courses, which are 
education courses from the Bachelor of Arts programme. This section analyses 
each type of course in turn, identifying the influence of socioculturalism in the 
text of course outlines pertaining to the course aims and objectives, the course 
work (pedagogical work: Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990), and required course 
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readings. The following analysis uses grids to chart the contents of each course 
using the 2007 course outlines from the case study university.  
 
6.4.1 Socioculturalism in the content of practice-based papers 
Socioculturalism exerts great influence on the content of practice-based papers 
in the objectives of courses, the pedagogical work undertaken in courses and in 
the required readings in the case study university. The practice-based courses 
encourage the formation of relationships and connections between children, 
adults, families/whānau and the wider community. These courses facilitated the 
development of learning communities through participation, shared experience 
and transformative pedagogical action. These courses used Te Whāriki (Ministry 
of Education, 1996) as a core text in describing not only the purpose of 
education, but also as a guide to the development of educational programmes 
for use in multicultural early childhood settings. They also aimed to acquaint 
student teachers with forms of socio-cultural assessment and encourage the 
development of professional partnerships within the sector. 
 
The pedagogical work undertaken in these courses emphasised that learners 
(and teachers) are embedded in diverse socio-cultural contexts. Focus was on 
both inclusion and understanding diversity in ECE settings. Student teacher 
observations were contextualised in particular settings and served to 
communicate a shared sense of social agency (one that encourages student 
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teachers to reflect on how their practice empowers children and their 
families/whānau). Broader socio-political contexts were considered in relation 
to the early childhood settings in which the students are embedded. A central 
theme of the pedagogical work was the understanding that children and their 
contexts are embedded in multiple social and cultural networks. Teaching 
practice emphasised the social construction of knowledge and aims to empower 
children through the co-construction of both the content and the context of their 
education.  
 
The sociocultural readings (e.g., Duffy, 1998) used in these courses emphasised 
relationship building, the formation of connections within settings, and 
methods of improving participation (of both children and adults). The readings 
linked individual children’s development with the learning environments in 
which they are embedded, and offered guidance on the application of socio-
cultural assessment tools. The vocabulary of these courses: the objectives, 
pedagogical work and required readings drew heavily upon socioculturalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
187 
 
Course Objectives Pedagogical work Required readings 
112 Development of 
professional skills 
through human 
relations; using Kei Tua 
o te Pae (2004-2007) for 
assessment. 
Contextual influences 
that brought students to 
ECE; educational 
influences; analysis of 
conversations with 
children; contextual 
analysis focused on 
relationship formation. 
Duffy (1998) on relationship 
building and Reid (2002) on 
using learning stories. 
113 Practicum focusing on 
professional 
behaviours, 
relationships with 
adults, relationships 
with children. 
Practice narrative 
observation and aim to 
contextualise children 
within wider social 
networks as a means for 
understanding them. 
N/A 
213 Practicum focusing on 
working in partnership 
with parents, whānau 
and caregivers in ECE. 
Narrative observation 
focusing on working with 
parents, whānau and 
caregivers in ECE. 
N/A 
214 Developing 
professional 
partnerships, analysis 
of environmental and 
contextual issues, 
developing parental 
and community 
relationships. 
Reflection on student’s 
values and beliefs when 
working with, whānau 
and caregivers; 
contextualising the child 
using learning stories, 
scaffolding for future 
action; reflective practice 
on human relations. 
Carr (2001) on learning 
stories; Dalli (1997) on ECE 
settings as sites of parental 
support; Greenfield, Quiroz, 
Rothstein-Fisch and 
Trumbull’s (2001) work on 
linking home and school; 
Morrow and Nigel (2004) on  
relationships with parents. 
312 The artistry of teaching; 
teachers’ ability to 
connect with the wider 
community; facilitate 
curriculum led 
practices; participation. 
Understanding the 
regulatory and statutory 
context of ECE; 
demonstration of teacher 
competencies. 
Keesing-Styles (2000) on 
improving parental 
participation; Smith (2006) 
on linking collaboration with 
children’s wellbeing. 
315 Construction and 
delivery of quality ECE 
programmes focusing 
on context, transition 
and socio-cultural 
assessment. 
Research report on 
children’s learning, 
professional 
development, early 
childhood settings. 
Anning (2004) on co-
construction of learning 
environments; Cullen (2001) 
on assessment in a socio-
cultural curriculum; Wien, 
Coates, Kealing and Bigelow 
(2005) encouraging a 
connection to place. 
Fig. 12 Socioculturalism in compulsory practice-based papers at the case study 
university. 
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6.4.2 Socioculturalism in the content of pedagogical papers 
 The objectives of the pedagogical courses focused on forming positive learning 
environments through the development of positive, reciprocal relationships 
between children, adults, families/whānau and the wider community. 
Programmes highlighted the importance of inclusivity and assumed that 
children, adults and families/whānau are embedded in social and cultural 
contexts that contribute to both well-being and a sense of belonging. 
Programmes aimed to enhance participation and encourage the expression of 
diversity in terms of culture and commitment to the wider communities to 
which children and their families/whānau belong through the development of 
reciprocal relationships. Specific focus was given to bi-cultural issues and 
strategies for the inclusion of Pasifika cultures in centre practices.  
 
Pedagogical work highlighted the importance of context in teaching practices 
and learning. Sociocultural teaching strategies surrounding the use of 
Vygotsky’s (1986) notion of the zone of proximal development were assessed, 
as was the application of socio-cultural assessment tools. Curriculum areas 
were linked to social and cultural considerations to encourage participation and 
a sense of belonging. Assessments encouraged the co-construction of 
knowledge through the application of sociocultural learning theories in diverse 
settings. Bi-cultural considerations were examined and a commitment to the 
Treaty of Waitangi was explored and used to inform teaching practice. 
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Pedagogical work in the pedagogical courses assessed the degree to which 
students could use Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) to inform, guide 
and reflect on their teaching practice. 
 
The sociocultural readings in the required readings focused on co-construction, 
adult/children relationships, contexualisation, strategies for inclusiveness, the 
celebration of diversity and encouragement of inclusive practices in ECE. The 
pedagogical courses linked pedagogy with community in the construction of 
learning environments to encourage participation, communication, belonging 
and a shared sense of community. Therefore, in great part, the content of 
pedagogical courses at the case study university drew on a sociocultural 
vocabulary to describe the aims and objectives of learning, to organise the 
assessed pedagogical work and to highlight key texts for consideration. 
 
 
Course Objectives Pedagogical work Required readings 
111 Overview of children’s 
learning and Te 
Whāriki (1996). 
Review 4 articles regarding 
Te Whāriki (1996); poster on 
a play context; test on an 
observation in the zone of 
proximal development  
Dockett (1997) on adult 
support of children’s play; 
Richie (2003) and Carr 
and May (2000) on Te 
Whāriki. 
112 Understanding how 
the culture of a setting 
influences children’s 
wellbeing and 
belonging; enhancing 
positive cultures in 
settings. 
Linking the nurture of 
wellbeing and belonging to 
quality teaching practices; 
preparing food in diverse 
cultural contexts; test. 
Quality in Action (1998); 
Church (2006) on creating 
a sense of community; 
Pugh (2001) on 
collaborative 
relationships; Swick & 
Freeman (2004) on 
peaceful communities. 
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113 Introduction to the 
study of culture; 
reflection on student’s 
own and other 
cultures; expression of 
the Treaty of Waitangi  
Understanding the Treaty 
of Waitangi; reflection on 
the role of culture in 
everyday life. 
 
211 Focus on art, language 
development and the 
communication strand 
of Te Whāriki (1996). 
Understanding 
Vygotsky (1986) theory 
of language 
acquisition. 
Studies of art and 
communication; studies of 
children’s literature; 
application of language 
acquisition theory. 
Eales (1996) on Vygotsky 
and art; Hamar (2005) on 
infant literacy from a 
socio-cultural perspective; 
Guylon and Terrini (2002) 
on linking learning 
environments and 
empowerment; Terrini 
(2005) on scaffolding in 
art education. 
212 Focus on diverse 
cultural environments 
for music and physical 
development. 
Importance of cultural 
factors for children’s 
expression and 
learning. 
Understanding musical 
composition in diverse 
cultures; understanding 
the value of physical 
movement and designing 
learning environments. 
Achilles (1999) on creating 
music environments; 
Poest, Williams, Witt and 
Alwoods (1990) on 
scaffolding children’s 
large muscle 
development. 
213 Extend and support 
skills in Māori 
language and customs 
for ECE programmes. 
Conceptual analysis of 
either whānaungatanga 
(interdependence), 
tuakana/teina (a Māori 
equivalent to scaffolding), 
manaakitanga (respect for 
others), or kotahitanga 
(being together); increasing 
Māori language in centres. 
Chang (1994) on cultural 
and linguistic continuity 
for the young; Royal-
Tangaere (1997) on a 
Māori interpretation of 
the zone of proximal 
development; Irwin (1994) 
on contextualising Māori 
educational policy. 
214 Focuses on the rights 
of children to active 
and equitable 
participation in 
communities; 
developing strategies 
for inclusion for Māori 
and Pasifika children.  
Cultural analysis of a 
learning story; role play 
using only in Māori 
language; reflective journal 
on personal feeling of 
inclusions and exclusion. 
Gerritsen (2000) on 
diversity; Sapon-Shevin 
(1996) on celebrating 
diversity and community; 
Villegas and Lucas (2002) 
on culturally responsive 
teachers. 
311 Focuses on the role of 
adults in 
understanding and 
extending children’s 
thinking processes. 
Linking maths to socio-
cultural pedagogy; linking 
technology with context; 
powerpoint on a topic in 
science. 
Bickmore-Brand and 
Gawned (1990) on 
scaffolding in mathmatics; 
Mactier (2006) on co-
construction of 
knowledge; Paley (1986) 
on child participation. 
Fig. 13 Socioculturalism in pedagogical papers at the case study university. 
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6.4.3 Socioculturalism in the content of academic papers 
The academic courses drew heavily on a socio-cultural vocabulary in the 
description of course aims, in the pedagogical work that is assessed and in the 
required readings for each course. The aim of these courses was to encourage 
students to consider the socio-historical contexts in which they are embedded 
and the diversity of sociocultural contexts that operate at any one time in ECE 
settings. These courses highlighted the importance of inclusive practices for the 
formation of learning communities, the importance of participation and 
belonging for effective teaching and learning, and the centrality of context in 
building relationships between children, adults and family/whānau in ECE 
settings.  
 
The pedagogical work undertaken in the academic papers required students to 
contextualise theorists and theoretical perspectives in ECE, national and 
international ECE settings and advocacy groups for children. Students focused 
on facilitating a sense of belonging and wellbeing for children and building 
positive relationships with parents/whānau and caregivers. In these papers 
students were required to demonstrate an understanding of embeddedness, 
participatory rights and the value of developing trusting relationships with 
children, adults, external agencies and the wider community.  
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The required readings provided insight into socio-historical contexts, 
participatory rights and the development of communities of learners, reciprocal 
relationships and social connectedness. The course outlines for the academic 
papers used a sociocultural vocabulary to describe aims and objectives for 
students, pedagogical work that is required to meet the terms of each paper and 
required readings.  
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Course Objectives Pedagogical work Required 
readings 
153 Encourages critical 
analysis of socio-
historical and political 
contexts of ECE in NZ 
and Europe. 
Book review or biography 
of historical figure focusing 
on contextual influences; 
contextual analysis and 
comparison of the origins 
of 2 ECE services. 
May (1997, 2001) on 
the socio-historico-
political contexts of 
ECE services in NZ 
and Europe. 
154 Understanding of 
developmental 
approaches in ECE; 
observation of children 
in ECE settings. 
Recognises that all 
children develop 
within social and 
cultural contexts. 
Overview of a theorist and 
their key ideas; observation 
and running record; socio-
historical comparison of 
two developmental 
theorists; review of Carr’s 
(1997) article on learning 
dispositions. 
Carr (2001) on 
learning dispositions. 
Smith (1998) on 
children’s 
development from a 
socio-cultural 
perspective.  
253 Appraise cultural, 
political and 
pedagogical contexts of 
ECE in NZ and 
internationally; 
children’s rights and 
contemporary issues in 
ECE. 
Portfolio of social issue; 
contextual analysis of 2 
contemporary ECE 
services; seminar on a 
contemporary ECE service 
and its socio-historical 
context. 
Hart (1997) on 
children’s 
participation; John 
(2003) on children’s 
rights and power 
sharing; Mitchell and 
Reid-Walsh (2002) on 
children’s cultural 
spaces. 
356 Examine adult/child 
relationships; explore 
the interface between 
good teaching practice 
and emotional and 
social wellbeing in 
diverse socio-cultural 
settings. 
Adult responsibilities 
within Te Whāriki (1996); 
journal focusing on issues 
of belonging and 
contribution; seminar on 
relationship building, 
socio-emotional wellbeing, 
or linking diverse contexts.  
Derman-Sparks 
(1989) on removing 
bias from ECE 
contexts; Hanna 
(2006) on children 
and parents learning 
together; Pollard 
(1996) on learning as 
a social activity. 
358 Overviews advocacy 
for children in a 
democratic context; 
develop skills to 
advocate on behalf of 
children. 
The role of adults as 
advocates; contextual study 
of an advocacy group and 
the strategies they employ; 
analysis of media releases 
on child specific issues. 
Drawing up a press release 
to be used for advocacy on 
a child specific issue. 
 
Fig. 14 Socioculturalism in the compulsory academic papers at the case study 
university. 
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Socio-culturalism was an integral part of the BEd (ECE) programme at the case 
study university. The content that student teachers were expected to learn 
across the courses, the pedagogical work that student teachers were expected to 
complete in order to meet the requirements of each course, and the literature 
that student teachers are expected to read as part of the course requirements 
were all heavily influenced by socioculturalism and sociocultural theory. These 
findings support the proposition that the content of IECTE programmes 
Aotearoa/New Zealand is heavily influenced by socioculturalism. 
 
In IECTE programme outlines and the course outlines of the case study 
university socioculturalism is the dominant discourse. The content of these 
programmes and courses encourages student teachers to acknowledge children 
as social beings connected to multiple communities. They emphasise the 
contextual influences on learning and development and highlight participation, 
inclusivity, communication and relationship building as appropriate 
pedagogical methods for early childhood education in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
6.5 Socioculturalism in student teacher’s experiences of their IECTE 
programme at a case study university. 
 
The final level of the ecological hermeneutic is the empirical findings from focus 
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groups carried out at a case study university. The focus groups are used to add 
an empirically based component to this thesis. Over the four focus groups it 
was clear that socioculturalism dominated the content of IECTE programmes, 
for example, when asked about the importance of cultural values on 
participant, responded that ‚to be a teacher you have to be culturally aware‛, 
which meant that teachers were expected to understand the important influence 
that culture has on both development and learning. When describing the 
content of the courses another student observed that ‚there is a lot of socio-
cultural theory< we know that it’s important‛. Other members of the group 
agreed. 
 
When student teachers were asked what they enjoyed most about their IECTE 
experiences, students across all four focus groups responded that it was the 
sociocultural aspects such as relationships, community, embeddedness, 
belonging and the opportunities to participate in their context (though few of 
the latter were reported by participants). One typical response was: ‚I like 
meeting everyone, making contacts and learning through others, not necessarily 
the lecturers, the students too‛. Another typical response was summed up by a 
student in a different group when she talked about the importance of building 
relationships and a sense of companionship:  ‚that’s one of the good things 
because you are in small classes, getting to know other students really well, 
which is really nice, making friends and all that‛.  
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Much of the the students’ focus, in terms of positive experiences, revolved 
around the practice of socioculturalism in their classroom context. Students 
found they had more affinity with their lecturers when content matched 
context, for instance, when asked about how she experienced the teaching on 
her course she responded ‚the lecturers that are good and the lectures you learn 
the most in, are the lectures that are related back to everyday life‛. These 
students were highlighting the importance of context in their own learning and 
voiced their support of intimate teaching spaces where relationships and 
connections could be formed not only between students, but also between 
students and teaching staff. For instance, when participants were asked what 
they enjoy about their course one participant highlighted the teacher-student 
relationship by observing that ‚with the small classes you get to know the 
teachers better‛. The other participants voiced their approval that this was a 
positive aspect in their education.   
 
Some participants in the focus groups pointed out the importance of lecturers 
using sociocultural teaching methods to implicate themselves within the 
context in which they are teaching. For example one participant said, ‚I like that 
the lecturers have had experience themselves in early childhood education so 
they are following their own experiences, they haven’t just learnt this theory, 
they haven’t learnt just concepts and stand up in front of us and preach it‛. The 
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other participants in the group agreed and indicated that real learning occurs 
for them when teachers and learners are embedded within the same social 
space, rather than separated by ownership of conceptual knowledge. The point 
here is not that teaching style needs to change, it is that this group of student 
teachers believed that for learning to be made more meaningful for them the 
delivery had to match the message. This theme is picked up in chapter eight. 
 
Student teachers found value in situations where they felt the university 
recognised their unique needs and in situations where there was an emphasis 
on relationship building, though all four groups reported that there was little 
opportunity to pursue these sociocultural factors in class-time. For instance, 
when asked what she thought of group work, one participant said, ‚yeah I like 
working in groups most of the time< the objectives are put there and 
everybody takes their share and does their part in producing whatever we have 
got to produce.‛ However, all groups stressed that there was not much group 
work, and some respondents also intimated that they would rather do 
individual projects because then there is control of the overall quality. This 
finding will be revisited in the next chapter. 
 
One particular group was made up entirely of Samoan students for whom 
English is a second language. For them the problems they faced involved a 
sense that their culture and language were not valued by their programme of 
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study (see discussion of this in chapter 8). However, these students also placed 
great value in those occasions when the sociocultural content they were 
absorbing was matched by socioculturalism in their learning context. For 
example, when asked how they feel about their experience at the case study 
university one student stated, ‚I was quite pleased today, you know, this is the 
practice that is done in the College [university] that I agree with, you know, it 
was like ‘if English is your second language, go into theatre 2 because you get 
an extra half an hour‛. Another student described what she thought was 
effective teaching given that English is her second language: ‚But she speaks 
slowly< If you ask a question she explains more and shows you on the board 
how to at least write an essay. Yeah, we feel better. You go home really happy, 
the next day you want to come back to school, if you’re not happy you don’t 
want to go back to school‛. These students are expressing a desire that their 
culture and social/linguistic practices be included in the institutional setting of 
the university. These students are expressing their hope that socioculturalism 
may have an influence beyond the content of their courses to encompass the 
context in which those courses are being provided. 
 
Summary 
This chapter has used an ecological hermeneutic to justify the proposition that 
socioculturalism heavily influences the content of IECTE programmes. Analysis 
began with the sociohistorical context of contemporary IECTE programmes 
  
199 
 
highlighting the movement from individual based to social based rationales for 
early childhood education. Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996), the 
Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 2007) and Kei Tua o te Pai 
(Ministry of Education, 2004) were all shown to draw heavily on 
socioculturalism in terms of their content. Analysis of seven IECTE 
programmes highlighted the great extent to which IECTE programmes use 
socioculturalism in the content of all compulsory courses within the 
programmes. Analysis of course outlines at a case study university supported 
the claim that the content of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
draw heavily on socioculturalism and evidence from the focus groups also 
supported this claim. This chapter has presented one side of structural 
dissonance in IECTE programmes. The next chapter constructs the other side of 
that pairing: Individualisation. 
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Chapter 7 
Individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
This chapter advances the argument that the context in which IECTE 
programmes are provided reproduces individualisation. This chapter is 
important to this thesis because it defines and identifies the second pairing in 
the thesis of structural dissonance. This chapter is organised into two sections: 
The first section constructs an ideal type for individualisation using the 
theoretical writing of Bauman (2001), Beck (1992), and Beck & Beck-Gernsheim 
(2002). The second section uses the ecological hermeneutic method (used in 
chapter 6) to organise interpretative analysis of the regulatory context in which 
IECTE programmes are provided based on the ideal type worked out in the first 
section.  
 
It is useful to distinguish between individualism and individualisation. 
Definitions of individualism vary by place and time (Lukes, 1973). Writers like 
Emerson (1847-1924) linked individualism with self reliance, which in turn can 
be linked to the Western liberal project of autonomy and self-creation (Taylor, 
1989). Wilde (1891) equated individualism to self-expression and personal 
creativity, whereas writers like Hayek (1949) aligned individualism with the 
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social will to limit coercive power resulting in free market philosophies and 
democratic social structures. In the field of early childhood education studies 
Woodhouse (2008) has defined individualism as ‚a belief in the primary 
importance of the individual and the virtues of self-reliance and personal 
independence‛ (p. 135). Individualisation, as this thesis uses the term, is not the 
same as individualism: Individualisation occurs when social institutions enforce 
individualism through standardisation and dependency. Under the condition of 
individualisation, being an individual is no longer a choice.  
 
The liberal idea of individualism as self-creation and personal rights has been 
used extensively in early childhood studies (e.g., Dunn & Cutting, 1999; 
Ministry of Education, 1996; Smiley & Dweck, 1994; Spodek & Saracho, 1994; Te 
One, 2009). But individualisation theory has not been used as part of a critical 
lens in the field of IECTE studies, though Dahlberg and Moss (2005) do pick up 
the reconstructive side of Beck’s (1992) argument against the fragmentation of 
modern Western society. In the broader field of early childhood education 
studies, the word individualisation is synonymous with teaching techniques 
that encourage individualism (self-reliance, autonomy and self-expression). For 
example, McCormick, Wong & Yogi (2003) wrote about individualisation in 
early childhood and special needs settings but defined individualisation as 
‚maximising every child’s opportunities for optimal learning‛ (p. 214). 
Likewise, Sheerer (1997) in her paper on using individualisation and scaffolding 
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to improve in-service ECE learning, aligned individualisation with individual 
assessment of persons and their skills. This thesis adopts neither of those 
approaches, but uses Beck’s (1992) individualisation theory to show 
individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand. 
 
Individualisation theory is a sociological theory popularised by Ulrich Beck 
(1992) in his book Risk Society: Towards a new modernity, and further developed 
in his book Individualization (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). Individualisation 
theory provides a new lens for the description of the institutional context of 
IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The word individualisation is a 
piece of technical vocabulary Beck (1992) used to describe the complex social 
processes of late modern, post-industrial nations (such as Germany, Great 
Britain and New Zealand. This section uses the writing of Beck (1992), Beck & 
Beck-Gernsheim (2002) and social theorist Zygmunt Bauman (2001) to construct 
an ideal type for individualisation theory.  
 
7.1 Individualisation theory: An ideal type 
 
This section introduces individualisation theory as a research perspective, as a 
social theory, and as an ideal type. The ideal type is a ‚one-sided accentuation‛ 
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(Weber, as cited in Rogers, 1969, p 17) of individualization insofar as it does not 
critically engage with individualization theory (e.g., Atkinson, 2007 who 
challenged Beck’s (1992) notion of a classless society). This approach leads to 
what critics might call a romanticised version of Beck’s theory, however, the 
point of this section is not to engage with Beck over his description of reality, 
but rather to use his approach as part of a broader critique of structural 
dissonance in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Beck’s (1992) 
theory is reduced to an ideal type and applied to the interpretation of texts in 
the context IECTE programmes. Given the philosophical assumptions that 
underpin this thesis and the methodological approach taken herein, that sort of 
one-sided accentuation is consistent with the other parts of this thesis.  
 
7.1.1 Individualisation as a research perspective. 
Individualisation theory has a relatively recent history in sociology, but 
individualisation has a much longer history given that from the time of writers 
such as de Tocqueville (1835) the question of individuals in society held special 
interest. Regarding the origins of individualisation theory, Bauman (2001) 
identified Norbert Elias’s (1991) posthumously published The Society of 
Individuals as the turning point of social theory; one that transformed the 
popular distinctions between the individual and/versus society and made the 
theory of individualisation possible:  
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Elias replaced the and and the versus with the of and in doing so he changed the 
imaginaire of the two forces locked in a mortal, yet unending battle of freedom 
and domination, into that of a reciprocal conception: society shaping the 
individuality of its members, and the individuals forming society out of their 
actions while pursuing strategies plausible and feasible within the socially 
woven web of their dependencies (Bauman, 2001, p.45).  
 
However, it was not until Beck (1986/1992) published Risk Society: Towards a new 
modernity that individualisation emerged as a coherent theoretical perspective 
in its own right. In this book, Beck (1992) outlined his thesis of reflexive 
modernity: a modern world characterised by the side effects of progress – 
ecological side effects, social/economic side effects, and individualisation (the 
side effect of de-traditionalising social connections and granting autonomy 
primacy in social relations). Beck (1992) described the innovation of his 
approach in the following way: 
 
Many people associate individualisation with individuation (= personalisation = 
uniqueness = emancipation). That may be true. But perhaps the opposite is also 
true< < In contrast to those inquiries, which are primarily concerned with 
consciousness, identity, socialisation and emancipation, the main question [of 
individualisation theory] is: how can individualisation be understood as a change of 
life situations and biographical patterns? (p. 128). 
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Beck’s (1992) theory of individualisation departs from liberal accounts of the 
self-empowered free individual to create a picture of institutional structures 
that make individualism a fate rather than a choice. Under the condition of 
individualisation, social institutions exert almost total control over a 
fragmented, non-mobile, preoccupied populace. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 
(2002) described individualisation as a sociological project established as an 
alternative to popular discourses of globalisation (‚globalisation denotes the 
processes through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and 
undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, 
orientations, identities and networks‛ (Beck, 2000, p. 11)). Specifically: ‚if the 
globalisation debate took up the territorial bias, the individualisation debate has 
probed and criticised the collective bias of the social sciences‛ (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002, p. xxi).  
 
Beck’s (2002) assumption was that analysis of society is equally possible from 
the perspective of the societal (as in class-systems) and from the terms of agents 
themselves (individuals). To premise this proposition, Beck (2002) made a 
distinction between new and old sociology. According to Beck, the new 
sociology asks questions like ‚what would happen if these individuals wanted 
a different society, or even a different type of society?‛ (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002, p. 12).  The old sociology cuts off this line of questioning by 
maintaining that ‚individuals can only be or become individuals within 
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society‛ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 12). Arguably, one of Beck’s (2002) 
intentions, therefore, was to create a new perspective in sociological theory by 
allowing ‚conflicts between individuals and society to be analysed from the 
standpoint of individuals‛ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 14).  
 
Research produced from the perspective of individualisation theory offers an 
alternative story of social institutions and those who live within their spheres of 
influence than those which give primacy to society in their analysis. Examples 
of scholars who have used individualisation theory in their work are: Côté and 
Schwartz (2002) who assessed the influence of individualisation on the 
formation of identity in adolescents; Ferge (2002) who used individualisation 
theory to analyse changes to welfare state provisions; Schwartz, Cote and 
Arnett (2005) who used individualisation theory to study identity formation in 
adolescents; and Gillies (2005) who used individualisation theory to challenge 
meritocracy practices in the United Kingdom. 
 
7.1.2 Individualisation as a social theory. 
Individualisation means institutionalised individualism (individualisierung) (Beck 
& Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, xxi), a term first developed by Talcott Parsons (1978) 
in the context of religious studies. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) gave the 
following definition to describe what they proposed the word individualisation 
entails: 
  
207 
 
‚Central institutions of modern society - basic civil, political and social rights, 
but also paid employment and the training and mobility necessary for it - are 
geared to the individual and not to the group. Insofar as basic rights are 
internalised and everyone wants to or must be economically active to earn their 
livelihood, the spiral of individualisation destroys the given foundations of 
social existence. So - to give a simple definition - ‘individualisation’ means 
disembedding without reembedding‛ (pp. xxi, xxii). 
 
Social theorist/philosopher Zygmunt Bauman simplifies things further stating:  
 
‚To put it in a nutshell, ‘individualisation’ consists in transforming human 
‘identity’ from a ‘given’ into a ‘task’ - and charging the actors with the 
responsibility for performing that task and for the consequences (also the side-
effects) of their performance: in other words, it consists in establishing a de jure 
autonomy (although not necessarily a de facto one)‛ (Bauman, in Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002, p. xv). 
 
Both Beck and Bauman maintained that contemporary Western societies are 
characterised by individualisation, and that this culture is becoming the shared 
experience of those living in the post-industrial world. Beck (2002) pointed out 
that ‚it is the individualisation and fragmentation of growing inequalities into 
separate biographies which is a collective experience‛ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 
2002, p. xxii). From this perspective, individualisation might be thought of as a 
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sociocultural condition of modern Western societies. Bauman (2005) 
wholeheartedly agrees with Beck’s analysis, differentiating himself only by 
using the term liquid modernity where Beck has used second modernity.  
 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) went on to note that individualisation means 
both the ‚disintegration of previously existing social forms‛ (e.g., class), and a 
modern social condition wherein ‚new demands, controls and constraints are 
being imposed on individuals‛ (p. 2). In the context of individualisation, ‚one 
has to win, know how to assert oneself in the competition for limited resources - 
and not only once, but day after day‛ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 3). 
Essentially, and here is the crux of the matter, individualisation processes ‚not 
only permit but they also demand an active contribution by individuals‛, or to 
put it another way, ‚individualisation is a social condition which is not arrived 
at by a free decision of individuals‛ (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002, p. 4). It is a 
default setting, an ‚iron cage‛ (Weber, 2002, p. 121), a set of circumstances over 
which individuals have little if any control. The invisibility of individualising 
processes in institutional discourses, to a large extent, results from the 
normalisation of those processes in modern life. Further on in their work Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim (2002), as in Beck (1992) use individualisation, in 
conjunction with the thesis of a risk society to argue for new social formations 
of local action on local issues (sub-politics). This thesis does not follow that line 
but instead focuses specifically on individualisation theory. 
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Bauman (2001) supported Beck’s (1992) thesis of individualisation and observed 
that life conditions (social context) and life narratives (the stories people tell 
about their successes and failures, hopes and fears etc.), ‚undergo a process of 
relentless individualisation‛ (p. 6). In regard to living within this context he 
stated:  
 
In our ‘society of individuals’ all the messes into which one can get are assumed 
to be self-made and all the hot water into which one can fall is proclaimed to 
have been boiled by the hapless failures who have fallen into it. For the good 
and the bad that fill one’s life a person only has himself or herself to thank or to 
blame (Bauman, 2001, p. 9). 
 
Individualisation, and the socially conditioned quest for a life of one’s own, 
coincide in the gatekeeper role education plays in the context of personal 
success:  
 
For it is after all only possible to pass through formal education by individually 
succeeding by way of assignments, examinations and tests. Formal education in 
schools and universities, in turn, provides individual credentials leading to 
individualised career opportunities in the labour market (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002, p. 32). 
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Individualisation the process by which biographical patterns are 
institutionalised (Beck, 1992, p. 131). On this account, institutions shape the way 
that people live without granting the opportunity for participation in the way in 
which those institutions shape their lives. Personal choices are made within a 
rubric of pre-formed institutional contexts. Under the condition of 
individualisation ‚the private is not what it appears to be: a sphere separated 
from the environment. It is the outside turned inside and made private, of conditions 
and decisions made elsewhere, in the television networks, the educational 
system, in firms, or the labour market, or in the transportation system, with 
general disregard of their private, biographical consequences‛ (Beck, 1992, p. 
133). Thus, institutions act to standardise biographies by creating contexts of 
institutional dependency: life in an individualised society is therefore a matter 
of managing multiple dependencies and living up to institutionalised 
expectations. In this context making a life of one’s own, given the great diversity 
of opportunities (and threats) available, is a matter of learning to live by the 
rules of the institutions upon which individuals are personally dependent. 
 
As a social theory Beck’s individualisation theory has been criticised for 
suggesting that individualisation results in a society that is beyond traditional 
class structures, as individualisation processes disembed individuals from 
traditional class structures  (e.g., Breen, 1997; Blossfield, Mills & Bernandi, 
2006). Other writers like Atkinson (2007) accuse Beck of constructing ‚a 
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primarily conceptual critique‛ (p. 356), devoid of empirical evidence. This 
thesis does not enter into these debates except to cite Beck (2007) as a useful 
response to these critiques. Using the assumptions that underpin this thesis, the 
argument over whether a metaphor represents reality or just an appearance 
makes no sense. It is the theoretical perspective that is important here, as it is 
used to form an ideal type to analyse the context of IECTE programmes, not the 
adequacy Beck’s (1992) theory in representing reality or truth in absolute terms.  
 
7.1.3 An ideal type for individualisation theory? 
Beck (1992) identified three ‘theses’ to organise his theory of individualisation: 
Disembedding, standardisation and institutional dependency. This section 
unpacks each thesis. These theses are then used as the ideal type for 
individualisation. 
 
Beck (1992) claimed that under the condition of individualisation people are 
disembedded from traditional social and cultural affiliations such as class. 
According to Beck (1992) this is because ‚the individual himself or herself 
becomes the reproduction unit for the social in the lifeworld‛ (p. 130). 
Affiliations to social class or social collectives take a back seat to the task of 
personal survival in a context determined by the rules of institutions, constant 
change and market forces. According to Beck (2002), disembedding means 
relinquishing historical connections in the pursuit of personal survival in 
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multiple contexts:  
 
‚With the decline of class and status groups the individual must become the 
agent of his or her own identity making and livelihood. The individual, not his 
or her class, becomes the unit for the reproduction of the social in his or her 
lifeworld. Individuals have to develop their own biography and organise it in 
relation to others‛ (p. 203). 
 
On Beck’s (1992, 2002) account, disembedding occurs at a societal level, as 
individuals forge an identity of their own through the various commitments 
they have rather than in relation to a particular stable sociocultural point of 
origin. Whilst sociocultural understandings of embeddedness integrate 
multiple contexts and transformations (e.g., Rogoff, 2003), individualisation 
theory maintains that those multiple commitments are managed by individuals 
who are in the process of working out their own personal biographies as they 
actively create a life of their own.  Many of those commitments are formed out of 
the relationship that individuals have with the various social institutions to 
which they belong. For example, individual contracts formed with banks, credit 
agencies, educational institutions, medical facilities, landlords, councils, 
employers, and tax departments, in addition to commitments to the immediate 
family or persons for whom the individual is directly responsible.  
 
  
213 
 
For Beck (1992, 2002) managing one’s personal biography is only one side of the 
disembedding process. The other side, the one that separates individualisation 
from the more emancipatory categories of individualism and individuation, is 
the assertion that under the condition of individualisation individuals not only 
manage their personal biographies, but they also manage risk. Under the 
condition of individualisation, the risk of success or failure falls squarely on the 
shoulders of individuals themselves. For Beck (1992, 2002) and Bauman (2001) 
the paradox is that autonomy leads to greater risk on the part of individuals as 
they manage their own biographies in a context where the institutions on which 
people depend demand personal accountability as a condition of inclusion.   
 
Beck’s (1992) notion of disembedding does not mean that individuals are isolated 
from their contexts. It means that the contexts in which individuals construct 
and re-construct their personal biographies make personal demands of 
individuals, which, for the most part, individual actors must meet individually.  
In other words, the social institutions that reproduce individualisation create 
demands on individuals for which the individual alone bares the final, and 
often legal, responsibility. Individuals may of course enlist communal help to 
meet those demands but in terms of institutional accountability (e.g., 
educational assignments), those demands must be met on one’s own. 
 
The second thesis of individualisation is standardisation. Beck (1992, p. 130) 
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observed that the ‚differentiation of socio-biographical situations is 
accompanied at the same time by a high degree of standardisation. Or more 
precisely, the very same media which bring about an individualisation also bring about 
a standardisation‛. The institutions to which people belong may be varied, but 
Beck (1992) maintained that the internal rules that govern the relationship 
between individuals and each institution are standardised, formalised and for 
the most part non-negotiable. For example, consider the forms that a 
prospective student must complete in order to enter university study. These 
forms are examples of standardisation given that they are administered to all 
prospective students, particular answers invoke standardised responses from a 
university (e.g., entry qualifications, residency), and the forms are non-
negotiable regarding the content they require.  
 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) called standardisation the paradox of 
individualisation where ‚the legal norms of the welfare state make individuals 
(not groups) the recipients of benefits, thereby enforcing the rule that people 
should organise more and more of their own lives‛ (p. 23). 
 
Beck (2002) goes on to explain: ‚This simultaneous individualisation and 
standardisation of our lives is not simply a private experience. It is institutional 
and structural‛ (p. 203). On this account, the contexts in which personal 
biographies are constructed standardise the relationships between individuals 
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and the institutions to which they belong. Participation in this frame is not a 
matter of moving from peripheral to full participation as per Lave and 
Wenger’s (1991) version, but is always peripheral, as participation is managed 
in a standardised manner by institutionalised mechanisms removed from the 
lived contexts of individual actors (e.g., in board rooms and lawyer’s offices). 
For example, a first year student entering university to study early childhood 
education enters after completing the standardised enrolment forms to the 
required standard, and participates in a number of compulsory courses that 
have been preformed and standardised (e.g., objectives, assessments, course 
readings). Participation in this respect is a matter of coping with standardised 
requirements. By the third or fourth year students have moved no closer to full 
participation in the co-creation of their learning programmes. They are still 
peripheral participants whose obligations are standardised by the institution in 
which the programme is undertaken. 
 
Thirdly, linked to both disembedding and standardisation, Beck (1992) claimed 
that ‚there are no longer merely private situations, but also always institutional. 
They have the contradictory double face of institutionally dependent individual 
situations‛ (p. 130). Beck (1992) went on to assert that because individuals are 
dependent on the labour market, dependency on the institutions that 
perpetuate and support the market (particularly the job market) increases. 
Education institutions are a primary vehicle for individualisation in post-
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industrial Western societies (Beck, 1992, pp. 87, 90, 93, 94, 130, 131). Beck’s 
(1992) point is that individualisation means individual dependency on 
institutional contexts whose operation is well beyond the control or individuals 
alone, for example ‚education, welfare state regulations and support, 
possibilities and fashions in medical, psychological and pedagogical care. 
Dependency on the market *and its institutions+ extends into every area of life‛ 
(p. 203).   
 
Beck’s (1992) vision of modern society is based on the ‚institution-dependent 
control structure of individual situations [whereby] individualisation becomes 
the most advanced form of societalisation dependent on the market, law, 
education and so on‛ (p. 131). Individualisation cuts off the possibility of 
autonomy through enforced dependency on the institutions that appear non-
arbitrary to modern living e.g., banks, schools, the Inland Revenue Department. 
For the most part the rules by which the institutions exert control are both non-
negotiable and standardised: ‚individualisation delivers people over to an 
external control and standardisation‛ (Beck, 1992, p. 132). On this account, 
personal biographies are necessarily entwined with social institutions on which 
daily existence depends in large part. To this end Beck (1992) observed: 
 
Individualisation thus means precisely institutionalisation, institutional shaping 
and, hence the ability to structure biographies and life situations politically. The 
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actual shaping usually occurs unseen as a latent side effect of decisions explicitly 
related to intra-organisational matters (education system, labour market, work, 
etc) (p. 132). 
 
Individualisation reproduces a culture characterised by disembedding, 
standardisation and institutional dependency. On this point Bauman (2001) 
concluded that individualisation ‚divides instead of uniting, and since there is 
no telling who might wake up in what division, the idea of ‘common interests’ 
grow ever more nebulous and in the end becomes incomprehensible‛ (p. 24). 
 
The fragmentation of societal structures makes concerted effort for social and 
institutional change difficult and nigh on impossible. That fragmentation, 
coupled with the personalisation of risk in a context of ambient uncertainty 
serves to anaesthetise citizen action for social change. For example, who could 
imagine citizens rising in protest against banks charging interest on mortgages, 
the government raising the goods and services tax to 15% or power companies 
returning multi million dollar profits. Who could imagine students rising 
against the university to put an end to assessment or compulsory courses? We 
might be able to imagine some people getting together to protest, but by and 
large such action for reform on a societal scale is just fancy – why? According to 
individualisation theory personal risk, standardised institutional dependencies 
and the ethic of a life of one’s own result in a fragmentation borne of self interest 
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and a sense of fatalism. For this reason the reign of institutionalised 
individualism goes largely unchecked, even, as this thesis argues in the context 
of IECTE programmes, unseen. 
 
This thesis claims that the institutional context in which IECTE programmes are 
provided reproduces a culture of individualisation and in the next section uses 
the ideal type set out in fig. 15 and ecological hermeneutics to justify this claim. 
 
 Individualisation 
View of people Disembedded, self interested, autonomous 
Ideal structure Standardised, externally controlled, homogenous 
Social agency Institutionally dependent, fragmented 
Participatory framework Limited, self interested 
Fig 15. Ideal type for individualisation. 
 
7.2 Individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand 
 
This part of the chapter applies the ideal type for individualisation to the 
context in which IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand are provided. 
The argument being presented here is that the context in which IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand are provided reproduces 
individualisation. This chapter uses an ecological hermeneutic similar to that 
used in chapter 6 as a structure for unfolding that argument (see fig. 3). This 
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begins with an analysis of broader contemporary societal norms in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand in order to show that in a general sense, the theory of 
individualisation is applicable to the New Zealand context. That section is 
followed by analysis of educational policy and the regulations for the provision 
of IECTE programmes in order to show that individualisation is reproduced in 
the regulatory context of IECTE programmes. Next, policy at the case study 
university is analysed in order to show how the site in which IECTE 
programmes are provided reproduces individualisation as an arbitrary 
requirement for participation in the programmes. The final two levels of analysis 
are the regulations identified in the course outlines of courses at the case study 
university and reports from the focus groups regarding their experience of 
individualisation.  
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Fig. 16 Ecological hermeneutic for individualisation. 
 
 
7.2.1 Individualisation and contemporary New Zealand society. 
 
It is incredibly difficult living in New Zealand (in any Western country) 
without forming dependency on social institutions. It is possible, but nigh on 
impossible, especially for those with families to support and who can not 
disappear into the bush to live an alternative existence. A short inventory of 
Individualisation (Indiv.) in 
contemporary NZ society 
Indiv. in policy and 
regulation 
Indiv. in the 
university delivery 
Indiv. in 
courses and 
student 
feedback 
  
221 
 
social institutions in New Zealand will show that individualisation is an 
integral part of this wider context. Examples of social institutions include: 
Inland Revenue Department, the health system, compulsory schooling (primary 
and secondary: which also have social benefits), Transit New Zealand, Accident 
Compensation Corporation, tertiary education institutions, banks and finance 
houses, phone and power companies, New Zealand Qualifications Authority, 
the legal system, policing, insurance companies, the Department of Internal 
Affairs. These social institutions have at least two things in common: they are 
each intricately implicated in the social structure contemporary New Zealand, 
and they are all powerful conveyers of individualisation (though this is not 
necessarily their only function). 
 
The Inland Revenue Department establishes a context of individual 
accountability and institutional dependency by providing individuals with 
standardised personal tax numbers which correlate to them and to them only. 
These tax numbers are compulsory and non-negotiable for all wage and salary 
earners, students who wish to get a student loan or allowance, and anyone who 
receives any form of government subsidy (e.g., working for family tax credit, 
ACC payments, unemployment or sickness benefit).  New parents are given 
three months from the registration of the birth of their child/ren 
(individualisation begins early) to have a personal tax number for their new 
  
222 
 
addition in order to qualify for family tax credits. That tax number will be 
assigned to the child throughout their lifespan. 
 
In the health system once registration (of name) is complete a baby becomes an 
individual entity and a personal, and standardised, medical file is created 
containing a history of diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis. In order to access 
less expensive health care the child will need to be enrolled with a Primary 
Health Organisation (Ministry of Health, 2009a), where they will also be 
expected to participate in the National Immunisation Register (Ministry of 
Health, 2009b). This dependency on the health system is standardised, 
personalised and appears to be a non-arbitrary fact of modern living. 
 
In New Zealand, schooling is compulsory for children aged 6 to 15 (New 
Zealand Education Act, 1989). Once at school children are individualised 
through the creation of portfolios which track individual achievement and non-
achievement. Testing is performed on an individual basis, and although 
students may share a classroom during key tests (e.g., National Standards) the 
results they generate are theirs and theirs alone, as is the risk of achievement 
and non-achievement. Data on academic achievement serves to make 
individual children visible to interested groups such as Boards of Trustees or 
special education services. Tests are standardised, the data produced is 
standardised and depending on the result (i.e. if the result is lower than 
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expected) tests can lead to a greater degree of institutional dependency (e.g. 
specialised lessons or classes).  
 
Likewise, the National Certificate in Educational Achievement (NCEA) 
individualises students to the point that all work that counts toward the NCEA 
qualification is individually assessed and grades are assigned to individual 
students in a standardized, externally constructed format. At this level, 
education delivers the key message of individualisation: the risk of success or 
failure belongs to the student alone as they manage their personal biography. 
Individuals are dependent upon the institution they are enrolled in (e.g., 
college, high school, correspondence school) in order to fulfil the requirements 
of NCEA. The grades that individual students attain will have direct bearing on 
the ability to enter higher education, thus enhancing personalising risk, 
individualising consequences and further necessitating institutional 
dependency as students forge the foundations of a life that will soon be their 
own (with all the personal risk and opportunity that entails). 
 
Owners of motor vehicles will know that Transit New Zealand is another force 
of institutional individualisation. New Zealand has one of the highest rates of 
motor vehicle ownership in the world. Individualisation begins with a person 
gaining a licence to drive on New Zealand roads (licences are highly 
individualising as they are constructed of a picture of the licensee, their name, 
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date of birth, and a particular licence number that applies to that person and 
that person only). Tests are standardized and individuals are wholly dependent 
on their own efforts and the will of the licensing authority to gain their drivers 
license. Owning a car furthers that individualisation insofar as car ownership is 
standardised through forms, payments, the need for a licence and set durations 
of registration. Car owners are dependent on Transit New Zealand to register 
their vehicles lest they incur fines for which they are personally fiscally 
responsible. 
 
Banks and finance houses, insurance companies, phone and power companies; 
all of which appear entirely necessary to a successful modern life, reproduce 
individualisation in contemporary New Zealand society. Bank accounts bearing 
long strings of numbers identify individuals and are arguably the basis for 
establishing oneself as a home owner, recipient of student allowance, and in 
most cases, as an employee (given that for the latter two examples a bank 
account is necessary for receiving payments). Likewise, insurances are also 
taken out in name (though also in partnership), individuals and partners are 
assigned highly personalised numbers, and in the case of premium payments, 
claims, or excess payments, individuals and individual partners are personally 
responsible. Insurance is a primary means of protecting the life of one’s own 
from the ambient uncertainty of modern living (e.g., life insurance, health 
insurance, earthquake insurance, car insurance etc.).  
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This analysis has shown that it is normal for people living in contemporary 
New Zealand to be dependent on multiple institutions in the day to day 
management of commitments and personal biographies. The scope of those 
institutions is far reaching and accounts little for social status or class, all are 
equal, standardised and made dependant on those social institutions for the 
resources and services they provide. It is within this context of multiple and 
standardised commitments that the life of one’s own becomes a personal 
obsession, to the point that opportunities for altruism and real participation in 
that institutionalised context become at best neglected and at worst impossible.   
 
7.2.2 Individualisation and educational policy in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
At the next level of the ecological hermeneutic are the policies and regulations 
which are external to the university, but which regulate the university and its 
internal policies. This section analyses three particular policies and identifies 
how they reproduce individualisation in the regulatory context of IECTE 
programmes.  
 
Educational policy forms the broad context in which IECTE programmes 
operate. It provides stipulations for the construction of programmes (e.g., NZ 
Teachers Council, 2010) and designation of the utility/function of those 
programmes within the context of New Zealand’s broader social aims (e.g., 
Ministry of Education, 2002). The first part of this section analyses three 
  
226 
 
documents: the New Zealand Education Act (1989), the New Zealand Tertiary 
Education Strategy (2007-2012) and the New Zealand Tertiary Education 
Strategy (2010-2015). These three documents set the general context within 
which IECTE programmes are situated. The 2007-2010 Tertiary Education 
Strategy is used because it highlights policy direction for universities at the time 
of the case study. The 2010-2015 Tertiary Education Strategy is used because it 
highlights a move toward a more concerted reproduction of individualisation 
in the context of IECTE programmes, particular as the rationale of economic 
uncertainty is employed.  
 
The second part of this section analyses the forces that directly influence or 
regulate IECTE programmes (i.e., the Early Childhood Strategy, 2002-2012; the 
New Zealand Vice Chancellors Committee; and the New Zealand Teachers 
Council). All of these sources were chosen for analysis because of their 
regulatory relevance to the context in which IECTE programmes are provided.  
 
7.2.2.1 Individualisation in the Education Act (1989).  
The New Zealand Education Act (1989) reproduces individualisation in 
education in general by regulating for the compliance of individual students, 
placing the consequences of non-compliance on individuals and their personal 
caregivers. For example, the New Zealand Education Act (1989) defines a 
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student as ‚a person enrolled at a school or institution‛ (p. 33): as an individual 
person situated in a context of institutional dependency. 
 
The New Zealand Education Act (1989) regulates the definition of student as an 
individual person, provides impetus for the standardisation of individual 
students through prescribing shared rights and responsibilities applicable to all 
in equal measure, and offers little if any participatory rights in the negotiation 
of those standards (e.g. the contents of one’s personal responsibilities). 
Institutional dependency is legally enforced for the eleven years of compulsory 
education. From the age of five, children are socialised into an institutional 
relationship wherein the content of that relationship is prescribed in the form of 
school charters, curriculum, testing schedules, and as of 2010, National 
Standards testing. The Act (1989) perpetuates the absence of democratic 
participation in the construction of educational outcome statements and 
objectives, a focus on standardised outputs for which individual children are 
personally responsible/liable, set in a context where there is a biographical risk 
of failure are characteristics of this system. 
 
Principals and Boards of Trustees have the right to the exclude individuals from 
educational institutions (Education Act, 1989, p. 80) based on their personal 
biographical details. The Act also requires that an individual’s personal and 
demographic details be recorded as evidence of attendance and kept available 
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for scrutiny (Education Act, 1989, p. 94). The effect of the NZ Education Act 
(1989) then, intentional or not, is that being an individual is mandated, 
expected, non-negotiable, and compulsory. The New Zealand Education Act 
(1989) legitimates a context where individualisation is a normal mode of 
operation for this system. As an Act of Parliament there is very little scope for 
individuals to re-negotiate the content of different sections of the Act, there is 
limited scope for alternative interpretations of the parts of the Act, and there is 
scant chance of any escape from individual accountability for success and 
failure. The New Zealand Education Act (1989) promotes individualisation in 
the context of social educational institutions by ensuring, through its content, 
that individualism is a fate rather than a choice. 
 
7.2.2.2 Individualisation in the Tertiary Education Strategy (2007-2012). 
The Tertiary Education Strategy (2007-2012) is significant to the regulatory 
context of IECTE programmes because it ‚provides a direction for all tertiary 
education‛ in New Zealand (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 3). More 
specifically, given the high demand for qualified early childhood teachers the 
strategy is also relevant in its aim to ‚reduce skills shortages through 
improving the relevance of tertiary education to the needs of the labour 
market‛ (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 6). This close relationship between 
tertiary education in general, the labour market, and economic prosperity is a 
theme that is played out throughout this document (e.g., pp. 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 13, 14).   
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A focus on economic outcomes, linked to the labour market, and the 
development of personal knowledge for economic advantage (achieving a 
sustainable life of one’s own) are characteristics of what Beck (1992, 2002) calls the 
social reproduction of individualisation. Skill accumulation is a key mode of 
individualisation, as it links personal biography success in a context of 
increased uncertainty/competition e.g., an economy in recession. The 
expectation here is that the more skills an individual possesses, the greater the 
chances of personal biographical success. Linking success to lifelong learning 
promotes individualisation by encouraging institutional dependency in the 
form of matriculation. Matriculation invokes at the outset the importance of 
one’s individual biography regarding entry criteria, it uses standardised forms 
and procedures to manage entry and it reinforces a context of institutional 
dependency (given that the individual is now subject to the rules and 
regulations of the tertiary institution).  
 
It cannot be argued that the Tertiary Strategy (2007-12) is solely individualising, 
as it also outlines a number of socio-cultural initiatives (e.g., a focus on 
supporting Māori and Pasifika cultural perspectives and traditions in education 
(p. 4); the strategic goal of building a national identity (p. 9 ); and, ‚building 
skills and competencies for social and cultural development‛ (p. 24). However, 
a focus on enhancing the personal wellbeing of individuals and their family 
groups in a context that is increasingly competitive, the goal of creating a 
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seamless system where individuals can move from one context of institutional 
dependency to another (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 12), and employment of 
a rhetoric that strongly links success in the labour market with personal 
educational outcomes (Ministry of Education, 2007, p. 35) contributes to the 
normalisation of individualisation in the strategic context of IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
 
7.2.2.3 Individualisation in the Tertiary Education Strategy (2010-2015). 
This strategy signals a change of direction as the National government works to 
‚make tertiary education more relevant and more efficient, so that it meets the 
needs of students, the labour market and the economy‛ (Ministry of Education, 
2010, p. 2). The link between personal success in education, entry into the 
workforce and economic prosperity are a key theme of this document (e.g., pp. 
2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 15, 16, 22, 23). Like its predecessor, it entrenches the ethic of a life of 
one’s own where success is a personal affair as one strategically manages one’s 
personal biography in the hope of achieving economic security in an 
increasingly competitive environment.  
 
The Tertiary Education Strategy 2010-2015 identifies a need for higher 
productivity in the workforce and assumes that higher skills will increase 
productivity (Ministry of Education, 2010, p. 7). Accordingly, it is believed that 
‚there is a significant wage premium for people who complete higher-level 
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study, particularly bachelors degrees‛ (Ministry of Education, 2010, p. 11). This 
focus on the fiscal outcomes of education and the strong link being forged 
between education and the labour market form a context in which a successful 
life of one’s own demands institutional dependency as a primary means. Again, 
matriculation into tertiary educational institutions bears all the hallmarks of 
individualisation, as discussed in 7.2.2.2.  
 
Similar to the 2007-2012 strategy, there are also social and cultural components 
invoked, for example, focus on Māori and Pasifika participation, development 
of culturally responsive pedagogies and the encouragement of multicultural 
perspectives. However, in saying that, the Government ‚expects students to 
take responsibility for their own performance‛ (Ministry of Education, 2010, pp. 
15, 20), and will reward those who are successful in this endeavour. Students 
will be encouraged to enter tertiary education directly from school, contributing 
to further institutional dependency as individuals piece together their personal 
biographies, ready to vie for success in the labour market. In the ways outlined 
above the New Zealand Tertiary Education Strategy 2010-2015 not only reproduces 
individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, it enforces it. 
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7.2.2.4 Individualisation and the New Zealand Vice Chancellors’ Committee. 
The New Zealand Vice Chancellors’ Committee (NZVCC) plays an important 
role in regulating university programmes including IECTE programmes. The 
NZVCC contributes to a context of individualisation through the personalised 
award of scholarships and university based certificates (i.e., degrees) it 
individual persons; it establishes standardised criteria for course approval and 
course accreditation, it assesses the quality of learning programmes (in a 
standardised manner) and advises universities on entrance criteria (NZ 
Education Act, part 19, 241).  
 
The NZVCC has a direct influence on IECTE programmes at New Zealand 
universities carrying out the roles outlined above. The NZVCC contributes to a 
context of individualisation by awarding scholarships to individual persons: 
Scholarship forms require personal details referenced to an individual’s 
enrolment details and academic record (personal biography), statements of 
personal need (sometimes including a personal budget), and statements of 
individual post-study aspirations are also required for some scholarships (e.g. 
William Georgetti Scholarship). The NZVCC also allows international students 
entry to New Zealand universities based on personal merit and credentials. The 
non-arbitrary nature of personal accountability is reproduced through the 
standardisation of criteria. 
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Leaving aside those functions of the NZVCC that individualise students 
through making personalisation an institutional demand (see NZVCC, 2009, p. 
59), this thesis focuses on the Committee on University Academic Programmes 
(CUAP) and its role in the reproduction of individualisation in the regulatory 
context of IECTE programmes. 
 
CUAP is the external body responsible for the accreditation of university 
courses and it is a ‚key component in the hierarchy governing the rational 
development of academic programmes‛ (NZVCC, 2009, p. 10), alongside the 
internal processes of the individual universities. CUAP reproduces a context of 
individualisation by standardizing requirements for the development of 
courses and entrenching not only institutional dependency, but also an 
institutionalised dependency on an external governance body. This last point is 
important because CUAP prevents localised co-construction of courses and acts 
as non-arbitrary external control managing course prescriptions and 
subsequent course content. That control acts as a barrier to the full participation 
of students in the content and context of their own education (I will expand on 
this last point in the next chapter). 
 
The effect of CUAP’s influence on IECTE programmes is regulatory. It is an 
external quality mechanism that influences the degree of institutional 
dependency experienced by students in the content of their courses, acts as an 
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external control on content of the pedagogical work within the course structure, 
and provides rules by which courses operate not only eliminating possibility of 
local co-construction, but also entrenching institutional control of lived 
educational experiences (see for example NZVCC, 2009, pp. 17-25). This, 
combined with the personalisation of risk (i.e., each student is personally 
responsible for passing or failing courses), the strong relationship between 
gaining a qualification and entry into the labour market, and the importance of 
work to succeeding in a life of one’s own reproduces individualisation in the 
context of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
 
7.2.2.4 Individualisation and the New Zealand Teachers Council. 
The New Zealand Teachers Council plays an important role in the context of 
IECTE insofar as it oversees the quality of IECTE programmes (in conjunction 
with the NZVCC in universities); provides advice on programme content via 
best practice; and issues competency guidelines for graduating teacher (i.e., 
Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 2007). These standards are a 
tool for standardising educational outcomes and influence the content of IECTE 
programmes by setting out a requirement for compliance (NZ Teachers 
Council, 2010). Significant to this thesis is the fact that those standards, 
although encouraging a sociocultural approach to early childhood education, 
reproduce individualisation through the focus on competencies that individuals 
must not only develop, but express in their history of personal practices. The 
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non-arbitrary nature of those standards, as they apply to all prospective 
graduates, adds to enforced institutional dependence as students seek entry 
into the labour market and success in the quest for a life of one’s own. This is not 
possible unless the competencies are signed off as being met. 
 
The New Zealand Teachers Council reproduces individualisation in the context 
of IECTE programmes by making individuals accountable for meeting the 
standards set out by the Teachers Council; by standardising the programmes in 
which student teachers undertake their education; by enforcing institutional 
dependency on approved providers; and by making personal biographies a key 
component in both entry to and successful exit from courses.  
 
The New Zealand Teachers Council is legally mandated to provide professional 
leadership to teachers and schools and act as a registering body for New 
Zealand teachers (Education Act, 1989). Across all levels of pre-tertiary 
education it is also mandated to encourage best teaching practice, issue 
practicing certificates to registered teachers, maintain standards for 
qualifications that lead to registration (i.e., IECTE programmes), approve 
quality teacher education courses (Teachers Council, 2010), develop a code of 
ethics for teachers (Teachers Council, 2004), act as a disciplinary authority in 
cases of teacher misconduct, set reporting criteria for serious misconduct, 
identify researching priorities, coordinate police vetting of teachers, and 
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provide guidelines for teacher competency (Education Act, 1989, part 10b, 
139AE). In this role, in the context of IECTE programmes, the New Zealand 
Teachers Council works with CUAP on the acceptance and assessment of 
learning programmes (NZVCC, 2009). 
 
IECTE programmes depend on the Teachers Council to approve courses and 
must demonstrate the programmes effectiveness in relation to the graduating 
teacher guidelines (Teachers Council, 2010). Programmes must obtain re-
approval from the Teachers Council every five years (Teachers Council, 2010). 
In addition major changes to programmes and particular courses within 
programmes must meet with the approval of the Teachers Council (Teachers 
Council, 2010), and CUAP (as outlined above). Institutional dependency and 
the externalisation of institutional control through standardisation contribute to 
the reproduction of individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes. 
These are the unavoidable conditions in which IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand operate. 
 
7.2.3 Individualisation and internal university regulations.  
This section takes another step in on the ecological hermeneutic (fig. 6) to 
analyse policy documents (at a case study university) and the generic 
prescriptions set out in the course outlines. This section argues that 
individualisation is reproduced within broader university regulations and in 
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specific course regulations in IECTE programmes. It is important to note, even 
at this late stage in analysis, that lecturers are also individualised under this 
context (particularly in terms of the regulatory criteria they must meet, the 
institutions they are dependent on for their livelihood, and the Performance 
Based Research Funding scenario in which they operate and by which they are 
held individually accountable).  
 
This analysis identifies some of the ways that universities reproduce 
individualisation through their internal regulations and policies. In general 
terms, universities are geared toward disembedding/personalisation (e.g., 
through the generation of student ID numbers, assessment practices and 
academic scripts, Student Conduct agreements and offers of study), 
standardisation (e.g., enrolment forms, assessment policies, course 
prescriptions), and institutional dependency (no degree without a provider). 
This thesis acknowledges individualisation in the broader context of teacher 
education faculties (e.g., in the experience of teaching staff) but narrows its 
focus to student teachers’ contexts and experiences in a case study university. 
 
The internal policies and statutes of the case study university institutionalise 
personal risk and individual accountability for students by making the 
individual a highly visible entity (e.g., the Student Conduct Policy, the Academic 
Policy, and the Assessment Policy). Individual responsibility is reinforced in the 
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way the university goes about its daily business (e.g., the use of student ID 
numbers throughout its administration and student services, and 
individualised assessment practices where each individual is responsible for the 
quality of their own pedagogical work, as well as the fees that individual 
students are expected to pay). The forms (texts) the university uses upon 
enrolment serve to induct individuals into the university structure through the 
requirement that individuals fill out standardised forms which require highly 
personal details and some of which must be accompanied by officially verified 
documentation (e.g., birth certificate, academic transcript).  
 
7.2.3.1 Individualisation and university policy at a case study university.  
University policy reflects the external context in which universities in New 
Zealand operate and outlines the rules by which the internal mechanisms of 
each university are enacted. University policy is non-arbitrary insofar as it is 
non-negotiable except by the official procedures of academic boards. By 
entering the university students agree to the rules and regulations of the 
institution and personally sign their agreement on their offer of study. Students 
are given no opportunity upon entry to participate in the formation of the rules 
by which their context is constructed. Instead they are absorbed into an 
institutional structure that standardises personal accountability and entrenches 
institutional dependency. In this context students personally bear the risk of 
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success and failure (in terms of impact on their personal biography) in a game 
where universities not only hold, but administer all the cards. 
 
University policies and statutes include Academic Policy, Facilities 
Management Policy, Finance Policy, Governance Policy, Research Policy, Staff 
Policy, and Student Policy. Individualisation occurs in a number of ways 
throughout these policies and often in conjunction with elements of university 
wide regulations (e.g., security, academic standards, governance). For example, 
the Academic Board Statute creates a committee whose function is to advise the 
academic council on matters relating to courses of study, awards, and other 
academic matters. The Academic Board Statute contributes to the reproduction 
of individualisation through the direction it gives to other university 
mechanisms (e.g., induction, assessment, graduation) all of which disembed 
individuals through the personalisation of risk, follow standardised formats 
and entrench institutional dependency.  
 
Another academic policy that contributes to individualisation in the context of 
IECTE is the Limitations on Courses and Programmes Statute which creates 
scarcity within programmes by capping student numbers. Entry to courses with 
limitations on numbers becomes a highly personalised affair, as participants are 
assessed and offered entry based on individual merit and personal biographical 
history. However, once there, the risk is only intensified for those students who 
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do not meet the standards of the institution upon which they are dependent, the 
outcome of which has real effect on both personal biography and opportunities 
in the labour market.  
 
Upon enrolment in teacher education courses, individuals must provide 
evidence from personal artefacts such as passport and birth certificate, 
personalised school results and/or other personalised tertiary results, and pass a 
highly personalised Police vetting process. The resulting offer of study for 
students whose personal biography is successful is again highly individualized 
coming in to force by the application of an individual’s signature, and is a 
contract between the individual student and the university. It is an artefact of 
both personal responsibility and institutional dependency. 
 
Other policies like the Student Protest Policy describe institutionally sanctioned 
boundaries for protest action taken by students on university property. Student 
Protest Policy reinforces and reproduces individualisation in the context of 
IECTE by serving as a constant reminder to protest groups that when dealing 
with the institution of their education, student protesters are highly visible 
individuals who are personally responsible for all of their behaviours.  
 
Conduct policies contribute to the reproduction of individualisation by making 
the individual accountable to the university. Under the general Conduct Policy, 
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complaints that are levelled at individuals within the institutional structure are 
dealt with through formal and standardised processes (i.e., all complaints focus 
on an individual: It is the conduct of that individual that comes into question). 
Likewise, the Student Conduct Statute aligns conduct and misconduct with an 
individual student’s actions. A copy of the Student Conduct Statute 
accompanies the offer of study form and is agreed to by all students at the 
outset of their relationship with the university. These forms are signed by 
individuals and serve the multiple function of forming an individual (though 
standardised) contract between the student and the university, invoking a 
culture of personal responsibility at the outset, and providing yet another way 
that individual students are made dependent on the institution. 
 
Throughout these policies and statutes the individual is constructed as a legal, 
biographical, autonomous, self responsible and self interested person. There is 
no alternative. Individualisation is ensconced in the rules and regulations that 
shape many important functions of the university (e.g., enrolment, research, 
assessment). The individual is disembedded from familial ties and social class 
(Beck, 1992), is assigned a student identification number and assumes the 
identity of one student among many. Individual rights, responsibilities, 
accountabilities and assessments are all standardised and apply to all students 
equally. University wide policies and statutes create the wider context in which 
IECTE programmes operate. The rules and functions contained in policies and 
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statute help to form a context of institutional dependency and in so doing 
reproduce individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes.  
 
The Statute for the Degree of Bachelor of Education (Teaching) Early Childhood 
also disembeds individuals from their familial ties (and social class) to cast 
them as candidates. Candidates are classed into subgroups (e.g., candidates with 
diplomas, candidates with current kindergarten registration, candidates with 
no prior early childhood education). Successful candidates are then integrated 
into the institution and as a result become wholly dependent upon the 
institution and its regulations for the achievement of their qualification, and 
subsequent entry into the labour market.  
 
7.2.3.2  Individualisation and course outlines at a case study university. 
Course outlines are a non-negotiable interface between students as a group of 
individuals and the institution. Course outlines contain advice on where to go 
for more information on topics like conduct, and answers questions like ‚what 
is plagiarism?‛ Course outlines also contain important information on 
assessment and learning objectives, and therefore act as a standardised conduit 
for achievement. They are also repositories of useful information about 
obligations, what to do when assignments go missing, how to apply for 
aegrotat, penalties for late work, and the grievance processes. Course outlines 
are artefacts of standardisation insofar as they contain rules that apply to all 
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students in equal measure. They are also technologies of dependency wherein 
institutional rules regarding participation, assessments and academic standards 
are set out in a standardised form as rules to which individual students are held 
personally accountable. Those rules are non-negotiable and link to other 
agencies in the broader context of IECTE programmes (e.g., CUAP and the 
Teachers Council). 
 
At the times when there is the most risk of success and failure – i.e., handing in 
an assignment and sitting a test, it is the individual that must front up, the work 
must be their own, and students must use their student ID number and 
standardised forms and formats. Late penalties reinforce the fact that the 
individual stands by their efforts alone (though extensions may take into 
account personal contextual influences i.e., bereavement). This is the same for 
everyone; it is standardised across the university in academic policy, in the 
assessment procedures, in penalty policies for late work, and in the final 
academic transcript.  
 
In terms of institutional dependency, course outlines are powerful artefacts. 
They contain the rules for participation in courses with little room for 
negotiation of the contents of what counts as a rule and what does not. 
Individuals are held accountable for their own success and failure on the exact 
terms set out by the university in the assessment schedule. This culture of 
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personal accountability is standardised to all individuals, who are each 
themselves caught within the social process of achieving the life of one’s own, 
often marked by entry into the labour market, in a context of increasing 
uncertainty. The course outline is the link between pedagogical authority, 
pedagogical work, and personal success. In terms of IECTE programmes the 
course outline is a generic expression of a universities internal policies and 
regulations in programmes that have met Teachers Council and CUAP 
approval. From this perspective, course outlines are a technology that 
reproduces individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes. 
 
The inability to negotiate the contents of course outlines, combined with the 
risk of failure, adds to individual dependency on the institution. There is little 
on offer in terms of co-creation in the structure and contents of the course 
outline. Individuals are given scant choice in the formation of their pedagogical 
context, instead, that context is preformed. Course outlines are an extension of 
institutionalised individualism in IECTE programmes. They set the rules and 
conditions for success and are non-arbitrary in that regard. 
 
The analysis in this section has shown that the course outlines disembed 
students from their socio-cultural contexts through the standardisation of 
course contents, course prescriptions and pedagogical outputs (assessment). 
The policies of the university standardise the relationship between the 
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institution and individual students, and through that standardised relationship 
they enforce institutional dependency. The course outlines are highly 
individualising texts as they prescribe the content of pedagogical work in a 
standardised manner, and make individual students not only individually 
accountable, but also institutionally dependent to the point that co-construction 
of educational contexts makes way for surviving externally mediated, non-
arbitrary assessment criteria. That preoccupation with personal survival in an 
institutionally controlled context where success is governed by how well a 
student meets a predetermined criteria of written expression means that 
education, for many, is a task not a collaboration. Simply put education is a 
blunt instrument.  
 
Other experiences such as the student union, class groups, and tutorial groups 
may be a counter balance to individualisation in the context of IECTE 
programmes, however, those social aspects occur within a larger context of 
individualisation which makes individual accountability a primary concern and 
social interaction a secondary consideration. This idea is picked up in the next 
section where student teachers reflect on their experience of group work in a 
highly individualising context. 
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7.4.3 Individualisation and student teachers. 
The final section of this chapter reports on findings from the focus groups held 
at the case study university. This is the most intimate of all the levels of the 
ecological hermeneutic. It is intimate because it contains sentences from student 
teachers regarding their experience of IECTE. Their sentences are interpreted 
using the ideal type for individualisation.  
 
When asked what they enjoyed most about their courses no students responded 
in the terms of ideal type for individualisation. As noted in chapter 6, 
respondents nearly wholly identified sociocultural aspects of their courses as 
the most enjoyable aspects of their IECTE programmes. This section is divided 
up into responses detailing disembedding, standardisation, institutional 
dependency and general statements on personal risk and standardisation. 
 
7.4.3.1 Disembedding 
All focus groups expressed disembedding as a negative experience in their 
education. For example one student, when asked about her experience of group 
work in the university setting stated:  
 
‚I think it should reflect how we really live, we don’t just go out and do 
something and then not see those people again. In our life everything is 
integrated, you know, you get to see the unity. Why can’t that be part of where 
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we are living? I mean this is our family in that kind of whanau sense, why can’t 
it reflect what we do at home?‛  
 
Another student, when asked what quality learning means to her observed: 
 
‚I think also another frustrating thing is, I mean in this course there are a lot of 
adult students and like people who have got families of their own, but 
sometimes it seems like the lecturers are teaching little kids, like young kids, 
you know but people have a lot of input you know, it’s a bit degrading 
sometimes‛.  
 
The contextual disembedding that is part and parcel of individualisation not 
only detracts from these student’s experiences, but also challenges their 
understandings of good educational practice. 
 
When asked about their least enjoyable experiences, some students felt that 
their own life experience was of little value in a highly theoretised context. For 
example, one participant observed ‚you kind of feel like you can’t have your 
own opinions because if you express that and it’s not what they think *other 
participants agreeing+ they fail you‛. In relation to the same question another 
participant stated, ‚the course is sort of dumbed down, it doesn’t take into 
account previous experience, and I don’t think that they adapt a course, they 
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just have it set, whether you come from school or a life full of experience they 
don’t alter it‛. These observations were particularly poignant for the 
respondents in light of the socio-cultural practices that they are expected to 
reproduce in their own teaching praxis. On this topic, another student summed 
up the general feeling of the groups when she observed ‚there are people who 
just learn through life by reading, and not just experiencing through life and 
seeing it or feel it themselves for them to know‛. This last comment matches the 
general distinction that respondents perceived between their experience of 
IECTE as a learning context and the real world. 
 
The focus group comprised of Samoan students felt this disembedding from 
their culture and devaluing of their social histories most profoundly of all 
groups. For example, when given space at the end of the focus group session to 
raise any further points, one student stated ‚because our language is different 
we think we are left out (yeah) even when the classes have discussion the tutors 
still treating us the same as the Pākehā‛. In this case, disembedding goes hand-
in-hand with standardisation, however another student made an even clearer 
point ‚I raised my hand the last Tuesday night and I asked if I don’t understand 
it, can I make it in Samoan words? But I can’t write it down in English, it’s not 
my first language, the year before, last year, it was written in Samoan. Now 
that’s why there is hardly any Island culture in the course, in the, in the college, 
you know it’s because of the language‛. The feeling of being disembedded is 
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accompanied by a perception of inequality in the experience of these students. 
For example, when asked how they feel about their experiences one student 
answered ‚sometimes we feel like we’re left out, you know‛ and another 
answered ‚really a majority of everything we are given is in English and not in 
our language‛. 
 
These students felt the disembedding of individualisation in the context of their 
IECTE programme. One student talked about feeling disembedded as she 
formed her own early childhood philosophy based on the theoretical 
perspectives of others: ‚I mean they talk about articulating our philosophy - 
half of that is me! Me, you know, my experience‛. This was a common theme 
across the focus groups – that those histories of experiences and contexts in 
which they are embedded were not important in the context of their education, 
even though the content of what they are learning proclaims the virtues of 
recognising the histories of experiences and contexts in the children they teach.  
 
7.4.3.2 Standardisation 
There are two sides to the standardisation felt by student teachers. On the one 
side is the standardisation of requirements for courses and their degrees that 
puts everyone in the same boat regardless of personal socio-historical issues 
(except for disability which is provided for in university statute). On this side of 
the equation, there is the recognition of outputs (e.g., institutional expectations) 
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that apply to all student teachers alike. On the other side, is the standardisation 
of the requirements that sees student teachers reproducing a subject matter that 
is not only expected of them but necessary for them to become professionally 
recognised early childhood teachers.  
 
The standardisation of course requirements is strongly linked to the 
disembedding discussed above. Students spoke openly about their experiences 
of being standardised when the conversation turned to the topic of being 
assessed, for instance, one participant said, ‚you kind of feel like you can’t have 
your own opinions because if you express that and it’s not what they think 
(other participants agreeing) they fail you‛. Another student agreed, saying, ‚if 
I was to write an assignment to agree with what they are saying, and just have a 
few references I’d probably get an A+, but if I was to do against it and have 
heaps of references that said I don’t agree with this person, da, da, da, then she 
would write that ‘I didn’t like the criteria’‛. In regards to standardisation and 
lack of choice one student reported, ‚we don’t even choose the papers or 
anything, there’s not even options you know, if you’ve got an interest in 
something, to follow that through, we just have to do this, this, and this‛. These 
students expressed a feeling of being dominated by a system where they have 
little hope of co-creation in the context of their learning.  
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On the other side, is the reproduction of a subject matter to which students feel 
they have little to contribute other than ensuring that their acceptance of that 
canon is recognised. For example when asked about the links between home 
and study one student stated, ‚what I’m learning now is the labels they are 
putting on what I already learnt, you know it’s these actual structures of things, 
you know, there’s a belief that you’re following‛. Another student concurred 
saying, ‚that’s the way I get through now, you’ve just got to say what they 
want you to say, write what they want you to write, and then you get a good 
mark‛. One student summed this feeling up in the following way ‚honestly, 
once you know the jargon, you just do it‛. These students believed that the 
institution is what it is and that they have to fit in with it or perish. The way in 
which their context standardises their responses to questions of early childhood 
theory and practice disturbs them on one level (an intellectual level) but the 
pragmatics of getting through and gaining their qualification far out-weigh the 
need to make their influence known.  
 
In the case of the student teachers in the Samoan focus group, standardisation 
was viewed as an inflexibility on the part of the institution in recognising their 
culture and language in terms of the pedagogical work required. For example 
when asked about the issues they face one participant answered, ‚I find that 
with the English language its got this proper side to it, it’s the same with other 
languages as well, but you have to use the proper words and you know, they 
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say it to be writing in the academic, that’s how we should be writing because 
we are in a university‛. Another student agreed stating, ‚I mean we have no 
choice, we have to learn English and we have to write in English, because I 
guess the majority are English‛. These statements highlight the disembedding 
from cultural influences (language and its uses) that is typical of 
individualisation. This sentiment was summed up by another student in the 
following way ‚I think the university is more interested in the majority than the 
minority‛. Students viewed this level of standardisation as oppressive and 
showed a great degree of fatalism when describing their experiences.  
 
7.4.3.3 Institutional dependency 
Institutional dependency was a given for all four focus groups. Respondents 
recognised the need to give the university what it asked for in the required 
format as they depended on it for gaining their qualification. For example, one 
student from the Samoan group, when asked aboutwhy she enrolled in the 
course remarked, ‚for me it is getting a qualification, here in New Zealand you 
can not get a high quality, I mean a job or a good paying job, you know, but 
because we are Islanders and English is our second language you won’t get 
something that gets the dollars‛. Another stated, ‚we’re doing a whole bunch of 
stuff around being professional , and like getting prepared for like teacher 
registration, like that’s, that’s, I’m really concerned with personally‛. Others in 
the focus group agreed and there was a sense that each person was highly 
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dependent on the institution for passing or failing, and as a result attempts at 
participating in the co-creation of their context were largely to be avoided.  
 
Another face of this institutional dependency is an ambient feeling that any 
attempt at being critical of the institution would result in increased personal 
risk. One student observed the following when asked why she didn’t pursue 
her grievances, ‚knowing what they would do, they would probably try and 
kick me out, probably fail me and kick me out [agreement from other 
participants], it’s so risky isn’t it, and nobody knows whose doing what‛. A 
student from another group agreed when she stated, ‚it’s too scary, they know 
you and your classes and you like see these people all the time. These teachers 
aren’t just going to be gone the next year; they are going to be your teacher the 
next year and they’re going to know your name, and they are going to hold it 
against you‛. Thus, in the face of a standardised dependency on the institution 
students felt there to be little if any benefit for them personally in seeking co-
creation of their context. Another student summed this up in the following way 
‚You can’t change the system because it’s just – mental‛. These students felt 
powerless to effect change in their own context because the external control of 
their situation is too powerful to challenge individually or as a group. 
 
The risk of passing and failing a course is taken personally by the student 
respondents who viewed their time at their teacher training institution as 
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necessary to their later employment opportunities. The reason for this fatalistic 
attitude is simple according to one student when asked what she could do 
about perceived unfair treatment, ‚you don’t want to put yourself in a position 
where you’re going to shoot yourself in the foot because it’s just like we’ve been 
saying, you are going to see these teachers the next day and the next year‛. 
Answering the same question, another student talked about the sense of 
isolation she felt, ‚I don’t think that there is anyone else that I can talk to 
because I just think that it would bounce back on me in a negative way‛. Their 
believed dependence on the institution was complete as they felt disembedded 
from contexts external to the institution, entered into standardised relationships 
within a standardised programme of study, and made personally dependent on 
their context to the extent that they feel that participation is limited to 
regurgitating words that the institution deems it important to hear: ‚honestly, 
once you know the jargon, you just do it”. 
 
The analysis undertaken in this section has shown that student teachers feel 
disembedded from their lives outside of the university and forced into a 
standardised programme with its predetermined requirements. At the same 
time, these students feel dependent upon the institution in which they are 
training to the point that they do not want to ‘rock the boat’ by complaining or 
making a fuss. This fear of participation is a symptom of individualisation in so 
far as individualising processes make student teachers highly visible to the 
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institution upon which they are dependent for success in the life of their own. In 
this regard, individualisation incapacitates communal resistance from the 
outset by cutting off the possibility of democratic change to a system that is 
preset, apparently non-arbitrary, and structured in such a way that failing it is 
personal failure, and success within it is personal achievement.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has constructed an ideal type for individualisation and used the 
hermeneutic ecology method to organise analysis of documents and regulatory 
bodies within the context of IECTE education. This chapter has offered evidence 
supporting the claim that the regulatory context of IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand reproduces a culture of individualisation. This analysis 
forms the second half of the pairing for structural dissonance, recalling that 
socioculturalism was the first part of the pairing. In the next chapter, the thesis 
of structural dissonance is advanced by using the hermeneutic ecology to show 
contradictions between socioculturalism in the content and individualisation in 
the context of IECTE programmes of Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
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Chapter 8 
Structural Dissonance in IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
This chapter advances the argument for structural dissonance in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand by analysing the contradiction between 
socioculturalism in the content, and individualisation in the context of those 
programmes. This chapter uses the ecological hermeneutic introduced in 
chapter 4 and the ideal types set out in chapters 6 and 7 to argue that IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand are structurally dissonant. 
 
The philosophical assumptions used in this thesis set out an approach that 
focuses on how language is used, that approach also adopts an ironist 
perspective to questions of truth and reality (see 3.4). For this reason, asking 
whether structural dissonance is a reality or just appears to be reality, or asking 
whether structural dissonance is a contemporary truth or just a result of 
particular justifications are redundant lines of inquiry (see Ch 3). From the neo-
pragmatic perspective adopted in this thesis it is more relevant to ask how 
compatible are the vocabularies that are being used in content and context? Or how can 
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the justifications that are put forward for structural dissonance help to improve 
conditions in IECTE programmes?  
 
This chapter begins with an analysis of the dissonance between the ideal types 
set out in the previous three chapters. This largely theoretical analysis aims to 
show that socioculturalism and individualisation are non-compatible to the 
point that as theories they are dissonant. The second section highlights points in 
the ecological structure of IECTE programmes where that dissonance is evident 
as structural dissonance. The chapter ends with student teachers’ reports of 
dissonance in IECTE, a re-statement of structural dissonance based on the case 
put forward in this chapter, and a link to the notion of structural violence. 
 
As the final chapter in this part of the thesis, the argument is advanced that 
structural dissonance occurs at multiple levels of the ecology of IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
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8.1 Dissonance between the ideal types. 
 
 Socio-culturalism Individualisation 
View of people Embedded/situated (culture, 
history, time, place); agents of 
change; connected 
Disembedded, self 
interested, autonomous 
Ideal structure Participatory, co-constructed, 
encouraging diversity 
Standardised, externally 
controlled, homogenous 
Social agency Shared control, supports 
equitable transformation 
Institutionally dependent, 
fragmented 
Participatory 
framework 
Inclusive, communicative, 
community based 
Limited, self interested, 
biographical 
Fig. 17 Pairing of ideal types: Individualisation and socioculturalism. 
 
Returning to the musical metaphor introduced in chapter 2, the chords that 
socioculturalism and individualisation strike are not harmonious. Using the 
ideal type model, which was developed in the previous chapters, it is apparent 
that these perspectives are opposite in several ways (see fig. 17). For instance, 
socio-culturalism views people as embedded and situated within social 
networks of connection (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991), as being formed through 
interaction with those contexts (Vygotsky, 1978), and as being socially and 
culturally oriented in both behaviour and the use of cultural tool (e.g., Wertsch, 
1998). Individualisation theory, on the other hand, views people as essentially 
self-interested, embedded within institutionally standardised contexts, and 
institutionally dependent  (e.g., Beck, 1992). Likewise, the ideal structure (social 
and/or institutional) for socio-culturalism is participatory with persons moving 
from peripheral to full participation over time (e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991; 
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Rogoff, 1990), with space for the co-construction of contexts and the content of 
those contexts (e.g., Rogoff, 2003). Individualisation processes leave little space 
for co-construction as contexts are pre-constructed, standardised, and externally 
controlled (Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002).  
 
The ideal type for socioculturalism encourages the transformation of social 
contexts with a view to inclusion and the construction of communities (e.g., 
Rogoff, 2003), whereas individualisation reproduces social contexts where 
individuals are dependent on institutions, participation in the construction of 
contexts is limited by the structure of institutions themselves, and where the 
primary motivation of people is biographical success/safety (e.g., Bauman, 2001; 
Beck & Beck-Gernsheim, 2002). It is difficult to hold social and historical 
connection to be of utmost importance in a context where social institutions 
promote self interest and individual autonomy. Likewise, it is difficult to put 
into practice the virtues of participation and co-construction if at the same time 
one is enmeshed in a context that enforces standardisation and institutional 
dependence through external mechanisms of control. 
 
At the level of vocabulary, recalling that the vocabulary used was chosen from 
key texts on both socioculturalism and individualisation, the words associated 
with each appear opposing, for example: embedded/disembedded, co-
constructed/externally controlled, collaborative/institutionally dependent, 
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relationship-focused/self interested. At the level of vocabulary, and in terms of 
the theoretical perspectives that support those vocabularies, the concepts 
employed oppose each other. They are dissonant. Their meanings and 
intentions contradict with one another. At the level of ideal types it is therefore 
justifiable to assert that because the content of IECTE programmes draws on a 
socio-cultural vocabulary, and because the structure of the context in which that 
content is delivered is regulated by a vocabulary of individualisation, then a 
situation of structural dissonance is present. 
 
Recalling that Beck (1992) used individualisation theory to argue for new forms 
of citizenship, i.e., sub-politics: wherein localised pressure groups lobby for 
institutional and social change on local issues. One issue here is the 
empowerment of students as citizens of their learning context. Bauman (2001) 
has observed that ‚the other side of individualisation seems to be the corrosion 
and slow disintegration of citizenship‛ (p. 49). Self-reliance and personal 
accountability in a context where social institutions enforce individual 
dependency through standardisation have a hidden cost. Bauman (2001) 
identified that cost as the loss of citizenry participation whereby persons are 
not, or much less) able to play a key role in the democratic co-construction of 
their social environment. Under the condition of individualisation, individuals 
are impotent in the institutional settings they inhabit: They are subordinated to 
externally constructed institutional contexts.  
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Citizenship is itself not a simple concept to unfold (e.g. Faulks, 2000; Heater 
1999; Marshall, 1950) where scholars talk of multiple conceptions of citizenship 
(e.g., Heater, 1999; Magnette, 2005; Marshall, 1950). Citizenship is a term that 
encompasses the notion of rights and responsibilities (Marshall, 1950) as well as 
an active participation in the co-construction of the social context of which 
citizens are a part. It is this participatory aspect of citizenship that Bauman 
(2001) claimed is eroded by individualisation.  
 
Individualisation erodes citizenry participation by personalising risk and 
opportunity (in pursuit of the life of one’s own), standardising institutional 
dependency and demanding individual compliance to externally controlled 
regulations. Socioculturalism, on the other hand, promotes citizenship through 
a focus on participatory relationship building, co-construction and 
transformation of shared contexts and the empowerment of communities of 
actors as they work together to negotiate social practices.  
 
Dayan (2008) made a similar point regarding contradiction in IECTE 
programmes in the context of practicum supervision in Israel, where she stated 
‚the most commonly favoured approach to working with children is a child-
centred humanist democratic approach, and the predominant approach in 
working with students is behaviourist‛ (p. 160). Dayan’s research is similar to 
that undertaken in this thesis in that she identified a contradiction between 
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approaches to pedagogical content and the delivery (and assessment) of that 
content. Dayan pointed out that practicum supervisors expect their students to 
work with children in a humanistic-democratic way, but work with the student 
teachers in a behaviouralist manner. The one practice contradicts the other. 
Dayan (2008) pointed out that ‚the inconsistency of the approaches used with 
children and with students hampers the students’ learning‛ (p. 160). She also 
pointed out that picking up alternative concepts might improve this situation.  
 
The argument advanced in this thesis is similar to Dayan’s (2008) insofar as  
both are saying that inconsistency (which I am calling structural dissonance) is 
a problem in IECTE programmes. Dayan was saying that inconsistency 
hampers student development, I am saying that contradiction creates a context 
of structural dissonance which is itself a form of structural violence (see chapter 
2). This thesis uses structural dissonance as a critical lens for viewing IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. However, we both hope for the same 
thing: Dayan hoped for more consistency and I hope for less contradiction; we 
both write from a belief that a more socially just approach to IECTE is possible. 
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8.2 Structural dissonance in the context of IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
Using the ecological hermeneutic it is possible to see the contradiction 
(dissonance) between socio-culturalism and individualisation at a number of 
levels of the ecology of IECTE. At each level of the ecology (see fig. 18) there is a 
distinct dissonance characterised by contradiction. This section explains how 
and where that dissonance occurs throughout the ecological structure set out 
below.  
 
 
Fig. 18 Ecological hermeneutic for structural dissonance.  
 
Macro-context 
Exo-context  
Intra-
university, 
focus group 
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Analysis begins at the macro-level of where socioculturalism in socio-historical 
context of IECTE and the wider societal reproduction of individualisation 
collide. Analysis of the structural dissonance at this level shows contradiction 
between the socio-cultural content of core texts in IECTE programmes (Ministry 
of Education, 1996, 2004, 2007), and individualising texts in the context of 
IECTE (the Education Act, the Tertiary Education Strategies (Ministry of 
Education, 2007; Ministry of Education, 2010), aspects of the Graduating Teacher 
Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 2007) and the NZVCC (particularly CUAP). 
The final part of this section identifies the dissonance in course outlines and 
reports structural dissonance in the experiences of student teachers at the case 
study university.   
 
8.2.1 Structural dissonance in the macro-context of IECTE programmes. 
At the macro-level there is dissonance between the socio-historical shift toward 
sociocultural theories of teaching and learning in the content of IECTE 
programmes and the institutionalised individualism (individualisation) that is 
characteristic of life in contemporary New Zealand society. One way to look at 
this dissonance is to say that the content of IECTE programmes hopes to create 
a more socially just world by focusing attention on relationship-building, 
empathy for diversity and developing an ethic of participatory transformation, 
whereas, processes of individualisation attempt to construct autonomous self-
interested individuals capable of managing multiple institutional dependencies 
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and standardised institutional relationships (see 7.4.3). These commitments are 
mutually exclusive enough to be dissonant, like opposing chords struck 
simultaneously.  
 
A perspective that places community, cooperation and participation at the 
centre of its approach to education cannot, without contradiction, be produced 
in institutions that encourage the personalisation of risk and institutional 
dependency with out some degree of dissonance. Why? Because, it would be 
self-contradictory, one either focuses on participatory relationship building or 
sets up institutions that demand personal accountability and dependency 
through external control. The movement toward socioculturalism that May 
(1997, 2009), Ritchie (2003) and Smith (1998) identify could also be viewed as a 
shift away from those perspectives in early childhood education that isolate 
individuals from the social and cultural contexts in which they are embedded: a 
shift away from social forces such as individualisation. From this perspective, 
the content of IECTE programmes can also be seen as an attempt to contradict 
the forces of individualisation, which may in turn heighten the sense that 
something in the structure of IECTE is dissonant. 
 
Sociocultural content on the one hand and a society that reproduces 
individualisation on the other: This is the dissonant mismatch that this thesis 
identifies in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. From this 
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perspective the larger stories of what early childhood education hopes to 
achieve, and how universities provide the programmes that will train teachers 
to achieve them, are by and large contradictory. Dissonance is the result of that 
contradiction. Structural dissonance resonates throughout the ecological 
structure of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The next section 
identifies that dissonance in the macro-structure of IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
  
8.2.2 Structural dissonance in the exo-context of IECTE programmes.  
One level in from the general macro-level on the ecological hermeneutic is the 
exo-level (fig. 17). At this level agendas are formulated and made into 
regulatory requirements by agents and agencies external to the university. On 
the side of individualisation, the previous chapter identified the NZ Education 
Act (1989), the NZ Tertiary Strategy 2007-2012 and 2010-2015, and aspects of the 
Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 2007) and the NZVCC 
(particularly CUAP). On the side of socioculturalism is the early childhood 
curriculum (Ministry of Education, 1996), elements of the Early Childhood 
Education Strategy (Ministry of Education, 2002), and aspects of the Graduating 
Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers Council, 2007). On the side of individualisation 
there is a drive toward personal accountability underpinned by notions of 
individuals as autonomous and self-responsible (e.g., Ministry of Education, 
2010, p. 15). There is standardisation in the form of legal definition (e.g. the 
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word student refers to an individual person), the application of regulations 
(funding, entry, graduating standards), and in the relationship of dependency 
that exists between individual persons and the institutions in which they 
undertake their education (e.g., approved provider stipulations, externally 
regulated course prescriptions, and prescribed graduate standards).  
On the other side, socioculturalism understands students as humans necessarily 
embedded within familial, communal and societal contexts (e.g., Ministry of 
Education, 1996, p. 19). From a sociocultural perspective it is not possible to 
understand what it means to be a person without understanding the social and 
cultural relationships from which that person constructs their sense of self (e.g., 
Mead, 1934; Vygotsky, 1978). From this perspective, personal accountability 
(including accountability for a life of one’s own) clashes with the will to belong, 
relate and correspond with others who are embedded within the context of 
their shared social space. In the context of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, individual student teachers are personally accountable to the 
universities in which they train. The personalisation of accountability and the 
individualisation of risk is dissonant with the sociocultural approach to 
education espoused in their programmes of study: Particularly as student 
teachers are encouraged to build links between their students and their wider 
communities (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 14), encourage well-being through 
support of their students’ families and cultural community (Ministry of 
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Education, 1996, p. 14) and encourage participation through the co-construction 
of learning environments. 
 
IECTE programmes are provided in a context where the relationship between 
students and the university is standardised by regulations external to the 
university itself. For example, Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers 
Council, 2007) provide a standardised template-based set of key competencies 
that students must be shown to meet before they are able to graduate from 
courses. Those key competencies are used in some teaching practice placements 
as standardised criteria against which individual students are measured, and 
subsequently made personally accountable. Another example of this 
standardisation occurs in the compulsory nature of the CUAP-approved 
courses that make up the majority of the BEd degree. This standardised 
structure of IECTE programmes is coupled with a policy drive for greater 
degrees of personal accountability tying government funding for qualifications 
to individual student success (e.g., Ministry of Education, 2010). This coupling 
creates a context where entry standards are applied not only on academic lines 
but also on economic ones. In the future it is plausible that programmes will be 
encouraged to accept only those students who meet a standardised criterion 
,those who have proven their ability to pass courses.  
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Standardisation of the type outlined above contradicts the sociocultural focus 
on co-constructive participation and the mutual transformation of social 
contexts (e.g., Rogoff, 2003). Student teachers are expected to encourage open-
ended exploration and participation among children, between teachers, 
between teachers and children, between teachers and parents/caregivers and 
between children, teachers, parents/caregivers, and the wider community 
(Ministry of Education, 1996, 1998, 2002; also see Ch 6). But there are no official 
documents that bind universities to ensure the same for student teachers. 
Institutionalised standardisation of the sort engaged in by universities leaves no 
space for the negotiation of what those standards entail or how those standards 
might be transformed by those who are being standardised. On this count, there 
is dissonance between the content of IECTE programmes and the context in 
which they are provided.  
 
The exo-context of IECTE programmes entrenches the reproduction of 
institutional dependency. For example, the New Zealand Teachers’ Council 
publishes a booklet listing approved providers of IECTE programmes. Those 
providers undergo a quality approval process to ensure that their programmes 
will lead to registration (NZ Teachers’ Council, 2010, p. 3). The by-product of 
that quality control is that students seeking their qualification, and later, 
registration, are entirely dependant on the institution that provides it. That 
dependency begins when students fill out the enrolment form and does not end 
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until their qualification has been conferred. This institutional dependency is 
standardised and is applied to all students in equal measure, but it serves to 
reproduce individualisation by simultaneously personalising responsibility and 
risk, whilst providing a link between personal success to success in a life of one’s 
own.  
 
Institutional dependency coupled with external control of the contextual 
conditions in which that dependency occurs (e.g., NZ Teachers Council, CUAP) 
contradicts sociocultural focus of contextual co-construction, collaboration and 
community (in the sense of shared transformation): Student teachers are given 
little choice in the papers that make up their degree, little participation in the 
structure that the compulsory component of the degree enforced upon them, 
and as the data showed in the previous chapter, little chance to negotiate and 
transform the pedagogical context in which they find themselves.  
 
8.2.3 Structural dissonance in course outlines used in IECTE programmes. 
The previous chapter of the thesis has argued that the context that students find 
themselves in, in terms of the actual physical environment in which they 
undertake study, is constructed by influences far outside the immediate 
environment. It is a context that is constructed in board rooms, by committees 
and by people whom students (and the lecturers of courses) may have never 
met. The university context in which IECTE programmes are delivered is pre-
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formed, externally constructed and above all reproduces a culture of 
individualisation. This section focuses on the official course outlines used in 
IECTE programmes as a case in point.  
 
Course outlines in IECTE are an interesting irony. They are the documents 
which most directly enforce individualisation for student teachers, in the form 
of the rules to which they are individually bound (and accountable). But they 
are also the place where socioculturalism makes its demands in the form of 
pedagogical output. In course outlines individualisation and socioculturalism 
simultaneously exist. Individualisation appears in the course assessment 
statement which informs the student about course regulations pertaining to 
individual accountability (e.g., grading scale, late submission of work, requests 
for extension, academic integrity and attendance requirements). This material is 
usually presented as housekeeping at the beginning of a course. And, as chapter 
6 showed in detail, much of the pedagogical work stated in the course outlines 
in IECTE programmes was sociocultural in nature (insofar as pedagogical work 
was being used to assess student comprehension of socio-cultural themes in 
issues concerning early childhood education, e.g., assessment, pedagogy, 
curriculum and perspectives on human development). 
 
Course outlines and the course regulations they contain, reproduce the culture 
of individualisation by foregrounding the individual responsibilities of students 
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in a standardised manner. It is not by chance that this information is sited at the 
front of the documents and usually dealt with in the first class. The 
disembedding of individuals from their socio-familial setting is achieved 
through a standardised requirement that individuals are personally accountable 
for their own academic progress, but have little choice in the direction that 
progress might take given the level of prescription in the course structure. The 
point here is that students enter a paradoxical relationship where-by the choice 
of subject matter is controlled and assessed by the institution, but the subject 
matter itself is based on a framework of participation, relationship-building and 
empowerment. Plainly there is dissonance in the structure of the course 
outlines. 
 
Within the context set out by the course outlines, the onus is on the individual 
to highlight issues in their personal biography that influence their performance 
within the course structure (e.g., disability). Furthermore, students are assessed 
on an individual basis, even in terms of group work where results of 
assessment are ascribed to individual participants. The risk of success or failure 
falls firmly on the shoulders of individual student teachers, and success or 
failure in this case means attaining an institutionally accepted standard (e.g., 
Standards for Graduating Teachers (NZ Teachers Council, 2007) or a passing grade 
in the assessments in each course. Individuals are wholly dependent on the 
tertiary education institution for the provision of each particular course, 
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including compulsory non-negotiable assessments. Course outlines establish a 
standardised set of rules and regulations that make the individual and their 
efforts highly visible and highly personalised. 
 
The course outline is an artefact of contradiction insofar as it imposes personal 
accountability on individual students by way of course regulations; it presents a 
standardised and non-negotiable structure for assessment and relates required 
pedagogical work to the pre-fashioned course objectives; which is bolstered by 
the fact that without attaining a pass in each course students will be unable to 
graduate, and have to return to redo the course (increasing the personal cost of 
study) in order to gain their qualification. Whilst at the same time the content 
students are expected to learn, produce and have assessed draws upon socio-
cultural themes of inclusion, participatory rights, holistic well-being, co-
construction, collaboration and reciprocal relationships.  
 
8.2.4 Structural dissonance and student teachers’ experiences.  
The thesis of structural dissonance is supported by the reports of student 
teachers in the four focus groups. At a general level, there was dissonance 
between those aspects of the course that student teachers enjoyed most and 
disliked the most. Student teachers reported that those aspects of their course 
that they found most enjoyable were those which developed socio-cultural 
capacities such as participation, co-creation, belonging and community. They 
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also reported that the aspects they disliked the most were those that constitute 
individualisation (disembedding, standardisation, institutional dependency, 
and an environment of personal risk). This highlights the distinction student 
teachers made between elements of their education that drew them together as 
a community and those elements that fragment them and dominate them 
through a culture of personal accountability and external control. 
 
Student teachers reported that they experienced contradiction in their courses 
of study. One student, in a discussion about the way IECTE courses are 
structured and the pressures placed upon students by the university asked the 
other students in her group: ‚do you find it frustrating that when you go to a 
centre and our curriculum states that we are here to empower children and you 
want them to express themselves and you know, it’s a real contradiction 
because you can’t do that here *at the university+< yeah, so you’re two 
different people‛. This comment was met with widespread agreement. Students 
felt that they had to be two different people because the socio-cultural teacher 
that they are expected to become is so wildly different from the institutionally 
styled individual that the university creates through processes of 
individualisation. Encouraged to empower whilst feeling disempowered in 
their own educational context, the experience of student teachers in this focus 
group is one of contradiction based on the dissonance between the structure of 
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the course content and the structure of the context in which that material is 
delivered. 
 
A different focus group spoke on the topic of belonging as they talked about 
their experience of IECTE. As the students were talking about how they felt 
about their experience at the case study university one student framed their 
dissatisfaction in the following way:  ‚you’re teaching a child empowerment, 
communication and belonging, but you need to feel like you belong to the 
institution you are educated in, for me anyway‛. Again the rest of the group 
agreed with this sentiment and pointed out that there is a contradiction 
between how the university as an educational institution treats them as 
students and how they are expected to treat the children with whom they work 
in their educational setting. Again, this is further evidence of dissonance in the 
structure of IECTE courses. 
 
Many of the student teachers in the focus groups had plenty to say about the 
contradiction between the content they were learning and the context of their 
own education. One student offered the following remark in a frustrated tone: 
‚they tell us that all children are capable learners so therefore they are able to 
use knives and you are able to trust them to use big heavy hammers that are 
real and not plastic, and things like that you know, let them go onto their 
furthest development and all this stuff, and with us, I mean it’s completely the 
  
276 
 
opposite end of the scale, I mean ‘here’s the playdough, you can play with it for 
two hours, then at the end of that you can come and talk to me about how you 
felt’‛. Other students in this group agreed. The point they made was that the 
compulsory nature of courses they took as part of their degree and the non-
negotiable nature of the course content contradicted the socio-cultural values of 
co-construction and participation. Students in this group felt a marked sense of 
frustration that there seemed to be one rule for what they are supposed to do 
with children and another rule for how the university taught them what to do 
with children.   
 
Another student summed up this feeling when asked if she could think of any 
examples of contradiction, ‚it happens pretty much all the time. Well we all 
know about it. They should be teaching us in the same way they expect us to be 
working with our children. It happens in all papers‛. This student is pointing to 
a contradiction that results from structural dissonance between content and 
context in IECTE programmes. The other students agreed with this appeal for 
harmony between what is being taught and how it is being delivered. Another 
student in that group then gave the following example to illustrate that point ‚I 
can think of one that happened yesterday when we were looking at art, like 
painting and things like that, and it was very directional ‘and this is what you 
will produce’< no chance to experiment and things like that, just, ‘this is what 
you will do, this is what will happen’< it’s very prescriptive and prescribed‛. 
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These students are taking issue with the standardisation and institutional 
dependency that accompanies individualisation. It is an issue with them 
because it contradicts the teaching practices that they themselves are expected 
to adopt. 
 
Students in another focus group talked about the way in which they 
experienced inflexibility in the teaching programme. Given that they were 
expected to follow children’s emergent interests they found it hard to reconcile 
a course where there was little chance to negotiate programme content. In this 
conversation one student remarked : ‚It’s like they’ve had this *course+ going 
for like three years and they thought this is how it is, let’s just teach everyone the 
same. Which goes against what they’re teaching us *laughter and agreement 
from other participants], yeah, it should be like constantly reflecting on their 
own practice and updating it‛. These comments suggest that what students 
perceive as an inability by lecturers to be flexible in the courses they teach is 
really a result of the inflexibility of the context in which those courses are 
provided, particularly in terms of CUAP and academic board limitations on 
what can be changed in courses and NZ Teachers Council stipulations on what 
must be covered (and what has been accredited).  
 
In the context that students saw as dominated by personal accountability even 
the group work involved in some of the courses was perceived by some of the 
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students that discussed this more socio-cultural element of their education saw 
it as a negative in a context that is dominated by personal accountability. The 
contradiction here was between the relationship-building potential of group 
work and the individualised impact that working in groups may have on 
personal performance. On this topic one student stated: ‚It’s frustrating because 
you do gravitate to a group of people for an assignment, because you know that 
they will get the job done, but it doesn’t necessarily mean that you are opening 
up relationships or really wanting to know that person, you just know that they 
will get the job done, I actually find it quite negative‛. This mercenary stance 
toward forming groups of learners can also be seen as a by-product of a culture 
of individualisation where students are aware that personal performance is the 
difference between pass and fail – this difference is connected to the pursuit of a 
life of one’s own and the benefits that passing papers entails for the individual 
student. When asked about the sense of community she felt at the institution 
one participant observed, ‚we work in groups doing things, but the group 
activities don’t really build relationships‛. In this way the structure of IECTE 
programmes contradicts socioculturalism so completely that even the socio-
cultural activities within the programme are warped by the demands of 
individualisation. 
 
The curriculum that student teachers are expected to put into action focuses on 
doing. This is to say that the curriculum focuses on activities, the links between 
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activities and the social and cultural history that underpins those activities (e.g. 
Ministry of Education, 1996, pp. 9, 10, 15, 16, 19). This sociocultural focus on 
communal action echoes Wertsch’s (1998) theory of sociocultural action, 
however, in their own education some students voiced resentment at a 
pedagogical format that expounds a pre-established content and the 
contradiction that this entails. For example, when asked about negative 
educational  experiences one participant remarked,   ‚just being told something 
is not really thinking, or active, or active learning, you’re just sitting there‛. 
Other students picked up on the contradiction in pedagogical style pointing out 
that they are expected to communicate with children in a way that encourages 
their holistic wellbeing, participation and respect while they felt that the same 
socio-cultural approach was not being taken in their own education. For 
example, a typical statement made across the groups was, ‚Half the time they 
treat you like children, they talk down to you‛. This feeling of imputed 
inferiority may be a result of the powerlessness students feel as a result of a 
heightened sense of personal accountability in a context that demanded 
dependency through standardisation.  
 
The group of Samoan students also voiced what they perceived as contradiction 
between what they were being taught and how they were being taught it. For 
this group language was a particular issue and they talked about how 
important language is within a sociocultural perspective on early childhood 
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education (particularly deriving from Vygotsky’s (1978) theory of 
development). Given this importance one student remarked: ‚It’s funny that 
they tell us to go to early childhood and to promote the child’s first language, 
but should we be doing that as students here as well? I mean, it’s just 
confusing‛. These students felt particularly disembedded from their social 
community through the standardised structure of their IECTE programme. The 
mixed message these students were being given is a by-product of the 
structural dissonance that occurs when course content and the contextual rules 
that govern the delivery of that content contradict one another. Another student 
in this group illustrated this point when talking about her negative experiences: 
‚They say we can do it in the centre *speak Samoan+ so we should be able to do 
it here too, instead of mentioning you can do it at the centre and here you have 
to use just one language‛. Though it must be added that the case study 
university did have in place Pasifika learning support, Samoan tutors and the 
option for students to hand in assignments in Samoan language. The point 
remains, however, that these students reported they did not feel supported. 
 
A feeling of dissonance ran deep in the group of Samoan students. They were 
trying to express themselves in their second language and trying to understand 
why they were expected to help others express themselves in their first 
language when they were not able to. The students in this focus group believed 
that teaching and learning are mutually inclusive concepts, in much the same 
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way that ako in Māori means both teach and learn. One student teacher summed 
up this sentiment when commenting on the negative experiences of her 
education: ‚It should start from the college of teachers, it’s a teachers’ college 
isn’t it?‛ The assumption being made here is that teachers should be taught the 
way that they are expected to teach others. From this perspective teaching and 
learning should be a harmonious event. However, this is not the case as the 
content of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand and the context in 
which they are provided are structurally dissonant.  
 
Out of that dissonance came a feeling of fatalism and disempowerment that 
was echoed by participants in each of the focus groups. In one of the groups 
conversation turned from what their ideal early childhood education might 
look like to how they could create changes now, and whether they felt they 
could participate in the negotiation of their educational context. One student 
said: ‚I think they *the university+ need to be more flexible with the course, and 
adapt it depending on the group and the group’s experience< and to recognise 
not just formal qualifications but life experiences as well, take those into 
account‛. This version of what IECTE might look like combats disembedding 
and standardisation, it also challenges institutional dependency, and looks, at 
least on the surface, like emancipation for student teachers. However, this 
sentiment was not held by all students, some students argued the futility of 
their situation, for example, when asked if there were any other comments they 
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would like to make at the end of a focus group session, one participant 
remarked: ‚We know we can’t change anything but we just wanted to say 
*something+.‛ The opportunity to have their say was enough for most students 
to gain a sense of participation, even though this research was explained to 
them as being completely separate from the case study university. 
 
When the subject of end-of-course evaluations was raised with each of the 
groups it was met with a degree of scepticism. On the face of things one could 
relate the course evaluation forms to participation in the ongoing shaping of 
IECTE courses. However, there is a subtle but important distinction to be made 
here. Course evaluations are past-focused (regressio: Bloch, 1986). They refer to 
what has already taken place, and therefore is unchangeable, at least for those 
respondents that pass the course in question. The rhetoric that supports the 
course evaluation forms might seem to draw upon the socio-cultural themes of 
participation and co-construction but in actuality they are merely ways of 
reporting the past. Students who contribute to their course by filling out the 
course evaluation form, in all honesty, are commenting on practices that they 
will no longer be participants in. Formally, the ability to change the programme 
is there if the feedback is used to inform following year, however, that does not 
help students in the following year to co-construct their context, it has still been 
pre-formed. On this theme, when asked about what they felt they could do 
about their negative experiences one student commented, ‚But why can’t we do 
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that now, why can’t we change things now when it is actually affecting you? - 
Well, what can you do?‛  
 
The culture of personal accountability that permeates IECTE programmes, 
combined with a standardised delivery of content (pre-determined by external 
agents, i.e., CUAP and NZ Teachers Council), and an entrenched dependency 
on the university (and its multiple structures) results in a context of submissive 
reception to programme content. This is especially so where learning the  
programme content is concerned, particularly in terms of making the 
institutionally determined aspects of context a personalised occupation (i.e., 
personal accountability, acceptance of standardisation, dependency on the 
university). The content of IECTE uses a vocabulary of co-operation, co-
determination, equity and empowerment as a guide for pedagogy and 
theoretical premise. However, the context, or rather, the manner in which the 
content is delivered runs in the opposite direction: Toward the erosion of 
participation and contextual co-construction, toward personal capitulation, and 
toward the repression of diversity and diverse participation in the co-
construction of educational contexts. 
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8.3 Structural violence and structural dissonance in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
To conclude this chapter, the link between structural violence and structural 
dissonance is re-stated in order to point out the moral hope that something can 
and should be done (see Ch 2). Structural violence is a form of violence where 
there ‚is no visible, physical actor intending violent consequences, but rather it 
is a violence which comes from the social context itself‛ (Galtung, 1996, p. 2). 
This and the previous three chapters have premised the claim of contradiction 
that substantiates the thesis of structural dissonance in IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. The contradiction is one between students as 
empowered co-creators of their educational context and disempowered 
receivers of a pre-determined and highly structured education. In Galtung’s 
(1996) terms, I have been arguing that student teachers are repressed by a 
structure where there is no specific actor which can be taken to account. Rather, 
it is the entire system, or structure that is brought into question.  
 
Within the courses themselves there is little room for negotiation or co-
construction/transformation (Rogoff, 2003) because the assessments, their 
weightings, and their relation to pre-formed course objectives are decisions that 
have been made long before the student teachers are handed their course 
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outlines. Courses are for the most part compulsory and ready-made for 
consumption leaving no space for negotiation or co-creation. It is ironic 
therefore that a highly standardised individualising institutional structure is 
being used to reproduce sociocultural pedagogies for teaching the nation’s 
children. Surely sociocultural insights on development do not only apply to 
children, but are also relevant to adults and adult education programmes. 
Surely it is also possible that socioculturalism can and should be taught through 
sociocultural means. Writers like Fleer & Robbins (2004) have stated in their 
work that such a connection is necessary. Ridgeway and Surman (2004) agreed 
with the need for consonance in their paper entitled Practice What We Preach. So 
too did Galtung (1996) in his classic Peace by Peaceful Means (at least at the 
theoretical level of institutions having an onus to ensure consistency 
throughout their practices). This thesis also agrees with these authors. 
Returning to the motif introduced at the very beginning of this thesis – it is 
important that what we teach and how we teach are telling the same story, for if 
there is anything to be learnt from socioculturalism it is this: We humans learn 
from our contexts as well as from each other and from books. Surely, if we hope 
to produce sociocultural teachers, then using the logic of socioculturalism, we 
have to role model the pedagogies we expect. This thesis has argued that 
because of the institutional context in which IECTE programmes are provided, 
we do not currently do this very well. 
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There are beneficial uses of dissonance, for example, to challenge inequitable 
situations or to break vicious cycles of domination and/or repression (e.g., 
Freire, 1970; MacNaughton, 2005; Neyland, 2010; Postman & Weingartner, 
1971). However, that dissonance is different to the notion of structural 
dissonance advanced in this thesis. Dissonance for social justice is not the same 
as structural dissonance. Structural dissonance has been shown to be an 
ambient contradiction between the content and context of IECTE programmes; 
it is not inclined toward emancipation, but rather, the repression of co-
constructive and participatory faculties for student teachers. So whilst it may be 
argued that some dissonance is good or useful, this thesis argues that structural 
dissonance is not. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the question of whether or not to overcome any form 
of violence is a moral one. This chapter and the thesis thus far has argued that 
structural dissonance, as a form of structural violence, is being reproduced in 
degree-based IECTE programmes at universities in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The 
question now is what can be done. An answer to this question will be suggested 
in the fourth and final part of this thesis. 
 
Summary 
This part of the thesis has advanced the argument that there is structural 
dissonance in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Ideal types were 
  
287 
 
constructed through the integration of textual sources and used to interpret the 
content and context of IECTE programmes using the method of ecological 
hermeneutics. This chapter has used that evidence to o premise the proposition 
of structural dissonance in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
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Part Four 
 
Reconstruction: A 
pedagogy of enacted 
hope. 
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Chapter Nine 
Hope 
 
So far this thesis has argued that structural dissonance is a type of structural 
violence where the content and context of IECTE programme are contradictory. 
This chapter is a first step in moving beyond the identification of this problem 
to suggest what might be done to overcome that situation. The 
reconceptualisation offered in this and the following chapter is an ironist 
example (Rorty, 1989) of blue skies thinking aimed at suggesting an alternative 
conception of IECTE programmes in order to counteract structural dissonance. 
This thesis does not argue that IECTE programmes, in a state of structural 
dissonance, are devoid of hope: Hope is abundant even in individualisation. 
Neither is it arguing that there should be more hope in IECTE programmes: 
Hope is abundant there too. The argument advanced in this chapter is that we 
can do a better job of aligning the context in which IECTE is provided with the 
social hope that socioculturalism describes.  
 
This chapter is an example of blue skies thinking (May, 2009) as opposed to the 
reproduction of concepts grounded in the reality of present practices. Recalling 
that this thesis is based on Rorty’s (1999) assumption that truth (and reality) are 
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a function of the sentences that we use to form agreements in the communities 
to which we belong, rather than correspondence to reality, the idea that the 
present can be essentially real is suspect. From the perspective used in this thesis, 
the term reality of the present refers only to those sentences that are currently 
used to describe the things that are important to us and the consensus our 
particular communities have found on the usefulness of those sentences. From 
an ironist perspective (see chapter 3), those sentences are final vocabularies that 
can and should be superseded (Rorty, 1989). Blue skies thinking, in this frame, is 
also synonym for the ironist project of constructing new vocabularies to use in 
place of the old. 
 
The goal of this chapter is to offer a philosophy of hope as a hermeneutic 
method for constructing a pedagogy of hope that can be used to create more 
socially just and less structurally dissonant relations within IECTE programmes 
The following chapter will then focus on the use of hope in education with 
particular emphasis on Freire’s Pedagogy of Hope (1994). This goal uses Rorty’s 
(1999) sentiment that social justice is one of the most useful conversations that 
philosophers, educators and culture at large can have. The second chapter of 
this thesis outlined the moral impetus that faces those who recognise injustice 
in an area of practice. Chapter two and part three of this thesis advanced the 
thesis of structural dissonance as a form of social injustice. This chapter is an 
attempt to open up space for further conversation of what might be done to 
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improve the lot of student teachers in IECTE programmes by suggesting a 
notion of hope that is holistic and philosophically coherent with the rest of this 
thesis. 
 
This chapter uses the ecological hermeneutic method to move from the general 
to the specific in terms of hope theory (see fig. 19). Discourses of hope and 
education are left out of this chapter and used to introduce the following 
chapter in which the theory of hope worked out in this chapter is applied to 
pedagogy. This chapter inverts the critical hermeneutic ecology used in part 
three (chapters 6, 7 and 8), transforming it into a reconstructive tool. In part 
three, the ecological hermeneutic method was used to organise critical analysis 
of socioculturalism in the content and individualisation in the context of IECTE 
programmes. Part four constructs an understanding of hope through the 
integration of multiple perspectives on this subject, organised from the general 
to the specific (as outlined in Ch 4).  
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Fig. 19  Ecological hermeneutic for understanding hope. 
 
 
The first part of this chapter is about hope as a philosophical and pedagogical 
concept. Hope is a word that people commonly use in a wide variety of settings 
to express their wishes, dreams, needs and wants. This chapter uses a specific 
understanding of hope to express the blue skies ironist reconceptualisation of 
IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand, constructed as a response to 
structural dissonance in the those programmes. This section introduces a 
general understanding of hope before drawing together a hermeneutic of hope 
A general view of hope 
Hope as a holistic concept 
Hope and Bloch (1986) 
Theory of 
Hope 
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(constructed in section 9.1.2.4) which will be used in place of epistemology 
(theory of knowledge). 
 
9.1 A general definition of hope. 
 
From a general standpoint this thesis defines hope as looking forward to a 
better future and acting on the possibility of its realisation. This formulation 
contains four inter-related parts: looking forward, a better future, acting and the 
possibility of realisation. This formulation is similar to that of 13th century 
Dominican monk Thomas Aquinas when he wrote of hope as ‚a future good 
that is arduous and difficult – but nevertheless possible – to obtain‛ (Aquinas, 
in Shade, 2001, p. 43). Hope and education are intricately related, relevant to 
one another, and compatible (e.g., Freire, 1994). The following discussion draws 
these two topics together as a background to the pragmatic theory of hope 
advanced in the next section. 
 
Hope looks forward, but the future focus of hope is not necessarily a temporal 
direction; hope also looks to those aspects of the past that have not yet worked 
themselves out, or which might offer new life and new perspective in the 
present (e.g., Taylor, 1989 who argues for the rehabilitation of history into the 
present by virtue of its unfinished elements). Education looks forward in all of 
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these ways: it takes the past and offers new interpretations (e.g., history and 
social sciences), it uses the resources of the present to create innovation (e.g., 
technology and art), and it imagines the world of tomorrow (e.g., English and 
science).  
 
Hope looks to the better in conditions. What this means is that hope provides 
positive inspiration as a condition of its vision. The object of hope is goodness 
(which is in itself a subjective term) and it finds this goodness in its subject 
(whether past, present or future), for example the child who longs for sweet 
things to eat or the student teacher that eagerly awaits a grade for an essay on 
which they worked particularly hard. Hope looks out upon brighter vistas, 
toward the better life, toward finer things (whatever that may mean to a given 
audience). Educational policy, curriculum statements and course outlines all 
contain statements of what they hope to achieve – descriptions of the better 
place to which they tend, e.g., building the lifelong foundations of success 
(Ministry of Education, 2002), or the aspiration that children ‚grow up as 
competent and confident learners and communicators, healthy in mind, body, 
and spirit, secure in their sense of belonging and in the knowledge that they 
make a valued contribution to society‛ (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 9). 
 
Hope, if it does not inspire action, is an end unto itself. It is a symbolic 
aspiration, an abstract dreaming. The notion of hope developed in this chapter 
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is the idea that hope is an activity, a praxis and a process, and as such has 
highly practical applications, particularly as a pedagogy for peace. Education is 
abundant in the activity of hope. In early childhood education, teachers in 
centres work towards the empowerment of children, their holistic development, 
community inclusion and the formation of reciprocal relationships. Mere 
knowledge of these principles is not enough – the hope of their implementation 
is dependent on the actions of teachers and learners in diverse contexts (e.g., 
Wertsch, 1998). The condition for the realisation of these principles is 
constructed through work, that is why student teachers go out for teaching 
practice and are assessed in the field: to see their abstract hopes put into action. 
Education, like hope, is something we do, not merely something we learn from 
books, and, as will be unfolded in this chapter, is at its best when it is 
something that we do together. 
 
Finally, the object of hope must be possible otherwise it is wishful thinking (i.e., 
‚I wish that money lenders would stop charging interest‛ as opposed to ‚I hope 
I can find a lender with a low rate‛). The possibility of realisation grants hope 
and hopeful activity the vital energy required to make change. In the case of 
student teachers, all respondents in the focus groups expressed the hope of 
gaining their degree and becoming registered teachers. All of them thought that 
this was possible and all had no doubt that with hard work they would 
someday graduate. Other students used their education as a tool for becoming a 
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better teacher, some for becoming a better researcher, others for gaining 
employment that would otherwise not be possible. In each case, hope was 
active and the possibility of its realisation was a real possibility to each of the 
respondents. With this in mind the general definition of hope this thesis uses is 
as follows: looking forward to a better future and acting on the possibility of its 
realisation.  
 
9.2 Hope is a holistic concept. 
 
In order to flesh out this general definition and also to link the concept of hope 
to research and discourses in a variety of disciplines, this section uses Durie’s 
(1994) idea of a four sided house as a metaphor through which to construct a 
holistic idea of hope (spiritual, mental, physical and social). Explaining hope as 
a holistic concept creates a link to the holistic underpinnings of Te Whāriki 
(Ministry of Education, 1996). This link offers insight into not only hope as a 
useful subject, but hope as a useful subject for early childhood education. 
Drawing philosophy of hope and IECTE programmes into conversation is the 
work of the final chapter of this thesis.  
 
From a theological perspective, and representing spiritual wellbeing (taha 
wairua) in this chapter, hope is one of the three theological virtues attributed to 
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St Paul in the Christian tradition (along with love and faith) (1 Corinthians 
13:13). Some theologians argue that hope is the predominant theme of the New 
Testament (e.g., Bultmann & Rengstorf, 1963; Polkinghorn, 2002; Moltmann, 
1967). In Romans, hope is the key to salvation (Romans, 8: 24, 25), and in 
Colossians it is Christ that is ‚the hope of glory‛ (Colossians 1: 27).   In his book, 
Sickness Unto Death, the 17th century theologian Søren Kierkegaard (1849/1941) 
in outlining ‚the sin of despair‛ (p. 208), identified hope as a counterpoint to 
despair (pp. 171, 172), which Kierkegaard regarded as the disease of the soul. 
 
Perhaps the most powerful use of hope in theology can be found in Jürgen 
Moltmann’s (1967) Theology of Hope. In this book Moltmann (1967) argues that 
‚from first to last, and not merely in epilogue, Christianity is eschatology, is 
hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionising 
and transforming the present‛ (Moltmann, 1967, p. 16). Moltmann (1967) goes 
on to argue that ‚hope alone is to be called ‘realistic’, because it alone takes 
seriously the possibilities with which all reality is fraught‛ (p. 25). For 
Moltmann (1967) hope is essential to faith, and Christian hope in particular has 
no place in accepting the status quo. Instead, for Moltmann (1967) it is hope 
that: 
 
Constantly provokes and produces thinking of an anticipatory kind in love to 
man and the world, in order to give shape to the newly dawning possibilities in 
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the light of the promised future, in order as far as possible to create here the 
best that is possible, because what is promised is within the bounds of 
possibility. Thus it will constantly arouse the ‘passion for the possible’, 
inventiveness and elasticity in self-transformation, in breaking with the old and 
coming to terms with the new (Moltmann, 1967, pp. 33-35). 
 
For Moltmann (1967) therefore, hope is the foundation of the spiritual life and 
being hopeful is a mark of not only a realised Christian, but also spiritual 
wellbeing.  
 
Psychology and hope are easy bed fellows. For instance, in Erik Erikson’s (1963, 
p. 239) psychosocial theory of human development, hope is the first of his 
psychosocial strengths: the outcome of infantile conflict between trust and 
mistrust: hope is the earliest and primary virtue to a healthy life, hope must 
remain, even where confidence fails and trust is broken (Erikson, 1963). 
Alternatively, Ezra Stotland (1967) is widely acknowledged as a pioneer in the 
study of hope in the discipline of goal theory. Stotland (1967) identified hope as 
a combination of the importance of particular goals and the probability of their 
achievement. For Stotland (1967), the higher the probability of reaching one’s 
goal, the higher the level of hopefulness experienced by the subject; where goal 
directedness is assumed to be a good thing – a sign of wellbeing. From this 
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assertion psychologists began their affair with the goal-related aspects of hope, 
which educational psychology picked up in due course (e.g., Ames, 1992). 
 
Other uses of hope in psychology include C.R. Snyder’s (1994) The Psychology of 
Hope, which proposed that hope is something that needs developing in children 
as well as in adults, involves setting challenging yet doable goals, and is 
accomplished with guidance, friendship, and cooperation. Snyder’s (1994) 
thesis was that hopelessness is at the root of mental disease and that hope heals 
the hopeless. This book is followed by Snyder’s (2000) Handbook of Hope: Theory, 
measures, and applications which added clinical evidence to his perspective. 
Gilman, Dooley and Florell (2006) linked hope with increased academic 
outcomes finding that adolescent students with higher levels of hope reported a 
higher grade point average, greater life satisfaction and social adjustment (p. 
166). William F. Lynch (1974) in his book Images of Hope: Imagination as healer of 
the hopeless, maintained that the development of hope is a key element in 
treating mental illness. The findings of a number of studies in this field agree. 
For example, Bland and Darlington (2002, p. 61) argued that hopefulness 
‚appears to be central to a family’s coping with the impact of mental illness. 
And Westburg (2003) found that hope is particularly useful in the treatment of 
‚elderly people as they experience a decline in their independence‛ (p. 16). 
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From a biological perspective, Norman Cousins (1989) published his 
groundbreaking book Head First: The biology of hope. In this book, Cousins 
reflected on his career as a medical practitioner arguing that ‚if negative 
emotions could bring about biological change on the downside, positive 
emotions could create effects on the upside‛ (p. 12). In his classic experiment, 
Cousins found that by taking two blood samples at a 5 minute interval and 
doing nothing but thinking hopeful thoughts between samples ‚there was an 
average increase of 53% in the various components of my immune system – 
from a low of 30% in the precursor NK (natural killer) cells, to a high of about 
200% in the antibody coated T cells‛ (p. 253). 
 
Cousin’s (1989) work is used widely in contemporary nursing studies alongside 
texts such as: Groopman’s (2005) research which found that hope ‚can block 
pain by releasing the brains endorphins and enkephalins, mimicking the effects 
of morphine‛ (pp. iv, 170); Arnaert, Filteau and Sourial’s (2006, p. 137) report 
that hope has a positive effect on the recovery of stroke patients; Rustoen, 
Howie, Eidsmo and Moum’s (2005, p. 417) work advocating interventions 
supporting hope in patients with heart failure for a positive effect on 
intervention goals; and Walker’s (2004, p. 8) research that concluded promoting 
hope in patient care is vitally important for promoting wellbeing in terminally 
ill patients. 
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Finally, from a sociological perspective writers like Rycroft (1979) point out that  
 
Hope is a social quality that is transmitted from individual to individual, from 
generation to generation, the sources of hope in any particular person are all 
those relationships which [s/he] has had in the past, which [s/he] is having in 
the present, which [s/he] envisages having in the future, and which endow 
[his/her] life with meaning and value (p. 12). 
 
According to social philosopher Patrick Shade (2001), ‚connection with other 
humans, such that a sharing of concerns and abilities is possible, is important in 
both persisting and pursuing hopes‛ (p. 111). This type of connection also 
inspires courage, which is necessary when faced with failure and the risk that 
the difficulty inherent in hope contains. Shade (2001, p. 164) argues that the life 
of hope is infectious. Individual hopefulness leads to agency, which leads to 
vibrant communities of hope. For this reason, hope plays an important role in 
‚the genesis and reconstruction of communities‛ (Shade, 2001, p. 200). What 
this means is that when we hope together our commitment to action is 
strengthened, and through the process of communicating our hopes to one 
another, our commitment to building just communities is invigorated.  
 
Each of the above perspectives on hope offer insight into how important hope is 
to holistic wellbeing. It is reasonable therefore to assert that if hope is important 
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to holistic wellbeing, and if holistic wellbeing is essential to contemporary early 
childhood education in New Zealand, then hope must be a subject of particular 
interest to early childhood education. Introducing a philosophy of hope to 
IECTE is therefore not a matter of introducing apples to oranges, but rather, it is 
an exercise in offering a new and useful perspective in a field that may have 
some natural affinity with what hope has to offer. The link between theories of 
hope and holistic wellbeing is useful to this thesis only insofar as it illustrates 
how hope theory is relevant to early childhood education in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand, whilst providing insight to some of the functions possible for hope as 
praxis. In the following chapter hope will also be used to inform a pedagogy for 
counteracting structural dissonance in IECTE programmes. 
 
9.3 Hope, Bloch (1986) and Rortyan assumption. 
 
This thesis adopts an approach to hope that integrates Ernst Bloch’s (1986) 
notion of hope as concrete utopian function with Rortyan philosophical 
assumptions. The point of this section is to fuse (Gadamer, 1975) a peripheral 
philosophy of hope (Daniel, 1997; Hudson, 1982; Kellner, 1997) into the general 
and holistic notions of hope set out above, in order to expand the vocabulary 
available to this thesis in the following chapter.  The first step in making this 
philosophical integration is to come to terms with Bloch’s (1986) philosophy of 
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hope, which is regarded by a number of scholars as notoriously difficult to 
understand, given the esoteric nature of his philosophical writing (Bloch, 1986; 
Daniel, 1997; Hudson, 1982; Kellner, 1997). It is worth surveying because of the 
unique and useful philosophical vocabulary that it has to offer.  
 
In keeping with the philosophical assumptions that underpin this thesis parts 
will be rejected in the next section in a similar way to how parts of Weber (1949) 
were dropped in chapter four. The metaphysical and epistemological elements 
of Bloch’s (1986) writing contradict the antimetaphysical and 
antiepistemological taken throughout this thesis. Following Rorty’s (1999, p. 12) 
assertion that there are aspects of a writers vocabulary that hold back the 
formation of new understandings, and Gadamer’s (1975) assertion that once the 
text has left the hand of its author it is open to new interpretations and 
applications, the rehabilitation of Bloch’s (1986) writing is both philosophically 
and methodologically consistent with the scholarly approach taken throughout 
this thesis. That rehabilitation will be carried out in section 9.3.3. 
 
There is much in Bloch’s (1986) 1420-page Das Prinzip Hoffnung (The Principle of 
Hope) that is worthy of rehabilitation. Foremost among these is Bloch’s (1986) 
conceptualisation of hope as concrete utopian function. Bloch’s (1986) conception 
of hope as concrete utopian function is considered complicated and requires an 
introduction to some general concepts before it can be comprehended (Daniel, 
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1997; Hudson, 1982; Kellner, 1997). It is perhaps due to the difficulty in Bloch’s 
work, the Eurocentrism of his justifications and applications, and his radical 
utopian reading of Marxism that his work remains foreign to most New 
Zealand readers. However, Bloch’s philosophy offers a new vocabulary to 
inspire action and challenge structural dissonance and thus can still be useful to 
IECTE programmes. Using Bloch’s (1986) philosophical vocabulary is another 
example of border crossing (Dahlberg, Moss & Pence, 1999), one that this thesis 
proposes has useful benefits, especially insofar as Bloch’s (1986) philosophy has 
not-yet-been-used in early childhood studies in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
9.3.1 Bloch: Some general definitions of hope 
 
There are four definitions that provide a useful introduction to Bloch’s (1986) 
philosophy of hope. The first is process philosophy which Bloch (1986) gives a 
Marxist bent (Hudson, 1982). The idea of history as a process is central to 
understanding Bloch’s idea of hope. By process he means movement through 
time. In Bloch’s work, the future is the front of the world process, that is, the 
world as it moves through time. Bloch (1986) asserts ‚the Real is process‛ (p. 
196), by this he means that reality is not premade, it is in the constant process of 
becoming other (and in the case of hope, becoming better). For Bloch, reality is 
not a closed affair or fatum, instead the real process of the world is an open one – 
one in which the future of the process has in no way been pre-determined. 
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Similarly, the material of the present is also deep in the process of becoming 
other. Therefore, a Blochian understanding of IECTE would be to see it as a 
process of description and re-description (this perspective is not different to 
that already taken up by this thesis). 
 
The second definition is Bloch’s (1986) use of the word novum. Bloch did not 
intend a philosophy that consists of contemplation, for he believed that 
contemplation has as its object what has already become (it is backward 
looking).  Instead he aimed to construct a conscious theory-practice: A 
philosophy that is embodied in human activity, or more specifically – in the 
material-dialectic of human hope and an unfinished world (Bloch, 1986, p. 200). 
On this point he claims, ‚Only thinking directed towards changing the world 
and informing the desire to change it does not confront the future (the unclosed 
space for new development in front of us) as embarrassment and the past as 
spell‛ (p. 8). Forward movement is exemplified by his concept of the novum (the 
objectively historically new). For Bloch (1986) it is novum that stands on the 
front of the world process, it refers to all that is radically new in human history 
and possibility. A novum is an unprecedented appearance of an object in the 
world – like the very first motor car, the very first printing press, the very first 
Froebel Kindergarten. 
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The third definition is linked to both process and novum – the concept of front. 
Front is Bloch’s word for that which is approaching, namely ‚Future, Front, 
Novum‛ (p. 8). In Bloch’s (1986) system, these categories have been historically 
constant in the consciousness of humans as they dream forward and create new 
things (p. 7), in the world of objects as they display their tendency to change 
and be changed (p. 7), and in the works of poetry, literature, philosophy and 
science whose innovations he calls explosive dialectics (p. 8). These explosive 
dialectics emerge as an attempt to break through what has become, (these are 
the discourses someone like Thomas Kuhn (1962, p. 6) might call revolutionary, 
as opposed to normal – as per Rorty (1979)). Bloch (1986) concludes that 
‚longing, expectation, hope therefore need their hermeneutics, the dawning of 
the In-Front-of-Us demands its specific concept of the Front‛ (p. 6): That 
hermeneutic is expressed in Bloch as the prefix not-yet. 
 
Not-yet (nocht nicht) is a characteristic hermeneutic device for conversation of 
the novum (Bloch, 1986). According to Bloch (1986) what is needed is a forward 
signal ‚which enables us to overtake, not to trot behind. Its meaning is Not-Yet, 
and the task is to grasp it thoroughly‛ (p. 9). It is the not-yet-conscious in 
humanity that gives hope its pre-conscious anticipation of the better life that is 
to come. It is the not-yet-become that lies latent in the world of process that 
provides the real possibility for matter to become other. And, it is the not-yet-
become-good that gives hope its positive correlate in the not-yet-experienced 
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and the not-yet-fully-worked-out, of an unfinished world. If, then, these are 
foundational concepts, what is hope? To this question Bloch (1986) gives two 
answers. 
 
On the one hand, hope is both emotion and cognition. On the other hand hope 
is short hand for concrete utopian function. For Bloch (1986), hope is the most 
positive of the expectant emotions. The expectant emotions are anxiety, fear, 
fright, terror, hope and confidence, these are contrasted with what Bloch (1986) 
calls the ‚filled emotions of envy, greed and admiration‛ (p. 108). The 
difference between the two is that the former face the possibility of the novum, 
and the latter face only that which is no longer new. Bloch differentiates the 
expectant emotions as negative (anxiety, fear, fright, terror and despair) and 
positive (hope and confidence): each expectation decreases as certainty is 
aroused. In Bloch’s (1986) philosophy ‚hope is thus ultimately a practical, a 
militant emotion, it unfurls banners. If confidence emerges from hope as well, 
the expectant emotion which has become absolutely positive is present, or as 
good as present, the opposite pole to despair‛ (p. 112). 
 
For Bloch (1986), hope is also cognitive anticipation: Hope is ‚more essentially 
an act of a cognitive kind (and here the opposite is then not fear, but memory)‛ 
(p. 11). Bloch (1986) calls this cognitive aspect not-yet-conscious (consciousness 
of what has not-yet-become). Not-yet-consciousness appears as thinking, which 
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Bloch (1986) defines as ‚venturing beyond‛ (p. 4), but more particularly it 
appears as a consciousness that is exemplified by daydreams: the waking 
dreams of a better life. According to Bloch (1986, p. 119), ‚all times of change 
are thus filled with Not-Yet-Conscious, even over filled.‛ Hope is the not yet 
conscious element expressing itself in the waking dream of a better life that is 
possible, but has not yet become.  
 
But Bloch goes a step further, and in doing so he creates a material dialectic of 
hope which casts human hope not above, but rather essentially entwined in a 
world that is in a rich process of becoming other: becoming better: ‚Thus the 
Not-Yet-Conscious in man belongs completely to the Not-Yet-Become, Not-Yet-
Brought-Out, Manifested-Out in the world. Not-Yet-Conscious interacts and 
reciprocates with Not-Yet-Become, more specifically with what is approaching 
in history and in the world‛ (Bloch, 1986, p. 13). For Bloch, front, future and 
novum exist in the very material of the present, insofar as the present is a 
moment in a far greater unfinished process in which what is co-exists as what is 
to become. For Bloch (1986), hope is not only content (what is hoped for) but also 
function (how hope goes), experienced continually in the open process of 
becoming other, of becoming better (p. 4). 
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9.3.2 Bloch: Concrete utopian function 
A utopia is a place or space that does not exist. In more specific terms, it is an 
abstraction made up of language and images describing a perfect, or objectively 
better place and/or state of affairs. To manage this notion of utopia Bloch (1986) 
makes a distinction between abstract utopias and concrete utopias. Abstract 
utopias are made up of language and images describing a perfect, or better 
place and/or state of affairs. Abstract utopias do not move beyond symbolic into 
action that creates the better life that is possible for all. This notion is very 
similar to those put forward by Dahlberg and Moss (2005), Dewey (1902), Friere 
(1994) and Wertsch (1998). In Levitas (1990) this hope is concrete in the sense 
that the material world undergoes some form of change as a result of the 
commitment of humans through their activity. 
 
For Bloch (1986) the utopian function consists of a dialectical relationship 
between not-yet-ontology (that which has not yet become of humankind) and 
real possibility (which is the unfinished world constantly pregnant with the 
possibility of the novum). Not-yet-ontology is Bloch’s (1986) concept of being. 
Not-yet-ontology is being on the processual front of human experience and as 
such it ‚passes straight through Becomeness and beyond it; hunger becomes the 
force of production on the repeatedly bursting Front of an unfinished world‛ 
(Bloch, 1986, p. 308). This concept refers to the present moment and points out 
that that by the time you are conscious of the present it has already past. The 
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present itself is empty (or in Bloch’s words – dark). However, using Bloch’s 
argument, it is possible also to conceive of the present as not only those 
moments that have passed us, but also those moments that are coming up, that 
have not yet formed themselves and so are full of the possibility of becoming 
other. According to Bloch (1986) when those moments in front of us are full of 
the possibility of becoming better – that is hope. 
 
The other side of the dialectic is real possibility. Real possibility exists as a 
latency in the material of a world that is itself in the process of becoming other. 
For Bloch, the objectively real possible is the not-yet-become of matter: It is the 
latent changeability of the world in the open process of becoming other, of 
becoming better. Thus, ‚real possibility is the categorical In-Front-of-Itself of 
material movement considered as a process‛ (Bloch, 1986, p. 237). Examples of 
this are the seed and the tree, mountain building faults and erosion, the world 
shifting on its axis, movement in weather patterns, the latency in wood and ore 
to be shaped and used for innumerable things. Bloch’s argument is that both 
humans and the world they live in are full of the possibility of becoming other, 
and in hope, better. In Bloch (1986) there is an ultimate state to which humans 
and the world tend and this process can be helped or hindered. In hope, the 
process of becoming other, of becoming better is helped as the tendency in 
humanity meets the latency of an unfinished world. The concrete utopian 
function is this dialectic working through its teleological process. The end of 
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this process, according to Bloch (1986) is ‚something which shines into the 
childhood of all and in which no one has yet been: homeland‛ (p. 1376). A place 
where humans are no longer alienated from the world and the world is no 
longer alienated from humanity. It consists of the ‚naturalisation of humanity, 
humanisation of nature‛ (Bloch, 1986, pp. 131, 205, 209). 
 
Bloch’s mission was to provide a philosophy of hope to challenge backward 
looking philosophy and to create a method for reinterpreting social history as 
forward looking. Bloch wanted to move beyond abstract idealisms to say that 
hope is a principle at work in the material world as it meets the social worlds of 
human beings. It is precisely in the not of the present moment that Bloch finds 
the impulse toward what has not-yet-become of people and of the world. This is 
an attractive sentiment because it promotes an open ended philosophy were 
there is still so much that is not-yet thought of: Not-yet-conscious. To an ironist 
scholar working out of a reconceptualist perspective, this philosophy is more 
useful than closed conceptions of the world, or settled vocabularies.  
 
9.3.3 Rehabilitating Bloch 
In chapter three, the philosophical assumptions of this thesis were set out as 
anti-metaphysical/anti-essential and anti-epistemological/anti-foundational. 
This section applies those philosophical assumptions to Bloch’s philosophy in 
order to extract the metaphysical and epistemological elements of his work, to 
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make his vocabulary consistent with the philosophical assumptions that 
underpin this thesis. Bloch’s (1986) concepts are still important to this thesis 
because the offer a vocabulary that cannot be found in any other philosophical 
perspective, for this reason his philosophy is worth rehabilitating through the 
fusion of the Rortyan perspective taken throughout this thesis. 
 
The first step in rehabilitation is to reject Bloch’s metaphysics, in particular his 
assertion that human hope is teleological (tending toward an ultimate and 
absolute end). If we reject the notion that there is some sort of ultimate reality 
(for Bloch this was Marxist homeland) then we rid ourselves of both Bloch’s 
politics and the assumption that all of history is heading to an ultimate 
conclusion. Bloch wanted to show that the spirit of the world was moving in 
process toward its ultimate conclusion, but it was doing so through the material 
dialectic of humans and matter, rather than through ideas and idealism. By 
dropping this component from Bloch’s framework we are able to conceive of an 
unfinished and unfinishable world, a world that is in process, a world that has 
at its front the novum, but a world heading in no preordained, unconditional 
direction, and therefore endlessly creative. This allows for the insertion of the 
Rortyan claim that constructing a more socially just society is about the best aim 
we humans can have. 
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The second step is to drop Bloch’s epistemology and his will to form a 
foundation upon which reality can be recognised as objectively real. From a 
Rortyan standpoint, the attempt to discover the essence of reality is a waste of 
time because reality is something we make, it is the product of popular 
metaphors, and those metaphors change with time and audience. Bloch (1986) 
argued that his dialectic method of identifying tendency in humanity and 
latency in the world acts as the gate-keeper of hope. He wished to carve away 
the abstract utopias of mere idealism and replaced it with his concrete utopia as 
a function for the realisation of ‚homeland‛ (Bloch, 1986, p. 1376) - his Marxist 
paradise. If his dialectic method is rejected and a hermeneutics of hope used in 
its place, then the presumption of gaining special insight into the nature of 
reality can also be set aside. From a Rortyan standpoint, this is an attractive 
proposition.  
 
So what then is left? A Rortyan answer must surely be vocabulary. Bloch 
wished for an accurate description of reality. All that he managed, from a 
Rortyan perspective, was to create an alternative metaphor, complete with its 
own vocabulary and proposals for use. Formulae like novum, not-yet, not-yet-
conscious, not-yet-become are a fresh vocabulary to be picked up and applied. 
As far as this thesis is concerned, the concept concrete utopian function is an 
ungainly attempt at detecting ultimate truth and for that reason can be rejected.  
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A rehabilitation of Bloch means picking up his concepts of novum, an 
unfinished world, his characteristic hermeneutic not-yet, his concepts of not-yet-
conscious and not-yet-become and his assertion that concrete hope is the activity 
of changing the world.  
 
9.4 Theory of Hope. 
 
As a theoretical position, a Bloch/Rorty theory of hope is notable for rejecting 
the idea that there is an ultimate reality (and therefore any attempt to accurately 
represent that reality, or measure how well our assertions correspond to that 
reality). It also views hope as a verb that leads to changes in cognition, affect 
and matter. Most importantly, at least from an ironist’s point of view, this 
theory of hope views the world (social and natural) as unfinished, full of the 
possibility of becoming better (more peaceful, more just), pregnant with the 
possibility of novum and enamoured with that which is not yet conscious and 
not yet become (in both word and deed). This section uses the term theory of 
hope as a generic term for the fusion of Blochian and Rortyan philosophies set 
out above. Later in the thesis this will be employed to constitute a pedagogy of 
enacted hope.  
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The theory of hope developed through the integration of Rortyan assumptions 
and Blochian theory is an edifice for reinterpretation of the past, present and the 
future. As an edifice, this theory of hope opens out on to the possibility of 
alternative stories that are not yet conscious – new integrations that can be 
made and new ways to make the world a better, more peaceful, more just place. 
In education, this philosophy of hope entails moving beyond what is into what is 
becoming. Alternatively, it involves re-creation of what has already become 
through integrative conversation of what has not yet been considered, or the 
retrieval of what has become in the past but has not yet fully worked out its 
possibilities, to inform present and future situations.  
 
This theory of hope entails an open system where vocabularies are picked up, 
put down and created in an effort to inspire and direct new constructive 
practices. The object of this theory of hope is the better life that is possible for 
all, which is achieved through the co-creation of contexts under the banner of 
social justice. Theory of hope is therefore a call to action and a call to difference. 
Not difference for its own sake, but difference for the sake of constructing a 
more peaceful less violent world. There may of course be a number of uses not 
yet thought of: that is an unavoidable facet of an open system. However, at least 
as far as this thesis is concerned, philosophy of hope lends itself to the creation 
of a praxis for social justice. It involves the radical negotiation of contexts from 
within the contexts themselves. For this reason, this theory of hope is useful for 
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challenging the dissonance between socioculturalism and individualisation in 
IECTE programmes. On the one side it is amenable to sociocultural theory 
(albeit in a radical way), and on the other it challenges disembedding, 
standardisation and institutional dependence by opening the space for a not-
yet-achieved-socially-just institutional culture. Theory of hope, when used as a 
framework for pedagogy, opens up the possibility of the novum in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
 
This theory of hope radicalises socio-cultural theory by viewing culture as a 
negotiated event rather than a set of traditions to which one belongs or adheres. 
The up-shot of this view is that cultures are not closed systems, they are 
constantly being created and recreated both in the direction of tradition (what 
has already become) and the novum (that which is objectively new). The 
assumption here is that humans create cultures. This theory of hope assumes 
that there is still more to make of what is and that there are a multitude of 
cultures and cultural experiences that have not yet become, not yet even been 
thought of, or acted out. Using Bloch’s terminology, theory of hope faces the 
front of socio-cultural contexts, to that space where the novum circulates 
awaiting entry into experience, whilst at the same time being formed and 
reformed through the collective experience of actors within their diverse 
contexts. When viewed through the lens of the theory of hope, culture is open 
to change. Participation does not involve moving from the periphery to the 
  
317 
 
centre (as per Lave & Wenger, 1991 and Wenger, 1998), nor does it involve 
undertaking an apprenticeship or initiation (as per Rogoff, 1990, 2003). Instead, 
participation is the radical co-construction of both context and content, and 
because of this it entails an unfinished and unfinishable process of becoming 
better (more peaceful, more just).  
 
Theory of hope is, therefore, embedded as a form of social activity, but aimed 
toward the radicalisation of the context within which that social activity is 
embedded. Philosophy of hope avoids standardisation by drawing actors 
together in contexts and encouraging re-negotiation as a means to 
interdependence. This theory of hope challenges institutional dependency by 
requiring flexibility as a condition of institutional life wherein standardised 
dependencies are abolished in favour of democratic standards open enough to 
allow full participation in the content of what the standards themselves contain. 
 
Theory of hope is therefore a radical social theory which would challenge 
contemporary hegemonies in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand 
within the current regulatory structure. It is also the realisation of the novum in 
sociocultural theory insofar as it localises culture to lived experience in diverse 
settings, allowing for the re-construction of those local cultures as a result of 
interactions and conversations between actors with diverse loyalties. When 
viewed in this way, theory of hope is exemplified by what has not-yet-become 
  
318 
 
of culture. And, at its most socially useful, it means an interdependent pursuit 
of peace and justice that has not yet been achieved.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has constructed a theory of hope, ready for application to 
pedagogy in the following chapter. A general view of hope has been introduced 
and the notion of hope has been broadened by offering an holistic survey of 
hope’s utility. Bloch’s (1986) philosophy of hope has been introduced as a new 
vocabulary for IECTE studies, and has then been fused with the Rortyan 
assumptions that underpin this thesis, in order to make Bloch’s vocabulary 
consistent with the philosophical assumptions used in this thesis. The following 
chapter uses the vocabulary worked out here to construction a pedagogy of 
enacted hope, as a suggestion for counteracting structural dissonance in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
319 
 
Chapter 10 
A pedagogy of enacted hope 
 
This chapter further advances a pedagogy based on the theory of hope 
developed in the previous chapter as a way to counter-act structural dissonance 
in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. The first part of this chapter 
links hope and education to show that others have brought the two together 
previously. The second part of this chapter blends philosophy of hope with 
enactivist learning theory (Varela, Thompson & Rosche, 1991) to construct a 
pedagogy of enacted hope. The final part explores some of the implications of 
using an enacted hope approach in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand. This chapter also presents data gathered in the focus groups to 
illustrate and evidence some of the points raised. 
 
10.1 Education and hope 
 
Education is the practice of encouraging not-yet-achieved qualities in human 
beings. For example, IECTE programmes aim to educate early childhood 
teachers to develop critical reasoning skills, a knowledge of best theory and 
practice, and a commitment to further professional training. Education 
programmes see future educators in the new admissions to training 
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programmes, and it is through education that these students work toward their 
goals through a process of personal transformation. Education programmes 
such as IECTE deliver the hope of graduation and entry into the workforce 
among the many other idiosyncratic hopes that students may individually hold. 
This section looks at how hope and education are easy bedfellows.  
 
The objects of early childhood education and IECTE programmes are 
overflowing with hope. Children have so much future in front of them - so 
much that has still not yet become of them. The younger the child, the more this 
is the case. For example, those that cannot yet walk have millions of steps on 
their horizon to realise. Those that cannot yet talk have millions of words to 
offer the world around them. From this vantage point, it seems reasonable to 
say that early childhood education deals with hope on a daily basis. It is also 
reasonable to say that Te Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996) is a document 
designed to keep hope alive, or better, to encourage the hope of building strong 
equitable and socially engaged communities. It achieves this by drawing upon 
socio-cultural themes of participation, co-creation and emancipated interest 
(interest that is free to experiment and explore the world). Curriculum-based 
early childhood education in Aotearoa/New Zealand holds open the door to 
that which is not yet possible, sees improvement as a signal of growth, and 
creates environments in which success is non-competitive and multifaceted 
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(Ministry of Education, 1996). From this vantage point, early childhood 
education in Aotearoa/New Zealand deals in hope.  
 
Hope and education are easy bedfellows combining to contribute to the cause 
of social justice on the world scene. Charity groups such as Education for Hope 
send children to school in Ethiopia in the hope that those children will one day 
become the architects of positive change in social and economic conditions in 
that country (www.educationforhope.com). Similarly, the charity Education and 
Hope provides a scholarship programme for children in Guatemala in the hope 
of breaking the cycle of poverty (www.educationandhope.com). In both cases, 
there is a firm belief in the ability of education to look forward to a better future 
and act on the possibility of its realisation.  
 
In his book Pedagogy of Hope (1994), Paolo Freire revisited the themes set out in 
his classic Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970) and reflected on his work and writing 
since that point. In this book, he expressed the importance of hope as a catalyst 
for social change, and described education as an essential element in bringing 
hope to the struggle for social justice. On this point he wrote ‚to attempt to do 
without hope< is tantamount to denying that struggle one of its mainstays‛ 
(Freire, 1994, p. 8). This insight into the connection between hope and action is 
confirmed by holistic perspectives on hope introduced in the previous chapter. 
It is also significant because it brings hope, education, action and social justice 
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together into a single vision. This chapter uses a very similar approach by 
bringing philosophy of hope and enactivist learning theory together to 
counteract structural dissonance in the pursuit of more social justice in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
For Freire (1994) hope is more than just conceptual, it is a force to guide 
emancipatory action, for ‚without a minimum of hope, we can not so much as 
start the struggle‛ (p. 3). In Freire’s (1994) writing, hope energises action, makes 
change for the better possible, and is an active ingredient in challenges to 
injustice:  
 
Hope, as it happens is so important for our existence, individual and 
social, that we must take every care not to experience it in a mistaken 
form, and thereby allow it to slip toward hopelessness and despair. 
Hopelessness and despair and both the consequence and cause of 
inaction and immobilisation (p. 3). 
 
In this tract, Freire (1994) distinguished between action and inaction in much 
the same way as Bloch (1986) used the terms concrete and abstract. Freire 
(1994), however, added a moral edge to his distinction by implying that certain 
hopes we may hold lead not to the better future that is possible, but rather to a 
future that is, by degree, worse. This thesis has pointed out that structural 
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dissonance is not devoid of hope, and on this point I will make a similar 
distinction to that of Freire (1994) and Bloch (1986): If social justice is the only 
useful topic for philosophers to discuss (as suggested by Rorty, 1989), then it 
can be argued that there can be more and less useful expressions of hope. Hope 
and action for social justice, on this account, are a more useful expression of 
hope, and hope for individual success is less useful. Hope for social justice 
combined with inaction is even less useful still. This chapter is about bringing 
hope and action together in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand by 
suggesting that a pedagogy of enacted hope can counteract structural 
dissonance in those programmes. 
 
Freire (1994) used hope to kindle the flame of revolution in both culture and 
pedagogy. Freire’s (1994) pedagogy of hope, although it deals with a different 
form of injustice than this thesis (namely the injustice of poverty, sickness and 
death through inequality) is similar in motivation if not scale: both perspectives 
are deeply concerned that the world we live in is not just enough, we are also 
deeply committed to education as a powerful means toward social change, and 
finally, we are both convinced that hope is the key ingredient in making and 
energising that change. For Freire (1994) hope is the basis of our humanity and 
without it we succumb to despair and oppression. This thesis maintains that 
hope is a tool we can pick up and use in any number of ways: The best of these 
is the struggle for social justice. 
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Other writers in the field of education have also specifically linked hope closely 
to education (e.g., Halpin, 2003; McInerney, 2004; Inglis, 2004; Thrupp & 
Tomlinson, 2005). And, if hope is the practice of creating a better world that has 
not-yet-been achieved, then it is reasonable to say that most writers on the 
subject of education enlist hope as an active ingredient in the vision they hope 
to achieve (although they may not conceptualise hope in the way the writers 
mentioned above have done). In early childhood studies for example, writers 
like Dahlberg and Moss (2005), Cannella (1997) and MacNaughton (2005) have 
expressed this hope of making early childhood, early childhood settings and the 
participants within those settings more socially just. 
 
In early childhood studies, Dahlberg & Moss (2005) have argued that in these 
changing times of social ambivalence and fiscal uncertainty there is a marked 
absence of utopian thinking. Utopian thinking for Dahlberg and Moss is similar 
to what Bloch (1986) meant by concrete utopia: it is the practice of bringing 
hope’s object to fruition through the means of human action on a world where 
change is possible. For Dahlberg and Moss (2005), utopian thinking involves 
critique of the status quo on the one hand and the radical reconstruction of 
social settings on the other. They argued that preschool settings have a role to 
play in the reconstruction of society along socially just lines through the 
reconceptualisation of those settings as sites for experimentation. To this end, 
they argue for what Santos (1998, as cited in Dahlberg and Moss, 2005, p. 182) 
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called, a ‚destabilising subjectivity‛ wherein the status quo is challenged 
through the engagement of critical and imaginative thinkers. This critical 
engagement, aimed at aiding in the creation of a better life for children and 
adults is itself an expression of hope insofar as these authors are seeking to 
encourage relationships that have not-yet-been-achieved in ways that are not-
yet-conscious with the aim of constructing a socially just culture that has not-
yet-arrived but is hopefully appearing on the horizon. 
 
From these examples it is reasonable to put hope and education together as a 
theoretical (and practical) exercise for the construction of socially just relations 
(personal and institutional). The next section continues on the theme of 
connecting hope, education and social justice  
 
10.1.1 The ‘Robust Hope Project’. 
In her keynote address at the Early Childhood Intervention Conference in 
Australia, Christine Johnston (2006) set out a manifest for Robust Hope as a 
project comprised of two key elements: 
 
1. ‚Hope itself is manifested in the potential for policy to create resilience, 
happiness and the imagining of a better future. 
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2. The socio-cultural conditions of policy which create ‘robustness’ are manifested 
in a futures orientation, sustainability and a version of democracy which 
privileges equality over the liberty of the market‛ (p. 7). 
 
The Robust Hope Project is a research project developed at the University of 
Western Sydney, which aims to express utopian possibilities in education and 
education policy in the face of neoliberal marketisation (Singh & Sawyer, 2008). 
According to Sawyer, Singh, Woodrow, Downes, Johnson and Whitton (2007) 
the robust hope project ‚relies on a number of key resources: utopianism, an 
enhanced vision of democracy, agency, a futures orientation, a research-based 
approach, sustainability and resilience‛ (p. 228). What makes the hope robust is 
a commitment to democratic action aimed at constructing a better and more 
sustainable future combined with a commitment to construct a framework that 
can be used to critique policy in general and policy as it pertains to education 
specifically. 
 
The Robust Hope Project is an exercise in hermeneutic interpretation whereby a 
particular set of ideas are brought into conversation with policy documents, or 
used to explain practices in specific education programmes (e.g., Indigo 
Preschool: Arthur & Sawyer, 2009) or teacher education research (e.g., Sawyer 
et. al, 2007). The robust hope project aims to make policy makers accountable 
for their vision of the future by casting a critical gaze on the content of that 
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vision in light of a commitment to democratic agency and sustainability. 
According to Sawyer et al. (2007), Robust Hope is ‚a metaphor for work to make 
a world in which projects of change count‛ (p. 239). For Halpin (2007), the 
Robust Hope Project offers a pedagogical impetus for all educational settings (not 
only early childhood) to embrace: 
 
‚Schools can only become significant sites of ‘robust hope’ if they... change and 
develop in ways that create cultures, curricula, pedagogues, support structures 
and opportunities for all students to interrogate their identities, identify new 
possibilities and build capacities and confidence to take risks and open up to 
new futures‛ (p. 245). 
 
By drawing education and hope into a single vision the above authors, as 
architects of the Robust Hope Project, are expressing a perspective from which 
any attempt to separate hope from education is held as suspect. The architects 
of the Robust Hope Project constructed their theoretical framework using hope as 
a source of critical awareness whereas this thesis uses philosophy of hope to 
form a pedagogy within IECTE programmes based on an early critique 
highlighting structural dissonance (rather than a lack of hope). However, 
differences aside both projects believe that hope is a good thing, and both 
projects advocate putting that hope into action. The next section outlines the 
theory of enacted hope that the remainder of this chapter will suggest as a form 
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of pedagogy that would be useful to counteract structural dissonance in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
 
10.2 Enactivist learning theory 
 
In this section a pedagogy of enacted hope is constructed by fusing enactivist 
learning theory with the theory of hope worked out in the previous chapter. My 
thesis is that using a pedagogy of enacted hope in IECTE programmes can 
counteract structural dissonance and encourage social justice for student 
teachers in those programmes.  This section begins with an introduction to 
enactivist learning theory (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991) and relates this to 
the philosophical assumptions of this thesis, at the completion of which a 
pedagogy of enacted hope is put forward. 
 
10.2.1 Enactivism. 
 
Enactivism is a theoretical approach to the science of mind (cognitivism) 
designed by Varela et al. (1991) and elaborated in their book The Embodied Mind. 
According to these authors, the aim of their book was ‚to build a bridge 
between mind in science and mind in experience by articulating a dialogue 
between these two traditions in Western cognitive science and Buddhist 
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meditative experience‛ (p. xviii). Enactivism is the name given to this bridge or 
middle ground. It reflects a growing commitment that ‚cognition is not the 
representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the 
enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of 
actions that a being in the world performs‛ (Varela et al., 1991, p. 9).  
 
This approach is similar to socio-cultural understandings of situatedness insofar 
as the authors assume that ‚to be human, indeed to be living, is always to be in 
a situation, a context, a world‛ (Varela et al., 1991, p. 59). From this perspective, 
it is possible for a room full of student teachers to be living in multiple worlds 
with multiple understandings of the universe and their place in it. On this point 
Varela et al. (1991) propose that ‚perception is not simply embedded within 
and constrained by the surrounding world; it also contributes to the enactment 
of the surrounding world‛ (p. 174). Thus, each of the student teachers in the 
classroom are enmeshed in the many worlds that they, through their actions 
and history of actions, have been instrumental in co-creating. The classroom is 
the place where these multiple worlds and multiple universes collide, combine 
and change. 
 
Enactivism drops the mind/body distinction in favour of mutual co-
determination: that notion that the mind and the world it perceives constantly 
create one another in a cyclic action of co-dependency. In other words this 
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means that organisms and their environments have no intrinsic nature of their 
own, but rather exist as an interaction of conditions and histories whereby each 
side of the equation determines the other. Thus, ‚the enactive programme 
encompasses the temporality of cognition as lived history, whether seen at the 
level of the individual (ontogeny), the species (evolution) or social patterns 
(culture)‛ Varela et al., 1991, p. 213). More precisely, ‚organism and 
environment enfold into each other and unfold from one another in the 
fundamental circularity that is life itself‛ (Varela et al., 1991, p. 217). 
 
Enactivism is anti-foundational or groundlessness. Varela et al. (1991) use 
Buddhist philosophies of sunyata (emptiness) and karuna (compassion) to 
formulate enactivism as a middle ground between Western cognitivism and 
Buddhism. In their explanation of Buddhism, the authors use Nagarjuna’s (c. 
200/1995) Mulamadhyamakakarika as the basis of their approach (Varela et al., 
1991, p. 219). This thesis uses Dalai Lama’s (1997) explanation of emptiness 
(sunyata) and altruism to explain both Nagarjuna (c. 200/1995) and Varela, et al. 
(1991). These concepts underpin the enactivist approach to cognitive science, 
enactivist learning theory, and the subsequent pedagogy of enacted hope 
elaborated in section 10.3.  
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10.2.1.1 Sunyata and karunā. 
Buddhist scholars have a number of ways of talking about sunyata (emptiness) 
and those ways do not always reconcile with one another. For example, the 
Chittamatra school of Buddhism perceives the physical world as being empty 
of permanent form altogether, the Madhyamaka-Svatantrika school 
understands emptiness to mean that objects are only real insofar as they depend 
on perception for existence, and the Madhyamaka-Prasangika school maintains 
that emptiness means that all of reality is dependent on causes and conditions, 
and has no form in and of itself (Dalai Lama, 1997, pp. 99, 100). Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch (1991), Dalai Lama (1997) and this thesis use the 
Madhyamaka-Prasangika perspective on sunyata.  
 
The notion of sunyata can be found in Nagarjuna’s (c.200) classic Buddhist text 
outlining the middle path: Mulamadhyamakakarika in 18 in chapter XXIV: 
 
Whatever is dependently co-arisen 
That is explained to be emptiness. 
That, being a dependent designation 
Is itself the middle way (as cited in Garfield, 1995, p.49) 
 
Dalai Lama (1997) identifies three meanings for dependent co-arising. First, 
there is the understanding that ‚conditioned things and events in the universe 
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come into being only as a result of the interaction of various causes and 
conditions‛ (p. 12). This means that no thing or event has an intrinsic reality in 
and of itself, rather, everything is both relational and inter-relational. Second, 
all objects ‚can be understood in terms of how the parts compose the whole, 
and how the very idea of whole and wholeness depends upon the existence of 
parts‛ (Dalai Lama, 1997, p. 13). This means that all things (people included) are 
part of larger systems, and are also the combinations of the smaller parts of 
themselves. Thirdly, everything arises ‚solely as a result of the mere coming 
together of many factors that make them up‛ (Dalai Lama, 1997, p. 14). This 
means that everything that has come into being has done so because of 
numerous causes and conditions. From this vantage point sunyata or emptiness 
is not an absence, but rather a rejection of un-conditionality.  
 
Sunyata is the philosophical equivalent to Rorty’s (1989) notion of contingency 
explained in chapter 3. Enactivism as a philosophy is therefore anti-
foundational and anti-metaphysical insofar as it holds that no such thing as 
unconditioned reality to be found. Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) offer the 
following metaphor to describe their project: ‚Our guiding metaphor is that a 
path exists only in walking‛ (p. 241). The other side of enactivism determines 
how that path is to be laid down, but not the content. Laying down a path in 
walking depends on the generation of what the Dalai Lama calls ‚altruism‛ as a 
skilful means for embracing sunyata.  
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According to the Dalai Lama (2005), altruism is a defining feature of Buddhist 
philosophy, and the best part in human experience. When this capacity is 
developed by people in their own lives it transforms into karunā. Karunā can be 
defined as any action that reduces the suffering of others, or the fountain of love 
and compassion. Varela et al. (1991) describe altruism as the warm side of 
groundlessness. Altruism in the Buddhist sense ‚has only one face, kindness to 
others‛ (Dalai Lama, 2005, p. 76). There are two general ways that kindness is 
understood in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition: helping others, and if that is not 
possible, then not causing harm to others. In this way, the interconnection 
between beings is organised for the pursuit of the best possible conditions for 
all beings. In the general Buddhist sense, the word being applies equally to 
humans, animals and insects. Altruism and the development of moral hope 
(hope for justice for others) are central aspects of Buddhist practice and 
Buddhist philosophy (Dalai Lama, 1997).  
 
The ideal of enactivism is the generation of altruism in the construction of 
compassionate and socially just relationships, for the formation of causes and 
conditions that will lead to peace and happiness within ever larger systems 
(Varela, Thompson and Rosche, 1991). In this case enactivism is also a moral 
philosophy for the generation of benefit through ever larger social and 
ecological structures. In the next section, this philosophy of enactivism will be 
reconciled with the Rortyan assumptions that underpin this thesis.   
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10.2.2 Enactivism and Rortyan assumptions. 
Varela et al. (1991) use a conceptual map to describe cognitive science and its 
constituent parts. They use this map as a way of conceptualising who, in the 
Western tradition, is close to what they are calling enactivist. Philosophy is one 
of these parts, along with cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience and 
research into artificial intelligence.  At the centre of this map is cognitivism, 
which takes modern computers and operating systems as a model for cognition. 
They also identify two alternatives conceptualised as wider ecologies 
surrounding the centre. The first alternative is emergence or connectivism: 
approaches that explain cognition as a system of smaller more discrete 
component parts. The second alternative is enactivism, which describes 
cognition as an event of internal and external co-determination. Upon this map 
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) situate a distinguished list of theorists, 
scientists and philosophers including Jerome Brunner, Mark Johnson, Noam 
Chomsky, Daniel Dennett and Richard Rorty. Their assertion is that Rorty’s 
philosophy is situated firmly within the enactivist paradigm (Varela, Thompson 
& Rosch, 1999, p. 7).   
 
Enactivism and Rortyan assumptions use different vocabularies to make the 
same point regarding anti-essentialism. For example, where Rorty (1979) 
explains an absence of foundations/unconditionality, Varela et al. (1991) make 
use of a vocabulary of groundlessness. Where Rorty (1989) announces human 
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descriptions of themselves, their world and their place in that world as 
contingencies of language, Varela et al. (1991) agree but instead use a language 
of multiple beginningless and endless conditions and causes. Furthermore, 
where Rorty (1989) talks of solidarity as the height of social utility condoning 
the expansion of the borders of those we call us until the category them 
disappears altogether, Varela et al. (1991) expound a philosophy of compassion 
based on a loving concern for the wellbeing of others and a will to bring about 
an end to suffering for all beings (karunā). From this perspective, Rorty (1979, 
1989, 1999) and Varela et al. (1991) occupy the same philosophical position. The 
only difference appears to be the vocabulary that each picks up to describe their 
position, and the audience to whom their writing is addressed.  
 
There is little, if any, conflict between the Rortyan philosophical assumptions 
used in this thesis and Varela et al. (1991) conception of enactivism. This lack of 
conflict allows this thesis to remain coherent in terms of not only how IECTE 
programmes can be re-conceptualised but also what that re-conceptualisation 
might look like. 
 
10.2.3 Enactivist learning theory 
Enactivist learning theory is an approach to pedagogical action that takes up the 
assumptions set out by Varela et al. Rosch (1991) and applies them to teaching 
and learning. The work of Brent Davis (1996) is significant in this regard. Davis 
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(1996) offers valuable insight into how enactivism can be used as the basis for a 
theory on education. Along these lines, Sumara and Davis (1997) and Dawson 
(1999) offer further inroads into pedagogical applications for a practical 
pedagogy.  
 
Davis (1996) described enactivist learning theory as a practice of occasioning 
performed understandings rather than discovering preformed knowledge. The 
thrust of enactivist pedagogy, according to Davis (1996), is the implication of 
ecologies and life histories in the structure of both learning and what is learned. 
However, the environment and individual historical structures/experiences are 
not determining agents in learning, instead: 
 
Environmental patterns do not cause actions. Rather, they present an occasion 
for the person to act according to his or her structure. In such interactions, one’s 
structure is necessarily affected and s/he thus emerges a different person. The 
other [people] involved in the interaction [are] similarly affected, and so [they] 
co-emerge (p. 10). 
 
Education from an enactivist point of view is the ongoing process of co-
emergence whereby subjects, objects and environments undergo structural 
change as a direct result of human interaction.  
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Davis’s (1996) point is that for education the question of what cannot be 
separated from who we are. To this end Davis (1996) notes that ‚enactivist 
theorists on cognition offer a perspective that involves both becoming part of an 
ongoing existing world and the shaping of a new one‛ (p. 190). Enactivist 
learning theory focuses on events of learning. In those events, past (in terms of 
the collective past histories of the group), present (in terms of the task at hand), 
and future (in terms of emergent perspectives) coalesce into a pedagogical 
approach for the formation of not-yet formatted knowledge. From this 
perspective, ‚exactly where *learning+ moves depends on such complex factors  
such as the structures of those present, the context, and what has been 
anticipated‛ (Davis, 1996, p. 235).  
 
Enactivist learning theory takes up the notion of groundlessness and applies it 
to the formation of group specific grounds: localities. This is a similar approach 
to Rorty’s (1979) presumption that the role of education is the creation of new 
edifices from which society and its constituents can be viewed. Enactivist 
learning theory is, therefore, ‚historical, situational, dynamic, intersubjective 
and consensual‛ (Davis, 1996, p. 8). Enactivist learning theory does not seek 
ever-fuller participation in a community of practice, but rather proposes that 
communities are formed through an ongoing praxis of conversation, integration 
and re-integration. Specifically, ‚emphasis is placed on cooperation over 
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competition, ecologies over monologues, adequacy over optimality, movement 
over progress, and complexity over linearity‛ (Davis, 1996, p. 13). 
 
Unexpected understandings are born out of the interaction/participation of 
formerly divergent personal structures within a group environment. In this 
way, ‚knowledge is recast as those patterns of acting that allow our structures 
to be coupled, thus entangling us in one another’s existence and implicating us 
in one another’s knowing‛ (Davis, 1996, p. 235). Along these lines, it is not 
possible to have a pre-formed curriculum guiding us to participation, rather, 
participation is the curriculum. It is enacted: ‚rather than attempting to teach 
toward a narrow, specific, and pre-stated understanding, [the enactivist] 
teaches from embodied understandings. Understanding [thus] is not a goal to 
achieve, but a quality to enact‛ (Davis, 1996, p. 239, brackets added). 
 
Sumara and Davis (1997) carry on this metaphor to assert that ‚all our 
understandings are situated in and co-emerge with complex webs of 
experience‛ (p. 412). For IECTE, this means that the lives and life-stories of each 
person in each year group are as valid as theorists’ and researchers’ voices in 
determining the content of their education. This assertion is based on the 
assumption that ‚actions are not simply manifestations of (internal) 
understandings. They are themselves understandings‛ (Sumara & Davis, 1997, 
p. 415). Dropping the distinction between internal and external in this way is 
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similar to Rorty’s (1979) prolonged attack on this distinction in Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature. 
 
For Sumara and Davis (1997), from the enactivist perspective, ‚what is 
imagined, what is fantasized, what is guessed at, what is intuited, are not 
marginalised to the fringes of valued thought and resulting actions, but are 
understood as vitally contributing to the conscious experience of everyday life‛ 
(p. 417). For enactivist learning theorists, education is a lived event and as such 
it is as diverse as the participants in any given setting. To highlight this insight, 
one student teacher in the focus groups identified the figure of a good IECTE 
teacher as one who allows ‚you discuss how you are going to do it. I mean it 
seems like they haven’t got a criteria for that whole morning, they come in with 
just that and they watch how everything unfold, and sometimes they don’t 
finish off their brief because they’ve gone so far into< I mean they are actually 
watching what the students are doing and being open to seeing that we just 
can’t finish it there because there are still some things going on.‛ According to 
this student, good practice in IECTE teaching occurs when knowledge is 
enacted and allowed to emerge as a product of human interaction. 
 
Sandy Dawson (1999) in her paper entitled ‘The Enactive Perspective on 
Teacher Development: A path laid while walking’ deepens the enactive 
commitment to education further. In this paper she states that ‚the thrust of 
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enactivist work is to < view the curriculum as being occasioned by the 
learner’s experiences in their *learning+ environment‛ (p. 149). It matters very 
little whether the learning environment means early childhood, primary, 
secondary or initial early childhood teacher education, the fact of the 
perspective remains, that ‚lived experience is crucial to the development of 
individual and shared awareness‛ (Dawson, 1999, p. 152).  
 
In terms of the pedagogical work that defines a programme of study, Dawson 
(1999) offers the following interpretation: ‚it is the learner and the environment 
within which the learner is functioning that together poses the problem and 
specifies those paths that must be tread or laid down for their solution‛ (p. 155). 
In enactivist learning theory, there is a high degree of flexibility in learning 
programmes as participants and the programme they are involved in co-specify 
one another. Through that approach, ‚there is not a predetermined, pre-set 
curriculum but rather a curriculum that will be co-determined by the 
interactions amongst the members of the group‛ (Dawson, 1999, p. 159). 
Enactivist learning theory therefore establishes participation as not only a right, 
but also as ends and means of pedagogical action. As a result, external contexts 
are discounted in favour of local contexts – or in other words, the structural 
component of educational programmes emerges from the structure of the class 
group itself as they interact with contextual arrangements (e.g. themes, 
curriculum documents, policy etc.). 
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In one focus group one respondent expressed her hopes in the following terms: 
‚I think they need to be more flexible with the course, and adapt it depending 
on the group and the group’s experience, and to recognise not just formal 
qualifications but life experiences as well, take those into account.‛ This student 
is expressing a wish for a more enactive teacher education programme. Another 
student from a different group asked for a more responsive programme of 
study in which ‚students were to set courses right here and now‛ and allowed 
to follow their interests in the present moment. These students are talking about 
a teacher education programme that they themselves are key stakeholders in, 
where they are able to bring their experience and interests to the table and share 
with others to create unique learning opportunities that are greater than the 
sum of their parts. Dawson (1999) calls this a form of learning where ‚groups 
lay down their own path while walking. This path is co-determined; devised 
from a rich and growing set of possibilities‛ (p. 160). 
 
Enactivist learning theorists like those introduced above understand teaching 
and learning to be a complex operation nestled within multiple layers of context 
and experience. They view cultural narrative as something that is constructed 
and reconstructed over and over in diverse contexts in the company of multiple 
and changing actors. Education, from this perspective, is therefore an 
evolutionary process resulting in a path of learning that ‚unfolds in a classroom 
and is particular to that context‛ (Davis, Sumara & Luce-Kapler, 2000, p. 93). 
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Enactivist learning theory makes the local environment and the actors within 
that environment the point of focus. Learning emerges out of interactions 
within that context. This is not to say that curriculum should be dropped, but 
rather, that interpretations of curriculum should be occasioned, rather than pre-
ordained, and pedagogical work should be co-created instead of externally 
controlled. 
 
10.3 Enacted Hope. 
 
Enacted hope is my neologism to describe open-ended learning processes that 
are focused on action for the betterment of others through the activities of 
emergent communities of learners. The previous chapter introduced a 
vocabulary of hope that can be used to challenge closed-ended conceptions of 
education and the world we live in (e.g., The Robust Hope Project). The 
previous section introduced enactivist learning theory as an alternative 
pedagogical perspective for use in IECTE programmes. This section brings the 
two together into unified vision for the creation of a socially just institutional 
structure in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Enactivism within 
this frame is the praxis of hope in education. 
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As noted, Rorty (1989) described a liberal utopia where solidarity and irony can 
co-exist without contradiction. This was Rorty’s (1989) brand of social 
dreaming. Hope, for Rorty (1999), is ‚the ability to believe that the future will 
be unspecifiably different from, and unspecifiably freer than the past‛ (p. 120). 
For Rorty (1999), hope is a condition for growth. Following this view Rorty 
(1999), argued that the role of universities (particularly the humanities) is to 
help students to see that their national narrative and past socialisation is open-
ended, unfinished and full of the possibility of becoming other. This thesis is 
arguing a similar line, however, it is talking about IECTE programmes in New 
Zealand universities and I am arguing that it is the role of the programmes 
themselves to counteract structural dissonance in those programmes. This 
thesis proposes that one way this can be achieved is by picking up enactive 
pedagogy and using it to encourage an active hope for structural and social 
justice. Enacted hope is the expression that something more can be done to 
encourage social justice for student teachers in IECTE settings.  
 
Enacted hope is the practice of putting social imagination into effect. It is the 
practice of holding open institutional structures to the point that aspirations to 
action emerge as they are occasioned by class groups, in local spaces. As a 
pedagogical perspective, enacted hope encourages classrooms to become 
emergent communities in which power to construct knowledge is shared by 
participants and organised by the will to construct socially just settings and 
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institutional structures. The construction of knowledge is enacted through 
conversations aimed at serving and emancipating diverse others and measured 
in terms of how those conversations can be translated into action (that is, can 
have a real result in the practical sense of getting the job done). Enacted hope is, 
therefore, the practice of encouraging conversations of the better life that is 
possible whilst working together to bring those hopes to fruition.  
 
Enactivism and the theory of hope worked out in the previous chapter share 
anti-foundational, anti-essentialist and altruistic underpinnings. At the level of 
praxis, enactivism shares a will to action with the notion of concrete utopia that 
was borrowed off Bloch (1986); furthermore, both enactivism and theory of 
hope are examples of open systems and each theoretical position is designed to 
encourage the novum (what has not yet become, not yet been achieved) in 
knowledge, practice and understanding. However, most importantly as far as 
this thesis is concerned, both enactivism and theory of hope do not merely open 
onto vistas of difference for the sake of difference itself. Rather, they open out 
directly onto the better life that is possible for all. In other words, they both face 
justice and peace, and their union is the praxis of forging these into an 
intersubjective experience. From this vantage point, the suggested pedagogy of 
enacted hope is a commitment to local effort to achieve the better life that is 
possible for all. 
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10.3.1 Enacted hope and socioculturalism 
Enacted hope is consonant with sociocultural assumptions of embeddedness, 
participation, co-construction and community. However, it adds a new 
inflection to each of these assumptions. Enacted hope understands 
embeddedness to be a form of embodiment that is open ended, mutually 
specified by environments and actors, and organised through a commitment to 
make the world a better (more just, more peaceful) place. From the perspective 
of enacted hope, sociocultural communities are communities enmeshed in an 
ongoing processes of emergence as not-yet-achieved possibilities are realised by 
actors through utopian activity, and moved beyond over the course of time. 
Culture in this frame is something that is not-yet-achieved, community is an 
ongoing conversation and context is a fluid concept that involves constant 
change as new actors enter the scene.  
 
For example, imagine a group of student teachers in a classroom. From a 
sociocultural point of view they are embedded within a particular setting for a 
particular purpose using culturally mediated tools to carry out culturally 
significant (at least for the culture of the particular paper) tasks. From an 
enacted hope point of view, each student holds a part of the puzzle regarding 
the construction of knowledge, conversation of what can be done to make life 
better for fellow humans is the only purpose of the interaction.  Interactions are 
allowed to emerge along themes (e.g., the principles of Te Whāriki (Ministry of 
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Education, 1996), or domain knowledge etc.), but the content and output of the 
group is determined by the group itself as the actors co-emerge. Enacted hope 
differs from socioculturalism insofar as the context where embedding takes 
place is groundless, performed and specifically directed toward what-has-not-
yet-been-accomplished. Whereas, for socioculturalists like Lave and Wenger 
(1991), Vygotsky (1986) and Wertsch (1998) the context in which actors are 
embedded is more like a ground of settled cultural specificities which may or 
may not be directed toward the novum of what-has-not-yet-become.   
 
Participation, from a sociocultural perspective, involves moving from 
peripheral to full participation in a particular social and/or institutional setting 
(e.g., Wenger, 1998) and it may also involve serving an apprenticeship leading 
to mastery and total inclusion into a communal body (e.g., Rogoff, 1990). 
Participation from a sociocultural perspective is about using cultural tools in 
culturally defined contexts for culturally defined purposes. Participation, from 
an enacted hope perspective, is a form of occasioning situations where the 
structure of the context in which participation occurs depends on the 
participants themselves. Rogoff (2003) wrote a similar interpretation of 
participants transforming culture and culture transforming participants, this 
approach assumes that culture offers a ground or foundation to be transformed. 
For enacted hope there is no such foundation implying a programme with 
minimal pre-formed structure. The educational culture in which people 
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participate is the sum total of the participants themselves, and the qualities that 
they bring to the conversation. Furthermore, the will to bring about a state of 
affairs, knowledge or experience that is not-yet-conscious to individuals alone 
but rather a function of the group interaction marks enacted hope as a 
pedagogy useful for reproducing an open system on the one hand, and 
encouraging the construction of the novum for pedagogical action on the other. 
 
Scaffolding (Wood, Bruner & Ross, 1976) and tuakana-teina (Tangaere, 1997) 
notions of pedagogical practice assume that younger/less experienced students 
are encouraged by older/more experienced students to participate in a learning 
context or community. It is assumed that those older/more experienced 
students hold and impart knowledge essential to the learning community. This 
approach assumes that there is an essence of knowledge to be scaffolded or 
imparted to less experienced members of a learning community.  
 
From an enacted hope perspective, there is no essence of knowledge to be 
imparted outside of the experiences of persons within a particular learning 
environment, and not-yet-achieved experiences that emerge as a result of the 
interaction of persons, themes, text and application (i.e., focus on making a 
better (more just, more peaceful) world. This approach disrupts the socio-
cultural dialectic of more and less knowledgeable and more and less 
experienced with an open dialogic that uses themes encourage the co-
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construction of knowledge through the relationships formed by individual 
participants in localised groups. Enacted hope drops the idea that there is an 
essence of knowledge to be imparted and picks up the metaphor of more or less 
useful for encouraging justice and peace in human interactions. Which is not to 
say that development, curriculum, pedagogy, culture and bi-culturalism, 
history and theory are no longer talked about in IECTE; rather, it means that 
they are talked about in a multitude of ways without privileging one narrative 
over the other, and where personal experience is equally important as the 
works of scholars and researchers in a given field of inquiry.   
 
Co-construction is native to both sociocultural theory and enacted hope. Both 
perspectives encourage participants within educational contexts to recognise an 
undeniable right to shape and form the content of those contexts. 
Socioculturalism holds the co-construction of contexts as an ideal closely linked 
to the praxis of participation (e.g., Rogoff, 2003). However, there are limits to 
the form that co-construction might take because of broader contexts and their 
apparently non-arbitrary elements (i.e., Graduating Teacher Standards). For 
example, from a sociocultural perspective learners are encouraged to follow 
their interests, work with others, learn/teach through modelling and become 
citizens of their learning environments. This occurs within a broader context of 
socio-cultural mores that are non-arbitrary; not open to co-construction or 
negotiation. For example, recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) and the 
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assumption that it is a useful document, Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ 
Teachers Council, 2007), university policy, curriculum and professional 
standards, current best practice, course objectives and assessment prescriptions.  
 
Enacted hope understands the above examples as arbitrary constructions that 
are open to negotiation within the local context of the group structure, with 
their importance being negotiated. This is not to say that the above examples 
should be rejected, but rather that they become open to interpretation, and re-
interpretation as group understandings emerge out of personal accounts and 
interaction with a diverse literature associated with different subject areas. 
Understandings of those arbitrary events, how they can be best applied, or 
whether there are better ways of educating emerge as a result of groundless 
participation (see 10.3). What each social and cultural topic means is open, non-
specified, not-yet-achieved and full of the possibility of becoming other (and in 
hope, becoming better). The understandings that emerge are themselves 
arbitrary expressions of a time and place, and of the particular actors present, 
the texts consulted and the wider convictions of participants. In this way ground 
as an expression of foundation, essence or non-arbitrary certainty does not 
emerge from groundlessness, rather, that which emerges is occasioned and 
idiosyncratic to the group involved.  
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Enacted hope creates a new inflection on embeddedness, participation, co-
creation and community. This is largely a function of a commitment to 
groundlessness (anti-foundationalism) and a focus on that which has not-yet-
become of relationships, knowledge, education and interpretation. Enacted 
hope, of the sort suggested in this section, might therefore be understood as a 
radical form of socioculturalism, one that drops foundations and essences in 
favour of occasioned understandings, constructed realities and a commitment 
to social justice, peace, resulting in activity that aims to change the world for the 
better.  
 
10.3.2 Enacted hope and structural dissonance.  
Enacted hope overcomes individualisation by dropping the individualising 
agenda in favour of a groundless (anti-foundational) pedagogy for IECTE 
programmes. Specifically, enacted hope ruins the disembedding function of 
individualisation by re-embedding individuals in groups of people in localised 
learning environments that encourage participants to implicate their life 
experience and the communities to which they belong in the act of constructing 
knowledge. The main achievement of enacted hope in this regard is to make 
individual biographical patterns and the institutional structure of the 
educational context arbitrary (up for negotiation and/or reinterpretation). This 
arbitrariness challenges pre-formed notions of personhood and human 
understanding by encouraging groundless perceptions of a self that has not-yet-
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become, and knowledge that has not-yet-been achieved. Using enacted hope, as a 
pedagogy, directly challenges disembedding by making re-embedding a pre-
condition for learning. 
 
Life experiences communicated between students give rise to new approaches 
to pedagogical action that can not be situated in the individual alone. 
Pedagogical work, in this approach, emerges as the generation of shared 
understandings and actions for the construction of a better world for all 
peoples. Education in this instance, equates to what Rorty (1979) has called 
edification (see also sections 2.1.1 and 4.1.3). Edification in terms of enacted 
hope means knowledge that emerges as a result of being embedded in local 
contexts. Pedagogy within this frame begins from the premise of groundlessness 
and involves laying down a path in walking (Dawson, 1999). These assumptions 
directly challenge the standardisation upon which the reproduction of 
individualisation depends. Standardisation may still occur (and necessarily so 
in the present institutional context), but it loses its power in the classroom itself, 
as the site where diverse histories, perspectives and interpretations coalesce, are 
valued, and are transformed as groups of learners define the content of their 
own emergent knowledge.  
 
Avoiding standardisation is not the same as lacking structure. IECTE 
programmes would retain a structure based on themes (e.g. principles of Te 
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Whāriki (Ministry of Education, 1996); domain knowledge; discourses of human 
development). Those themes are not essences to be internalised, nor are they 
foundations upon which knowledge is built, but rather, they are points of 
departure and points of return. This metaphor draws on the enactivist account 
of laying down a path in walking (Dawson, 1999). The thematic approach is useful 
here as part of the environmental structure with which personal structures in 
students may co-emerge to occasion understandings and interpretations that 
are not-yet-conscious, or pedagogical actions that have not-yet-been-achieved. 
From an enacted hope perspective, each theme contains a literature, and 
examples of interpretations and/or practices, but these are not foundations, they 
are opportunities for further conversation, further localised reconstruction.  
 
The pedagogy of enacted hope draws together communities of learners, 
literature and themes and places the power to form knowledge and 
understandings in the hands of groups of actors within localised settings (i.e., 
particular classrooms). There is still standardisation in the learning programme 
but only insofar as there are themes that link to wider contexts (e.g., legislative, 
regulatory, curriculum) and the meta-theme of social justice. This is achieved by 
giving primacy to interactions within the group structure as communities of 
learners co-emerge and knowledge is occasioned from lived experiences and 
lived interaction with texts and teaching staff. Given this vision, there is no 
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place for the standardisation of individuals and their learning programmes 
under the condition of enacted hope. 
 
From the perspective of enacted hope, institutional dependency shifts to 
institutional interdependency. Pedagogical action (teaching), pedagogical work 
(assessed output) and pedagogical practice (teaching experience) would emerge 
as shared understandings of contextual requirements (i.e., Teacher’s Council, 
university policy), as groups of learners actively work together to meet those 
requirements whilst engaging with themes and acting on emergent 
understandings. From this vantage point, it is conceivable that different groups 
of students within a single university will create different but also highly 
meaningful outcomes from other groups within the university. This diversity 
opens the door to inter-group dialogue and further emergent learning. The 
prospect of inter-group dialogue encourages a meeting of perspectives within 
the wider institution and across cohort years. In this way, interdependencies are 
formed in terms of intra-group emergence, inter-group emergence, multiple 
uses of textual sources and diverse orientations toward contextual 
requirements. 
 
Enacted hope rejects disembeddedness, standardisation and institutional 
dependency by focusing on emergence, occasioned knowledge and 
interdependency. Of course, elements of individualisation will still exist (for 
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example student ID numbers, personalised enrolment, individualised 
graduation, statutes for personal responsibility), but they will exist as a 
contingency rather than an organising principle. By switching pedagogical 
practice within IECTE programmes to one based on the paradigm of enacted 
hope this thesis proposes that the power of individualisation in the context of 
IECTE can be counteracted. Enacted hope is a praxis for social justice insofar as 
emergent communities of learners enjoy freedom to occasion their own learning 
within a flexible institutional structure. Furthermore, this approach does not 
contradict the socio-cultural content of IECTE programmes but rather offers 
support for embeddedness, participation, co-creation and community in the 
manner set out in the previous section. 
 
The word structure has been used throughout this thesis to explore 
institutionalised rules and regulations and the rules and regulations of the 
context in which the institution is embedded. Within the perspective of enacted 
hope, structure has emergent properties and is co-determined by participants in 
contexts and the contexts themselves; thus structure is lived and it is local. This 
section has argued that the entire contextual structure of IECTE institutions 
need not change to yield an improvement, only the level of pedagogy: the level 
of the course outline, links to contextual requirements (e.g., Graduating Teacher 
Standards, curriculum), and teacher education praxis. External determinants 
such as Graduating Teacher Standards (NZ Teachers’ Council, 2007) are 
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internalised into the group structure and take on emergent qualities as 
understandings of what these mean, and how they are applied in courses, are 
occasioned as a result of conversation, interpretation and re-interpretation by 
actors within educational settings.  
 
This section has introduced the pedagogical concept of enacted hope and 
advanced arguments on how taking this approach to teaching in IECTE 
programmes is on the one hand, not dissonant with sociocultural frameworks 
and on the other, able to counter-act structural dissonance.  
  
10.4 A pedagogy of enacted hope challenges structural dissonance 
in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
 
This thesis now takes one last step in the direction of enacted hope by 
imagining what a course using a philosophy of enacted hope might look like. 
This section is intended as a move toward application but still hovers above 
current practices as a theoretical construction. In future, it is hoped that enactive 
and action research projects might take up some of the ideas developed here, 
and put them to the empirical test.  
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One major difference between current practices and an enacted hope approach 
is that when using a pedagogy of enacted hope the course outline is developed 
over the duration of the study. In other words, the course outline emerges along 
with the group; it is an artefact of that emergence. There would still be 
individual enrolment in courses and university statutes on conduct and so on, 
that would still be up held, however these would be structural elements with 
which groups would engage directly and account for as a matter of shared 
responsibility. Courses would, therefore, necessarily include appreciation of 
regulatory requirements but seek room for movement within these 
requirements rather than being simply positioned by them. 
 
Learning objectives would be replaced with themes to be covered and 
pedagogical work would be left open but with guidelines as to what counts and 
what does not count as pedagogical work. The themes and guidelines would 
become part of the environmental structure of IECTE courses. The pedagogical 
work required in each course would be like filling in the blanks in the course 
outline (e.g., what do the themes mean? What research and perspectives are 
available on these themes? Why are these themes important? What are 
alternative themes and why were those not specified? How can these themes be 
put into practice? How does this theme link with courses we have already 
taken?). The understandings used to fill in those gaps would emerge from 
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dialogue between participants as they approach the environmental structure of 
the courses and the themes around which those understandings are organised. 
 
Pedagogical work would involve reflecting upon and communicating personal 
beliefs on questions such as those suggested above. It would also involve a 
conversation between personal perspectives, research into the literature 
concerned with each theme, conversation with those literary perspectives, the 
creation of artefacts reflecting emergent understandings, imagination of 
practical applications of the theme in terms of working with children and their 
families and concrete activation of that theme in inter-group relationships and 
teaching practice with the aim of making the world (both human and material) 
better (that is, more just and more peaceful). This is quite an agenda, but the 
point here is that this agenda would be shared by all participants rather than 
handed down in a non-negotiable manner by unseen forces in the context of the 
university.  
 
This vision of students, under the condition of enacted hope, is directed toward 
what has not yet been achieved in the context of each theme. It is expected that 
because each student in the group has a highly idiosyncratic personal history, 
and because emergence depends on those personal histories being brought into 
conversation with one another and with the task at hand, that the understanding 
that emerges will be one that has not-yet-been-achieved: a novum. This, in itself, 
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challenges the university structure particularly in terms of the external control 
of courses and their content that this thesis has argued reproduces a context of 
individualisation. For example, this would cause issues with programme 
certification under the current Teachers’ Council structure, and potential 
problems with CUAP and the Academic Board, as cohorts co-construct their 
own assessment schedules (although these could still be constructed to meet a 
specified criteria). The challenge would be in the localisation of control and the 
potential for a number of different approaches within particular papers and in 
particular year groups. 
 
Using a pedagogy of enacted hope would disrupt the status quo in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand. From this perspective, enacted hope 
prompts a reconceptualisation of the structural elements that currently 
reproduce individualisation in the context of IECTE programmes. At the outset 
however, it may be possible for teacher educators to work with the emergent 
pedagogy set out above within the current structure of the papers they teach in. 
This will take imagination, a democratic orientation and a willingness to lay 
down their own path in walking. Stepping onto this path also takes a good 
measure of courage, especially where doing so runs counter to present 
organisational structures. Taking a similar approach to that used in the Robust 
Hope Project (i.e., Sawyer et. al, 2007) would offer evidence-based support for 
any pedagogical change, this would also have the follow-on effect of generating 
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research based funding for teacher educators who are willing to make their own 
pedagogy the subject of their research.  
 
At the conclusion of this chapter, enacted hope as a pedagogy for counteracting 
structural dissonance has arrived into consciousness (though in an embryonic 
form) but as a praxis it is not-yet-achieved. This thesis has argued that enacted 
hope is a pedagogical technology that is theoretically useful for the purposes of 
encouraging more just and peaceful relations between student teachers and the 
universities where they undertake their training. The challenge for the future is 
to translate these ideas into a practical programme (at first within present 
structures, and later as alternatives to present structures). What that challenge 
might look like or the steps that one might take to achieve that praxis is beyond 
the focus of this thesis, but it is certainly a subject open to future research.   
 
Another point of interest for future consideration is the question of what an 
early childhood lecturer or tutor might look like from the perspective of enacted 
hope. In the perspective imagined here, lectures are replaced by workshop style 
tutorials where understandings emerge as groups of learners converge with one 
another, with structural requirements and with pedagogical themes. The role of 
the lecturer/tutor in this scenario is multifaceted. The teacher might potentially 
act as a conductor (like the conductor of an orchestra), except the music is not 
written in advance. In this role the teacher would be an expert in starting 
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conversations and keeping them going. The teacher might be expert in 
constructing a sense of group cohesion and encouraging the development of 
group identity and safety, without cutting off the opportunity for change. They 
might initially draw people into conversation through questions and listen 
intently for opportunities for students to bring their life experiences to the 
discussion. The teacher might alternatively take on the guise of a bricoleur 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005)   intent on constructing an enacted bricolage. Again, in 
this role, the teacher would be less of an expert in content and more of an expert 
in encouraging connections and conversations whilst ensuring that the 
structural component of the course, and the theme around which emergence 
takes place, are given adequate voice. Given the discussion on enacted hope 
worked out above, whatever role the teacher would take, it is not a role that 
should be worked out in advance, but rather it is a path that should be laid down 
in walking, and in hope: laid down in the spirit of a better life that is possible for 
all involved. That is the spirit of moral hope. 
 
Summary  
This chapter has set out the philosophical assumptions, pedagogical theory and 
suggested application for a pedagogy of enacted hope. The concept of a 
pedagogy of hope has been reconciled with socioculturalism and has been 
shown to subvert individualisation processes. Consideration has been given to 
application in IECTE programmes and offered answers to some of the potential 
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pitfalls in using this approach.  The argument has been advanced that a 
pedagogy of enacted hope can counteract structural dissonance in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand.  
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Chapter Eleven 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter is organised into two parts. The first part summarises the thesis 
and discusses some of the key arguments made through each of the chapters. 
The second part of this chapter identifies the limitations of the approach taken 
in this thesis as well as possibilities for further research. 
 
11.1 Summary of thesis. 
  
The main argument of this thesis is that there is structural dissonance in IECTE 
programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and that something can be done about 
it.  
 
All that an ironist scholar can hope for is that the vocabulary they have set out 
can gather support within the community for which it is intended. This thesis 
has created the term structural dissonance to make the point is that we can do 
better in our efforts to care for one another with IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. From the ironist perspective taken in this thesis, there 
are always new vocabularies that can be created, picked up and used – there are 
always more ways to go beyond the status quo and make life better (more 
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peaceful, more just) for others. This thesis has been an ironist effort at keeping 
that possibility for further conversation going. 
 
There is much more that can be said of structural dissonance as a concept; in 
this thesis I have limited my discussion to the contradiction between the 
sociocultural content of IECTE programmes and the cultural reproduction of 
individualisation in context of those programmes. This thesis, aside from being 
a complete text (see chapter 4) is also a collection of beginnings for further study 
including neo-pragmatic approaches to education, using structural dissonance 
to analyse other educational settings, improving the ecological hermeneutic 
method, and making an empirical study of the pedagogy of enacted hope.   
 
This thesis has avoided stating that this is how it really is, or here is the truth and 
this is how I know it, or this is the best method to find out what is really happening in 
IECTE programmes.  Philosophically speaking, it is not useful to make 
statements of this nature (though others may fundamentally disagree on this 
point). Dropping both metaphysics and epistemology from the outset cut off 
the need to make statements such as those above. Rather, this thesis has argued 
that for those interested in social justice, the thesis of structural dissonance 
offers a useful lens through which to view IECTE programmes in 
Aotearoa/New Zealand. 
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The perspective set out in this thesis has had two primary motivations: The first 
is to reconceptualise IECTE in a unique and, hopefully, informative way. The 
second is to disrupt the idea of research as a search for certainty. This thesis has 
also attempted to show that theoretical research is an exercise in poetic 
reconceptualisation as much as it is an exercise in rational justification. 
 
Beginning with the notion of structural violence did not seem appropriate for 
early childhood studies. Suggesting the concept of structural violence seemed in 
itself a form of violence. Softening this notion to structural dissonance seemed 
more useful to the potential audience of the ideas set out here. This is just to 
say, softer words can make more acceptable points sometimes. From a neo-
pragmatic point of view the strength of the metaphor is not in its ability to 
accurately represent reality, but in its ability to add to the conversation 
regarding IECTE, as well as the potential to court agreement. 
 
A major part of this project was introducing Rortyan assumptions to early 
childhood studies. This research found that this had been done in a partial way, 
but after reading re-reading many of Rorty’s books I have sought to offered a 
concise and consistent approach to how his writing might be used in theoretic 
research. This thesis has picked some of the base philosophical arguments that 
Rorty offered, but there is a great deal more that can be written in the future, 
from a great deal more aspects of Rorty’s writing that I have not covered in this 
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thesis (e.g., critique of the Foucauldian left, see Rorty, 1998a). Understanding 
Rorty’s philosophical assumptions and their implications for methodology and 
the structure of this thesis was in itself a major undertaking in this thesis. 
 
The one-sided accentuation of the ideal type method allowed this thesis to side 
step issues of correspondence to reality or validity of method if certain of 
Weber’s original assumptions were dropped. Using this approach has allowed 
the use concepts and vocabularies to interpret the content of IECTE 
programmes and the textual sources which construct the context in which those 
programmes are delivered. By focusing on forming relationships between the 
ideal types and IECTE programmes, using the medium of language, this thesis 
has taken the neo-pragmatic shift away from experience toward language use. 
Dropping the need for accurate representation has been a key element of the 
philosophical assumptions that have been adopted in this thesis. 
 
Socioculturalism in IECTE programmes was an easy proposition to premise 
given the abundance of evidence available. However, this thesis has presented a 
multilayered approach that offers ecologically diverse justifications for 
socioculturalism in the content of IECTE programmes.  Similarly, the chapter on 
individualisation picked this theme out of Beck’s (1992) theoretical perspective 
and used his theses to reinterpret the context of IECTE programmes. Those 
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elements of individualisation used in the ideal type were linked to the 
regulatory documents used in the context of those programmes.  
 
The chapter on structural dissonance brought the ideal types of 
socioculturalism and individualisation together to argue a case for dissonance 
between these perspectives before showing where that dissonance occurs in the 
structure of IECTE programmes. The ecological hermeneutic was applied in this 
chapter to organise analysis and it was found that there is evidence of structural 
dissonance throughout the context of IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand. 
 
In part four, this thesis shifted from a hermeneutics of suspicion to a hermeneutics 
of understanding (Ricoeur, 1974), as attention turned from identifying structural 
dissonance to constructing a pedagogical approach that could counter act it. 
The chapter on hope integrated diverse discourses of hope into a general 
perspective within which a specific philosophy of hope could be situated. 
Bloch’s (1986) vocabulary of hope was introduced as a reservoir of terms and 
concepts that could be used to reconceptualise contemporary perspectives on 
IECTE, particularly as they had not-yet-been-used in this field of research. By 
dropping the metaphysical and epistemological aspects of Bloch’s (1986) work 
this thesis developed a philosophy of hope that could be integrated with 
pedagogy and applied to IECTE programmes. 
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The final chapter of part four introduced educational approaches that have 
linked hope with education, to show that this type of fusion is not without 
precedent in educational literature. The next section introduced enactivist 
learning theory and related that perspective on pedagogy to the philosophical 
assumptions that underpin this thesis. The pedagogy of enacted hope was then 
constructed as an integration of the philosophy of hope worked out in the 
previous chapter and enactivist learning theory. Discussion of enacted hope 
centred around implications for IECTE programmes, consonance with 
socioculturalism and the ability to counteract structural dissonance. Though out 
the final parts of this chapter, indications of how a pedagogy for hope might be 
used in practice including challenges and considerations were explored.  
 
This thesis has been about expanding contemporary conversations in IECTE to 
include a critique of structural dissonance, use of Rortyan assumptions and 
individualisation theory, and the introduction of a pedagogy of enacted hope. 
These four contributions have achieved the reconceptualist goal of offering new 
integrations (fresh border crossings) for both early childhood studies and 
IECTE. They have also met the ironist requirement to seek new vocabularies for 
the use in IECTE and early childhood studies in general.  
 
At the conclusion of this thesis, however, it is very difficult to say ‚X has been 
found‛ or that ‚Y has been discovered‛. This difficulty is a function of the 
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philosophical assumptions used throughout this thesis, and to turn against 
them at this point would be to court inconsistency at the final hurdle. 
Consistency between philosophical assumptions, methodology, analysis and 
reconstruction has been important throughout each chapter of this thesis: As 
the glue that holds the project together.  
 
This thesis has attempted to maintain consistency has been assured throughout 
each of the parts and in each of the chapters. Hermeneutic methods of fusion 
have been employed in each chapter to integrate diverse texts in order to 
construct new and useful understandings and applications. The method of 
ecological hermeneutics has been used to organise analysis in a consistent 
manner, employing the ideal types (themselves constructed through 
hermeneutic fusion) to analyse content and context of IECTE programmes and 
their dissonance. Finally, the constructivist use of philosophical hermeneutics 
has been used to create a pedagogy of hope that is open to empirical testing in 
future, as discussed below. 
 
Actual success, at least from the philosophical perspective adopted in this 
thesis, will be in whether aspects of this thesis or the thesis entire can find 
enough agreement within the community for which it is intended to be deemed 
useful enough to influence practice. Following Rorty (1989), however, that 
success may not be immediately measurable – as future audiences may find 
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uses that contemporary audiences do not. From an ironist perspective, the idea 
that this thesis has created a final vocabulary for describing what is really going 
on in IECTE programmes is laughable. Rather, success from this the ironist 
perspective is a function of the degree to which common vocabularies have 
been dropped, new vocabularies picked up, and the possibility of further 
development left open.  
 
11.2 Limitations and possibilities. 
 
Adopting Rortyan philosophical assumptions has opened up possibilities in 
terms of methodology, analysis and reconceptualisation, but it has also closed 
off a number of possibilities. Foremost among those limitations has been an 
inability to use certain ways of speaking about what is being done, how it is 
being done, and why. For instance, using Rortyan assumptions, the term 
findings arouses suspicion. The assumption behind this word is that the thesis 
has discovered something that exists beyond mere appearance. This 
presupposes the philosophical assumptions that this thesis rejects (metaphysics 
and epistemology). The issue that arises then is one of validity and the 
reliability of results. Not insofar as these are questions that need to be 
answered, but insofar as they are questions to be replaced.  
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This is a primarily theoretical thesis, and as such the limitation set by dropping 
the word findings or found is allayed by using words such as useful, constructed 
and argues. That said, it is a potential limitation that the arguments and the 
constructs set out in this thesis are not framed as findings or discoveries: If not 
in terms of structure to the over-all thesis, then in terms of ease of presenting 
positive/affirmative research outputs. 
 
In terms of methodology; naming foreunderstandings and application at the 
outset of this thesis has served to explain the type of thesis being presented and 
the reason for presenting it. This thesis aimed to be consistent in its treatment of 
texts and the integrations set out throughout this thesis, however one potential 
weakness that arises is that no firm framework was used to define textual 
sources in absolute terms. This, of course, was a function of the philosophical 
assumptions used, particularly in the will to drop epistemology and pick up 
hermeneutics. The ideal types were used as frameworks, but they were 
hermeneutically constructed; created as fusions of chosen primary texts; of 
chosen parts of those texts. This, from some perspectives is a limitation when 
methods of knowing are expected to find absolute truth. However, if truth is 
viewed as a function of the sentences we use to gain consensus, then absolutism 
dissolves into particular purposes, in particular places, at particular times.   
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Constructing the method of ecological hermeneutics offered a structure to the 
analysis and an innovation on hermeneutic method, but it did not account for 
the aspect of choice in the texts that were included for consideration. I 
attempted to include key texts into the analysis undertaken in each chapter: 
Where the word key means, accepted as important by the communities 
associated with the concepts, e.g., socioculturalism and Lave and Wenger 
(1991), Rogoff (1990, 2003), and Vygotsky (1978); individualisation and Beck 
(1992); hope and Bloch (1986); enactivism and Varela et al. (1991). But even in 
these attempts, as mentioned above, I have not been exhaustive. Primary texts 
have been consulted but the many potential uses of those texts have seldom 
been explored. Instead my own use of those texts has been highlighted, in 
relation to the foreunderstandings and application that guide this thesis. This 
approach is methodologically sound. 
 
From the outset, this thesis was designed as a theoretical project in IECTE 
education; focused on textual analysis and hermeneutic fusion of diverse ideas 
into a coherent argument.  
 
Constructing ideal types to stand for complicated sets of ideas is another 
potential limitation insofar as some aspects of a theory are left out while others 
are accentuated (recalling that Weber (1949) called the ideal type a one-sided 
accentuation in any case). The criteria for inclusion and exclusion was the major 
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ideas of primary sources, however, arguments for how to know what is major 
or not were not possible given the philosophical assumptions used in this 
thesis. Comments like ‚this is more essential than that‛ would have created an 
inconsistency between the parts of this thesis. Rather, the ideas of theorists have 
been extracted from the original work and fused with the ideas of others to 
form groups of ideas that are were then used to analyse content and context. 
The possible limitation here is that the approach taken has not been exhaustive 
enough, however, the claim of being exhaustive, a true representation of reality, 
and infallible was never made, and could not be given the philosophical 
assumptions used in this thesis.  
 
The final part of this thesis offered further reconceptualisation of IECTE 
programmes (in addition to using Rortyan assumptions and constructing 
structural dissonance as a critical concept) by creating a pedagogy of enacted 
hope and suggesting application to IECTE programmes. The greatest limitation 
of this approach is that at the end of the thesis enacted hope remains an 
abstraction. This is a limitation for those with an empirical bent. Of course the 
thesis argument would be much stronger with empirical evidence that the 
suggested programme actually works, but that would be a thesis in itself. The 
focus of this thesis has, from the outset, been theoretical construction. However, 
finishing with a theoretical construct in the context of this focus is not so much 
a limitation as the continuation of a theme.  
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A further possibility for study exists in the current trend toward online and 
distance learning tuition. This is interesting because of the heightened degree of 
individualisation in programmes where the sociocultural elements of coming 
together in a shared physical space to learn a common subject matter are 
missing. It might be possible to see that structural dissonance is particularly 
poignant in these courses. That, however, will remain to be seen. 
 
Final summary 
This thesis has constructed the concept of structural dissonance as a critical tool 
for understanding IECTE programmes. It has used Rortyan assumptions 
throughout in order to ensure coherence and consistency between chapters and 
parts. Ideal types for socioculturalism and individualisation have been 
constructed and used to ainterpret the content and context of IECTE 
programmes. An ecological hermeneutic was been constructed to organise that 
analysis, and hermeneutic methods have been used to highlight structural 
dissonance in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New Zealand as a result. Finally 
a pedagogy of enacted hope has been constructed and suggested as a way to 
counter act structural dissonance in IECTE programmes in Aotearoa/New 
Zealand. 
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Appendix A 
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Appendix B 
(VUW letterhead) 
Participant Information Sheet for Focus Group Study. 
 
Researcher: Bradley Hannigan: School of Education Studies, VUW. 
 
I am a PhD candidate at Victoria University of Wellington. I have previously been a tutor 
and lecturer in Early Childhood Education but no longer work in these roles. My PhD 
thesis studies the influence of individualisation in initial early childhood teacher education. 
I am assuming that individualisation, as a social process, exists in the practice of initial 
early childhood teacher education. Individualisation is a social process that reinforces 
individualism in institutions. Social theorists describe individualisation as a process that 
erodes citizenship. My research asks the question to what extent does individualisation 
influence initial early childhood teacher education in Aotearoa/New Zealand? 
 
As part of my research I am inviting second and third year early childhood teacher 
education students to take part in focus groups to discuss their experiences in educational 
programmes. These focus groups will be audio taped, transcribed, and analysed to find out 
if individualising processes are referred to either directly or indirectly (that is, by referring 
to individualising processes by name, or using a language that is synonymous with 
individualisation). 
 
I envisage that the focus groups will take around one hour, and depending on the number 
of interested respondents, there may be more than one focus group running. Focus groups 
will be held at the XXX Campus at a time convenient to participants (outside class time). 
 
Participation in the focus groups will be confidential and will be reported in several of the 
chapters of my PhD thesis. All material collected will be kept confidential and no persons 
other than myself and my supervisors (Dr. Jim Neyland and Asso. Prof. Carmen Dalli) will 
hear or view the data collected. No names (other than pseudonyms) will be used at 
anytime in the research.  
 
The thesis will be submitted for marking to the School of Education Studies, Victoria 
University of Wellington in 2010 and deposited in the University library thereafter. Tapes 
and transcripts will be destroyed seven years after the completion of this project. Findings 
from this research may be published in academic journals or presented at conferences. You 
may receive a summary report of findings for your verification if this is your wish (please 
indicate on the consent form). You may withdraw your input at any time prior to your 
verification of the research report. Your participation in this project is independent of your 
course work and in no way has a bearing on your assessment. 
 
For further information you may contact: 
Bradley Hannigan (peacenow@paradise.net.nz) Ph (03) 5248737 
Jim Neyland (jim.neyland@vuw.ac.nz) Ph (04) 463 5977 
Carmen Dalli (carmen.dalli@vuw.ac.nz) Ph (04) 463 5168 
 
Bradley Hannigan, PhD Candidate, VUW. 
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(VUW header) 
 
Consent to Participation in Research 
 
Researcher: Bradley Hannigan, PhD candidate, Victoria University of Wellington. 
 
(Please circle Y yes or N no as is appropriate). 
 
I have been given and have understood an explanation of this research project. Y / N 
 
I have had an opportunity to ask questions and have had them answered to my 
satisfaction. Y / N 
 
I understand that I may withdraw my self from this project at any time (or any of the 
information that I have provided) before data collection and analysis has been verified, 
without any need for explanation or detriment to my self or my course of study. Y / N 
 
I understand that all information I provide will be confidential and that my name will 
not be recorded or appear in any publication. Y / N 
 
I understand that audio recordings and transcripts will be destroyed at the completion 
of the project. Y / N 
 
I understand that I will have access to the group transcripts, for verification of content 
and analysis, before the thesis is submitted for assessment. Y / N 
 
I understand that the data I provide will be reported in the researcher’s PhD thesis, 
appropriate academic journals and at conferences. Y / N 
 
I undertake to respect the opinions expressed by others in the group and their right to 
confidentiality.  Y / N  
 
I would like to receive a summary of the results of this research when it is completed.    
Y / N     (My contact address is <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< 
      <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<...) 
 
 
I ___________________________________________ agree/disagree to take part in this 
research. I have understood the terms and conditions set out above, and I have given 
my agreement of my own free will and without any form of duress. 
 
 
Signed:         Date: 
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